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ABSTRACT 
 
On 4 April 1949, NATO was founded with the ultimate objective to combat the Soviet 
Union’s aggression. Turkey and Greece were arguably ‘victims’ that suffered from the 
Soviet Union’s aggression, but they still were not considered as appropriate NATO 
members. Neither Greece nor Turkey were considered to be in Western Europe nor in 
the Atlantic; and both were considered by Britain that they should be included in a 
Mediterranean pact. Turkey and Greece were eventually accepted by Britain into NATO 
because of the MEC plan. This study will expound the British Foreign Office’s 
perspective with regards to the admission of Turkey and Greece to NATO. The prime 
objective of this research is to identify their rejection and acceptance of the Foreign 
Office from the angle that has received less attention from other researchers. This 
thesis has focused on the significant perspective of the Foreign Office through the 
methodology of British primary historical resources. The study of these resources has 
found Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin wanted to have NATO swiftly formed, and the 
Cyprus issue between Turkey and Greece also encouraged him to not consider Turkey 
and Greece as eligible to be invited to join NATO. After NATO was successfully 
established, the Cyprus issue remained one of Britain’s reasons to continue its 
opposition towards these countries’ admission into NATO. Britain used the MEC as a 
means to prevent Turkish and Greek membership of NATO. However, due to the 
difficulties in creating the MEC, the new Foreign Secretary, Herbert Morrison, 
eventually agreed to allow Turkey and Greece to join NATO. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is an intergovernmental military alliance 
which was formed on 4 April 1949 in Washington D.C. The twelve original countries 
were the United States, Britain, Canada, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, 
Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Portugal and Italy. The Treaty required these countries to 
‘consult each other whenever the territorial or political integrity of one of their number 
was threatened, to regard an actual attack on a member as an attack on all of them and 
to collectively develop their joint capacity to resist such an attack.’1 This decree is stated 
in Article 5 of the Treaty and specifies that each member is expected to maintain the 
security of the North Atlantic area from outside aggression.2 
 
NATO’s responsibility for defence and security matters was seen by its members as the 
best mechanism to resist the expansion of the Soviet Union’s power and Communist 
ideology in the post-Second World War era. It is worth mentioning that there are two 
distinct groups with different types of NATO membership. The first consists of the seven 
founding countries that initially formed NATO: The United States, Britain, Canada, 
France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg.3 The second group consists of those 
                                                 
1
 Mark Smith, NATO Enlargement during the Cold War: Strategy and System in the Western Alliance (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), p. 11. 
2
 See André de Staercke, et al (eds.), NATO’s Anxious Birth: The Prophetic Vision of the 1940s (London: C. 
Hurst & Company, 1985), pp. 184; Lord Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years, 1949-1954 ([s.l]: N.A.T.O., 
1954), p. 18. 
3
 Foreign Relations of the United States [hereafter FRUS], 1948, Western Europe, Vol. III (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948), p. 225, Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning 
Staff (Kennan) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett), 31 August 1948. 
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countries that were invited to join NATO. Some, such as Portugal and Iceland,4 were 
invited because it was believed they would be an asset to NATO. In the case of Norway, 
Denmark and Italy,5 the invitation to join was motivated by the fact that these countries 
had been threatened, or had the potential to be threatened, by the Soviet Union. On 
these grounds, it would have been logical for Greece and Turkey to also have been 
invited to join. These two countries were arguably “victims” that faced Soviet 
aggression in the early Cold War period, the same ‘enemy’ faced by all NATO members. 
 
Soviet intervention in Greece and demands on Turkey triggered the outbreak of the 
Greek Civil War (1946-1949) and the Turkish Straits crisis (1946-1953). Although the 
extent of Soviet interference in the early years of the Greek Civil War was unclear, the 
British Foreign Office believed the Soviets were the true masterminds behind the war. 
In Turkey, the Soviet Union demanded that the Black Sea Straits settlements, the 
Montreux Treaty of 1936, be revised in conjunction with its territorial claim over the 
provinces of Kars and Ardahan, in eastern Turkey. With regard to the Straits, the Soviet 
Union wanted the same usage rights as Turkey, as well as a naval base on the 
Bosphorus or in the Dardanelles.6 The territorial concessions from Turkey concerning 
Kars and Ardahan would have given the Soviet Union effective control over both of the 
                                                 
4
 TNA, FO 371/73075/Z 6948/2307/72/G, ‘Security talks: question of Inclusion of Italy in Western 
European and North Atlantic Pact’, From Washington to Foreign Office, 26 August 1948; FRUS, 1948, 
Western Europe, Vol. III, p. 211, Memorandum of the Ninth Meeting of the Working Group Participating 
in the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, 9 August 1948. See also Theodore C. Achilles, ‘US Role in 
Negotiations that Led to Atlantic Alliance, Part 2’, NATO Review, 27:5 (1979), 16-19 (p. 16); Escott Reid, 
Time of Fear and Hope: The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty, 1947-1949 (Toronto: McClelland and 
Steward, 1977), pp. 193-212. 
5
 See Kew, The National Archives [hereafter TNA], FO 371/68067/AN 1276/1195/45/G, ‘Atlantic Security 
Talks: First meeting of Group, 22 to 24 March 1948’, From Washington to Foreign Office, 22 March 1948; 
FRUS, 1948, Western Europe, Vol. III, pp. 60-51, Minutes of the First Meeting of the United States-United 
Kingdom-Canada Security Conversations, ‘Security Information’, 22 March 1948. 
6
 See Barry Rubin, The Great Powers in the Middle East 1941-1947: The Road to the Cold War (London: 
Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1980), pp. 191-219. 
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Turkish Straits.7 As a result of these developments in Greece and Turkey, it appeared 
likely that these countries would be invited to join NATO when the West began its 
formation in late 1948 and early 1949. 
 
Nevertheless Britain, one of NATO’s prominent founding countries, resolutely refused 
to invite Greece and Turkey to join NATO. Britain’s rejection was initiated by Foreign 
Secretary Ernest Bevin and the Foreign Office. It was a surprising decision, considering 
that British strategic interests in the Mediterranean and the Middle East depended on 
these two countries not being conquered by an outside power, especially the Soviet 
Union. It had been for this reason that Britain sought the help of the United States State 
Department when, in early 1947, it could no longer assist Greece and Turkey in facing 
the Soviet threat due to domestic economic difficulties. As a result, the first American 
containment policy, the Truman Doctrine, was introduced in March 1947, followed by 
the Marshall Plan in June 1947 and NATO in April 1949. Two years after NATO was 
formed, the new Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison and the Foreign Office 
reconsidered Britain’s decision regarding Greece and Turkey’s NATO membership. At 
first, Britain agreed to grant associate membership to Greece and Turkey, but 
eventually Britain gave its permission for both countries to be accepted as full NATO 
members. Greece and Turkey officially entered NATO on 18 February 1952. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 See John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin, 2005), p. 28. 
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Research question and objectives 
 
This dissertation aims to identify Britain’s perspective, specifically that of the Foreign 
Office and Foreign Secretaries Ernest Bevin and Herbert Morrison, towards the 
admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO during the early Cold War period, 1947 to 
1952. Further, it seeks to understand the shift in opinion concerning their membership 
that occurred in 1951. 
 
Given that, thus far, most research on the admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO has 
focused on the involvement of the United States, this thesis seeks instead to shed light 
on Britain’s involvement. In viewing the United States as the dominant power in 
determining Greek and Turkish membership of NATO, other factors unrelated to the 
Cold War that impacted their admission remain overlooked. Increasing tensions 
between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus were equally important, as was Foreign 
Secretary Morrison’s inexperience in and ignorance of issues concerning Greece, 
Turkey, Cyprus and NATO. Morrison’s lack of expertise in foreign affairs led him to 
accept the accession of Greece and Turkey into NATO less than three months after he 
succeeded Bevin. In order to understand how the issue of Cyprus impacted Greek and 
Turkish membership of NATO before 1951, and how Morrison’s role in the Foreign 
Office contributed to Greece and Turkey’s eventual acceptance into NATO, both must 
be examined from the perspective of the British Foreign Office. At the time of the 
dispute, Cyprus was still a British Crown Colony, and Foreign Secretary Bevin and 
Foreign Secretary Morrison were the key decision makers determining the timing and 
the grounds for the inclusion of Greece and Turkey into NATO. 
14 
 
 
In researching this question, this study will give a full account of the admission of 
Greece and Turkey into NATO and will demonstrate Britain’s significant contribution in 
ensuring the prompt and successful formation of NATO. Many historians, such as 
Lawrence S. Kaplan and Timothy P. Ireland, believe that the United States was the most 
influential power behind the rejection, and later acceptance, of Greek and Turkish 
membership in NATO.8 However, this dissertation will reveal two important elements 
that influenced Foreign Secretary Bevin in his decision not to invite Greece and Turkey 
to join NATO at the outset, which have received less attention from historians. First, the 
United States was initially hesitant about forming NATO and delayed its progress. 
Second, NATO membership became a complicated matter that caused further delays in 
the ratification of the Treaty. Ultimately, Bevin was more focused on speed than 
strategy and decided not to press for Greek and Turkish NATO membership, despite 
British strategic interests in both countries, because of the delay their entry might have 
brought to the organisation’s formation. 
 
Furthermore, this dissertation will present new insights regarding the British Foreign 
Office and its role in the admission of Greece and Turkey into NATO by concentrating on 
Bevin and Morrison’s distinctive diplomatic tactics in handling these issues. Although 
the admission of Greece and Turkey happened during the tense period of the early Cold 
War, both the Cyprus issue and the differences between the two foreign secretaries 
were unrelated to the Cold War. While this dissertation recognises the importance of 
                                                 
8
 Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO 1948: The Birth of the Transatlantic Alliance (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2007); Timothy P. Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (London: Aldwych Press, 1981). 
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the Cold War, both in global politics and in the formation of NATO, it argues that local 
dynamics – both within Britain and within Greece and Turkey – have been largely 
overlooked in understanding why these two countries were not initially invited to join.  
 
This research has four objectives. The first is to reflect on British foreign policy towards 
Greece and Turkey at a time when Britain was suffering economic depression in the 
years immediately following the Second World War. A detailed account of these policies 
shows the importance of Greece and Turkey in relation to Britain’s position in the 
Middle East and demonstrates why Britain sought help from the United States to 
prevent these countries from being penetrated by the Soviet Union. In light of the 
importance of Greece and Turkey to Britain, it was therefore surprising that the British 
Foreign Office decided to reject their admission into NATO. 
 
This relates to the second objective of the dissertation: to identify why Britain, 
specifically Bevin and the Foreign Office, was reluctant to invite Greece and Turkey to 
join NATO during its formative years. Previous studies have cited the geographical 
issues of these two countries – namely that both were located outside the Atlantic 
region - and the British proposals for a Mediterranean defence pact as key reasons for 
this reluctance. However, this study will focus on the delays faced during the 
negotiation years. It will be argued that these delays obstructed Bevin’s ambition to 
form NATO swiftly and contributed to his decision not to invite Greece and Turkey to 
become original NATO members. At this time, Greece and Turkey were in dispute over 
Cyprus, which soured the relationship between the two countries. Bevin, therefore, 
16 
 
believed encouraging these countries to join NATO might have brought about further 
delays in NATO’s formation. 
 
The third objective is to identify additional reasons for Bevin and the Foreign Office’s 
reluctance to allow Greece and Turkey to join NATO after its formation in April 1949. 
While Britain’s aim to include Turkey in the Middle East Command (MEC) – a regional 
defence pact proposed by the British - was a factor which has been outlined in previous 
studies, this study reveals the extent to which Bevin and the Foreign Office’s resistance 
to Greek and Turkish NATO membership was influenced by the Cyprus issue. 
 
The fourth objective is to identify the reasons for the new Foreign Secretary Morrison 
and the Foreign Office’s eventual acceptance of Greece and Turkey as NATO members 
in 1951. The MEC was a key reason for Morrison’s change of stance over Greece and 
Turkey’s full NATO membership. Through this objective, this dissertation will reveal 
external as well as internal factors at play in Greece and Turkey’s acceptance into NATO, 
particularly in relation to Morrison’s inexperience in handling foreign affairs such as the 
MEC and his limited understanding of issues concerning relations between Turkey, 
Greece and Cyprus and the impact of this on NATO. 
 
Through these research objectives, this dissertation will provide an original analysis of 
the influence of Foreign Secretaries Bevin and Morrison on Greek and Turkish NATO 
membership. This research will demonstrate that Greece and Turkey were not included 
in NATO, either before or after its formation, because Bevin strongly believed that a 
conflict between them over Cyprus would delay the formation of NATO and affect its 
17 
 
stability. It was ultimately Morrison, Bevin’s successor, who decided to accept Greece 
and Turkey as new NATO members after less than three months in office. 
 
Literature review 
 
NATO was formed in the context of the early Cold War and it was clear that a key aim of 
NATO was to deter the Soviet Union and Communism. This underlying premise was 
embraced by traditionalist historians, who claimed that the policy of the Soviet Union 
during the post-Second World War period was aggressive and that it was natural for the 
United States to react to this aggression by forming NATO.9 However, revisionist 
historians argued that Soviet policy in the post-war era was defensive and it was the 
failure of the United States to recognise this, aggravated by the provocative NATO 
military alliance, which brought about an avoidable Cold War.10 Post-revisionists, on the 
other hand, place blame squarely on both sides.11 They argue that the United States’ 
                                                 
9
 This interpretation was advanced in the memoirs of participants and the writings of the majority of 
contemporary commentators and historians until the 1960s. Prominent examples are Harry S. Truman, 
Memoirs by Harry S. Truman, Volume 1: Year of Decisions (New York: Doubleday & Company Inc., 1955); 
Harry S. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman, Volume 2: Years of Trial and Hope, 1946-1953 (Suffolk: 
Hodder and Stoughton Ltd., 1956); Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State 
Department (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1970). 
10
 Peter G. Boyle, ‘America’s Hesitant Road to NATO, 1945-49’, in The Origins of NATO, ed. by Joseph 
Smith (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1990), pp. 65-81 (pp. 69-72). The revisionist view was 
propounded by contemporary dissidents such as Henry Wallace and by New Left historians of the 1960s. 
For examples see John M. Blum (ed.), The Price of Vision: The Diary of Henry A. Wallace, 1942-46 (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1973); Denna F. Fleming, The Cold War and its Origins, 1917-60 (London: Allen & Unwin 
Ltd., 1961); Lloyd C. Gardner, Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941-1949 
(Chicago: Quadrangle, 1972); Gabriel Kolko and Joyce Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United 
States Foreign Policy, 1945-54 (New York: Harper & Row, 1972). 
11
 The post-revisionist scholars included John L. Gaddis, ‘The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the 
Origins of the Cold War’, Diplomatic History, 7:3 (1983), 171-190 (p. 172); J. Samuel Walker, ‘Historians 
and Cold War Origins: The New Consensus’, in American Foreign Relations: A Historiographical Review, 
eds. by Gerald K. Haines and J. Samuel Walker (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood, 1981), pp. 207-236; 
Geoffrey Smith, ‘Harry, We Hardly Know You’: Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945-1954, American 
Political Science Review, 70:2 (1976), 560-582; Geir Lundestad, America, Scandinavia, and the Cold War, 
1945-1949: Expansion and Its Limitation in US Foreign Policy, 1945-1959 (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1980); John L. Gaddis, We Know Now: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997). 
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nuclear arms race gave Stalin, then leader of the Soviet Union, an understandable 
reason to be paranoid and provoked him to react by expanding Soviet power and 
ideology.12 Post-revisionists add that the United States countered this Soviet 
encroachment by implementing a policy of containment, which included the creation of 
NATO. 
 
It is worth emphasising here that the traditionalists, revisionists, and post-revisionists all 
employ a bipolar analysis, focused on the Soviet Union and the United States, to explain 
the genesis of the Cold War and NATO. In recent years, however, the opening of British 
archives relating to the post-war period has allowed the British perspective, also known 
as the British school, to be added to Cold War historiography. Scholars of the British 
school posit that Britain played a significant role in provoking Cold War tensions 
between the Soviet Union and the United States.13 This approach was regarded as a 
form of depolarisation, meaning the Cold War was ‘no longer seen simply as a conflict 
between the United States and the Soviet Union.’14 With its poor economic and military 
                                                 
12
 See David Holloway, ‘Stalin and the Bomb’, in Origins of the Cold War: An International History, eds. by 
Melvyn P. Leffler and David S. Painter (New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2005), pp. 72-90 (p. 
73). 
13
 Robert Frazier, ‘Did Britain Start the Cold War? Bevin and the Truman Doctrine’, Historical Journal, 27:3 
(1984), 715-727; Victor Rothwell, Britain and the Cold War 1941-1947 (London: Jonathan Cape Ltd., 
1982); William C. Cromwell, ‘The Marshall Plan, Britain and the Cold War’, Review of International Studies, 
8:4 (1982), 233-249; John Kent, ‘British Policy and the Origins of the Cold War’, in Origins of the Cold War: 
An International History, eds. by Melvyn P. Leffler and David S. Painter (New York: Routledge, Taylor & 
Francis Group, 1994), pp. 155-166; Anne Deighton, The Impossible Peace: Britain, the Division of Germany 
and the Origins of the Cold War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990); Jamil Hasanli, Stalin and the Turkish 
Crisis of the Cold War, 1945-1953 (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2013). 
14
 Bert Zeeman, ‘Britain and the Cold War: An Alternative Approach. The Treaty of Dunkirk Example’, 
European History Quarterly, 16:3 (1986), 343-367 (p. 346). The British school scholars included Michael L. 
Dockrill and Michael F. Hopkins, The Cold War 1945-91 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Michael L. 
Dockrill and Michael F. Hopkins, British Foreign Policy, 1945-56 (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1989); 
Anne Deighton, Britain and the Cold War (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990); John A. Lukacs, New 
History of the Cold War (New York: Doubleday & Company Inc., 1966); John W. Young, France, the Cold 
War and the Western Alliance, 1944-1949: French Foreign Policy and Post-war Europe (Leicester: 
Leicester University Press, 1990); Sean Greenwood, ‘Anglo-French Relations and the Origins of the Treaty 
Dunkirk’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of London, 1982); Wm. Roger Louis, The British Empire 
19 
 
circumstances, as well as a growing concern over the expansion of Soviet power to 
areas significant to Britain such as Western Europe, the Eastern Mediterranean and the 
Middle East, Britain, and specifically the Foreign Office, turned to the United States for 
support in retaining its influence in those areas.15 The British Foreign Office’s strategic 
plan inadvertently brought the United States into a hostile situation with the Soviet 
Union, which later resulted in the Cold War and the establishment of NATO. Although 
traditionalists, revisionists, post-revisionists and the British school have their own 
perspectives on who caused the Cold War, it would be accurate to conclude that these 
schools of thought all view the genesis of NATO within the context of the Cold War. 
 
Literature on the origins of NATO demonstrates that the United States and Britain 
played significant roles in establishing this new military alliance.16 However, some 
scholars, such as Peter Foot and Lawrence A. Kaplan, saw the United States’ role as 
more dominant than that of Britain. This was due to the fact that the United States 
initiated the negotiations and was seen as a superpower due to its economic stability 
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and the strength of its military forces.17 The United States’ role in determining which 
countries were eligible to join NATO during its negotiation years has, therefore, been 
reviewed in depth.  
 
The same tendency was reflected in literature on the admission of Greece and Turkey 
to NATO, with historians such as Mark Smith, Alexandra Gheciu, Melvyn P. Leffler, 
George S. Harris, Bruce R. Kuniholm and Sydney N. Fisher discussing their admission 
from the point of view of the United States.18 In doing so, these scholars have neglected 
Britain’s perspective in their analyses and their works do not present a full account of 
Greece and Turkey’s admission to NATO. 
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A considerable amount of written material is available from the perspective of Britain 
on Greece and Turkey’s admission to NATO. This literature raises two key issues 
concerning the rejection, and later acceptance, of these two countries. On the issue of 
rejection, two distinguishing phases were noted: NATO’s formative years (1948-1949) 
and NATO’s years of expansion (1950-1951). Literature on the first phase of rejection 
demonstrates that Greece and Turkey’s geographical location was a primary factor in 
the decision of NATO’s founding countries to omit them from the organisation. Ekavi 
Athannassopoulou and Abdulkadir Baharçiçek assert that Greece and Turkey were seen 
as too far from the Atlantic and thus unfit to be included in Western Europe.19 
According to George C. McGhee, NATO’s founding countries had focused only on the 
North Atlantic region when discussing membership, which led Greece and Turkey to be 
excluded from NATO.20 These scholars have also argued that Foreign Secretary Bevin 
and the Foreign Office would have preferred to include Greece and Turkey in a 
Mediterranean pact rather than in NATO.21 This matter became a key factor that 
influenced their rejection of Greece and Turkey’s NATO membership between 1948 and 
1949.  
 
The aforementioned scholars, however, have not considered another influential reason 
for Bevin and the Foreign Office’s decision to leave Greece and Turkey outside NATO: 
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Bevin’s desire to form NATO swiftly at a time when tensions had increased between 
Greece and Turkey over Cyprus. Historians have largely ignored the Cyprus dispute 
between Greece and Turkey and how this affected these countries’ NATO membership. 
That this dispute took place in isolation of Cold War considerations and was the result 
of local dynamics between Greece and Turkey thus provides new contribution to the 
existing literature. 
 
Literature on the second phase of rejection, from 1950 to 1951, illustrates that the 
geography of Greece and Turkey remained a major factor influencing Britain’s refusal to 
enlarge NATO. Britain argued that Greece and Turkey’s Mediterranean location would 
ruin the Atlantic community of existing NATO members.22 In addition to this 
geographical concern, Athannassopoulou and Behçet K. Yeşilbursa demonstrate that 
Britain also refused to enlarge the organisation due to strong opposition from many 
smaller NATO members, such as Norway and Denmark, to any extensions in their 
obligation to go to war against the Soviet Union.23 Britain took this opportunity to justify 
its decision to keep Greece and Turkey outside NATO.  
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Further research regarding Bevin and the Foreign Office has been done by S. Victor 
Papacosma, Athannassopoulou, Yeşilbursa, Dionysios Chourchoulis and Mehmet 
Gonlubol. They unanimously agree that Bevin and the Foreign Office’s aim to include 
Turkey in the MEC project was the most prominent reason for the decision to rebuff 
Turkey’s requests for NATO membership in May and August 1950.24 These historians, 
however, overlook three important factors relating to the MEC. The first is that neither 
Turkey nor Greece had been considered as potential members during the two attempts 
to formulate the MEC undertaken by the British Foreign Office and the Egyptian 
government in 1946 and early 1950. Secondly, it was only decided that Turkey should 
be included in the MEC after it requested membership of NATO, in early May 1950. 
Thirdly only Turkey, not Greece, was confirmed to be included in the MEC in late May 
1950. In this way, the MEC was merely used as a means to keep Turkey and its security 
partner, Greece, outside NATO, while tensions over Cyprus were the underlying cause 
of their exclusion. 
 
Historians such as Chourchoulis, Papacosma, Kuniholm, Gonlubol, McGhee, Harris and 
Fisher have discussed Greece and Turkey’s dispute over Cyprus in their works.25 
However, they focus only on the Cyprus problem in the period after Greece and Turkey 
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became NATO members (in particular the 1955 Cyprus Emergency in which Greek and 
Turkish Cypriot factions clashed with British forces).26 In addition, these historians focus 
on how this issue threatened the stability of NATO’s southern flank, rather than seeing 
the discord between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus as a reason for Britain’s rejection 
of their NATO membership before 1951. Even though the root of the Cyprus conflict can 
be traced to 1925, the year Cyprus was declared a British Crown Colony, and worsened 
in the 1940s, the conflict’s impact on Greece and Turkey’s admission into NATO has 
received little attention from historians. 
 
The second key issue in the literature on Greece and Turkey’s admission into NATO is 
the matter of acceptance. Historians have unanimously agreed that the MEC project 
was the dominant reason influencing Britain to accept Greece and Turkey as part of an 
enlarged NATO in May 1951. Scholars such as Gonlubol stated that Britain withdrew its 
opposition towards Turkish NATO membership once it received word that Turkey would 
play a leading role in the establishment of the MEC project.27 However, Britain did not 
execute this decision promptly: while the MEC was being formed between 1950 and 
1952, opposition to Turkish NATO membership continued. According to Yeşilbursa, 
Britain was blackmailed by the United States, which would only consider committing to 
the MEC if Britain agreed to accept Turkey as a new NATO member.28 Chourchoulis, 
Athannassopoulou, Geoffrey Lewis and Papacosma also argue that when Britain saw 
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that the MEC project was not progressing, but was unable to find a solution, it 
eventually yielded to the United States’ pressure and accepted Turkey as part of an 
enlarged NATO.29 These historians have not considered internal British factors, in 
particular the inexperience of the new Foreign Secretary Morrison and how this 
influenced Britain to accept Greece and Turkey into NATO. This internal factor existed 
independently of the Cold War question.  
 
To conclude, previous scholars have generally approached Greece and Turkey’s 
admission to NATO from the point of view of the United States and the wider Cold War. 
Historians who have researched their admission from the perspective of the British 
Foreign Office seem to have overlooked several interrelated factors that occurred 
during the period. Interestingly, these neglected issues largely existed independently of 
the Cold War question. This study therefore fills this gap in the literature and presents a 
comprehensive analysis of the British Foreign Office’s decision-making regarding the 
admission of Greece and Turkey into NATO by moving beyond the question of the Cold 
War. This study demonstrates that the two British Foreign Secretaries, Bevin and 
Morrison, handled matters regarding the Greco-Turkish Cyprus issue and NATO 
differently. This difference in diplomacy brought a drastic change in Britain’s approach 
to the membership of Greece and Turkey to NATO between 1951 and 1952. 
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Methodology and sources 
 
This study is not about Greece and Turkey’s actions within NATO, but rather focuses on 
the British Foreign Office’s perspective towards and policies regarding the admission of 
Greece and Turkey into NATO. This study employs a qualitative method and the 
interpretation and analysis of British primary and secondary sources from the 
perspective of diplomatic history and policy-making. This dissertation employs the 
induction method, moving from specific observations based on empirical evidence to 
broader explanations, generalisations and theories. It begins with specific observations 
and measures on selected issues, formulates hypotheses that this study explores and 
ends by developing conclusions or theories. 
 
The archival material used in this study was retrieved from the UK National Archives, 
the British Library, as well as the Brotherton and Edward Boyle Libraries at the 
University of Leeds. Most of the primary materials are official letters, minutes of 
meetings and reports from Foreign Office officials concerning the issue of Greece and 
Turkey’s accession to NATO. Other archival sources, such as FRUS (Foreign Relations of 
the United States) and HANSARD (House of Commons Parliamentary Debate) were 
accessed online. Public sources, such as books, memoirs and newspapers written mostly 
by politicians, diplomats and officials of government departments, were of equal 
importance in understanding the issue at hand. Academic sources such as monographs 
and journal articles have also been used.  
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This dissertation combines a chronological and thematic approach. The chapters are 
arranged chronologically, beginning from the development of the Cold War in Greece 
and Turkey in 1945 and ending with Greece and Turkey officially joining NATO in 
February 1952. The content within each chapter is arranged thematically. This 
dissertation is divided into three main time periods. The first is the early years after the 
Second World War in the Eastern Mediterranean region as well as in Britain, from 1945 
until 1947. The second is the formative years of NATO, from 1948 until 1949. The third 
includes the years after NATO was established until Greece and Turkey officially became 
NATO members, from 1950 until 1952. 
 
This dissertation has four chapters. Chapter One examines British and American policies 
towards Greece and Turkey during the early period of the Cold War, from 1945 to 1947. 
This chapter illustrates that, during these years, Greece and Turkey were of great 
significance to British, and later US, strategic interests in the Mediterranean and the 
Middle East. The need to defend the security of these countries from the Soviet Union 
became a high priority for Britain. The significant value of Greece and Turkey to Britain 
was evident in that it was originally intended these countries would be part of NATO. 
Nevertheless, both countries were excluded from NATO. Chapter One justifies the main 
argument of this study: that Britain had reasons for not including Greece and Turkey in 
NATO, despite its strategic interests in both countries. 
 
Chapter Two demonstrates Britain’s motives for excluding Greece and Turkey from 
NATO during its formative years, 1948 to 1949. This chapter analyses the significant role 
played by Foreign Secretary Bevin during the negotiations and problems that delayed 
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the establishment of NATO. The chapter also introduces the concurrent situation in 
Cyprus, which led to the rapid deterioration of relations between Greece and Turkey. 
The intersection between these two issues consequently sheds light on Bevin’s decision 
to exclude Greece and Turkey from NATO membership. 
 
Chapter Three inspects Britain’s reasons for rejecting Turkish requests for membership 
of NATO in 1950 as they relate to the Cyprus issue. The chapter deals with Bevin and 
the Foreign Office’s second attempt to formulate the MEC with the Egyptian 
government in early 1950, after the failure of the first attempt in 1946. On both 
occasions, neither Greece nor Turkey were nominated as potential members. Only after 
the Turkish government requested NATO membership in early May 1950 did Bevin and 
the Foreign Office decide to include Turkey in the MEC. This chapter demonstrates that 
the MEC was merely a means of preventing Greece and Turkey from joining NATO. 
 
Chapter Four illustrates Britain’s refusal to extend NATO’s membership to include 
Greece and Turkey, during the period late 1949 to early 1951. This chapter analyses 
Bevin and the Foreign Office’s continued resistance to Greek and Turkish accession to 
NATO in light of their deteriorated relationship following disputes over Cyprus. Further, 
the chapter reveals Britain’s reason for accepting Greek and Turkish NATO membership, 
from 1951 to 1952. Despite issues regarding the southern flank of NATO and the MEC 
plan, this chapter argues it was the appointment of Morrison as the new Foreign 
Secretary that altered Britain’s decision to accept Greece and Turkey into NATO. This 
chapter details the differences between the two Foreign Secretaries, specifically in their 
attitude towards the MEC and Turkey’s refusal to participate in it. This chapter shows a 
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link between Britain’s change in standpoint over the admission of Greece and Turkey 
into NATO and the significant changes brought about by the new Foreign Secretary in 
March 1951. 
 
In summary, this study will argue that Foreign Secretary Bevin played a substantial role 
in ensuring Greece and Turkey remained outside NATO. During NATO’s negotiation 
years, he refused to invite these countries to join. He was also opposed to NATO 
enlargement, as demonstrated by the fact that he and the Foreign Office turned down 
Turkey’s requests for NATO membership in 1950. This study shows that Bevin’s 
decision-making, both before and after NATO was established, was influenced by the 
intense conflict between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus. Bevin worried that this 
discord would delay NATO’s formation and would harm the stability of NATO as a 
whole. Only after he left office did the Foreign Office, under Morrison, eventually 
accept Greece and Turkey’s NATO membership. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
The Eastern Mediterranean, the development of the Cold War and the Road to 
Containment: British and American Policy in Greece and Turkey, 1945-1949 
 
Introduction 
 
Historians writing on the origins of NATO have focused on Soviet aggression in Eastern 
Europe and Scandinavia, their hostile response to the Marshall Plan and their demand 
for a treaty of friendship with Norway, but very few have given attention to Soviet 
action in the Eastern Mediterranean.30 When focusing on the onset of the Cold War 
from the view of the British school, it can be argued that Soviet involvement in the 
Greek Civil War (1946-1949) and the Turkish Straits crisis (1946-1953) was a keystone in 
the creation of NATO in 1949. These crises drove the United States to abandon its 
isolationist foreign policy and begin intervening in the internal affairs of countries that 
were threatened, directly or indirectly, by the Soviet Union. This was known as 
containment.31 To prevent the spread of Communism worldwide, the US first provided 
economic aid to Greece and Turkey under the Truman Doctrine. The second part of the 
policy of containment was to rehabilitate the economies of all European nations under 
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the Marshall Plan. NATO was the third instalment. Yet, while crises in Greece and 
Turkey paved the way for NATO’s formation, nevertheless, both countries were 
excluded when this new military alliance was formed in 1949. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the historical conflict in the Eastern 
Mediterranean, specifically Greece and Turkey, as an important factor in the 
development of the Cold War and subsequently NATO. It examines the importance of 
Greece and Turkey as buffer countries in containing the expansion of Soviet influence in 
the Middle East. In detailing the significance of Greece and Turkey to the West, this 
chapter shows that both countries were important to British, Soviet and, increasingly, 
American strategy in the aftermath of the Second World War (1945 - 1948). It 
consequently raises the question as to why Britain later chose not to support Greece 
and Turkey’s membership in NATO, which will form the focus of the next two chapters. 
 
It is worth highlighting here that the Soviet Union’s aggression towards countries 
important to the West during the post-Second World War era was the key issue that 
shaped subsequent discussions of NATO membership between 1948 and early 1949. 
Given that Greece and Turkey were geostrategically valued by the West, and that these 
two countries were also early “victims” of Soviet aggression, it is puzzling that they were 
not invited to become NATO members. Literature concerning this rejection states that 
Britain excluded Greece and Turkey during NATO’s formation years due to a 
geographical issue; these countries were seen as being too far from the Atlantic.32 
Ultimately, these reasons would become invalid when Italy, a country equally far from 
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the Atlantic and that Britain was considering including in a Mediterranean pact, was 
invited to join NATO. The case of Italy demonstrates therefore that Britain had other 
reasons for not accepting Greece and Turkey into NATO, despite its strategic interest in 
both countries. 
 
In examining how Greece and Turkey became buffer countries for the West, this 
chapter explores their geostrategic importance to Britain and the Soviet Union, which 
led to the development of the early Cold War. It also roots Britain’s exclusion of Greece 
and Turkey from NATO in both domestic and international politics. Domestic economic 
disruption led Britain to seek aid from the United States to combat the Soviet threat in 
Greece and Turkey. British strategic interests in Greece and Turkey dragged the United 
States and the Soviet Union into a war of nerves immediately after the end of the 
Second World War. In order to understand the importance of Greece and Turkey to 
Britain, this chapter will elaborate on British policy towards both countries and the 
British understanding of the links between these policies. In analysing the struggle for 
power and the strategic interests of the ‘Northern Tier’33 in Greece and Turkey during 
this period, the latter part of this chapter will examine the formulation of American 
foreign policy in both countries and American understanding of the links between its 
Greek and Turkish policies. In the final part of this chapter, it will investigate the impact 
of these events on Anglo-American relations and the beginnings of NATO. 
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The geostrategic importance of independent Greece and Turkey, 1936-1945 
 
During the Second World War, Britain, the Soviet Union, and the Allies cooperated in 
the Eastern Mediterranean. The Soviets did not interfere when early signs of civil war in 
Greece appeared from 1942 to 1944 since, unlike other Balkan countries, Greece was of 
little interest to the Soviet Union at that time.34 The Soviets were also aware that Britain 
had an interest in Greece and, given Soviet-British collaboration in fighting Germany, it 
could be argued that the former respected the British sphere of influence in Greece. 
Later, in October 1944, Joseph Stalin, the Soviet Premier and Winston Churchill, the 
British Prime Minister, reached an understanding concerning the Balkan countries 
through the ‘Percentage Agreement.’ Under this agreement, Stalin accepted British 
“predominance” in Greece (90 per cent), while Churchill agreed to Soviet hegemony in 
Romania (90 per cent) and Bulgaria (75 per cent), while both would share Yugoslavia 
and Hungary on a 50-50 basis.35 It was as a result of this agreement that the Soviet 
Union refused to assist the Greek People’s Liberation Army (ELAS – Ellinikós Laïkós 
Apeleftherotikós Stratós) in their revolt against British control in Athens in December 
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1944. The Soviet Union firmly stated that ‘our Greek friends will not be able to count on 
active assistance from here *Moscow+.’36  
 
Soviet determination to keep Greek internal affairs at a distance continued until the 
Yalta Conference in February 1945. During a discussion between the Soviet Foreign 
Minister, Vyacheslav Molotov, and the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, 
concerning the principle of non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs, the 
former hastened to ‘repeat the word of comrade Stalin that he did not have in mind the 
position in Greece.’37 However, the Soviet position on Greece began to change by the 
time of the Potsdam Conference in August 1945. The Soviet Union had believed that, if 
the new democratic government led by the left-wing National Liberation Front (EAM – 
Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo) were to be formed, it would receive massive support 
from the Greek people. However, Britain helped the right-wing party, the Greek Royalist 
government, destroy the EAM and form an anti-communist government.38 This was 
arguably the turning point for the Soviet Union, which subsequently decided to ignore 
British predominance in Greece. 
 
In contrast, the Soviets had longstanding interests in Turkey and the Turkish Straits and 
a desire to change local dynamics. The Soviet Union had renounced the historical claims 
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of the Russian Empire to the territories of Western Armenia (Kars and Ardahan) and the 
Turkish Straits when the Soviet Union and Turkey signed the Treaty of Friendship and 
Neutrality in 1925.39 The Soviet Union, however, revived its interest in the Straits in July 
1936, after the Montreux Convention concluded that the Montreux Treaty of 1936 gave 
Turkey exclusive rights to regain control over the Straits, which included 
remilitarisation.40 The Dardanelles and Bosphorus straits were also important to the 
Soviet Union because they were the only gateways between the Black Sea and the 
Mediterranean. The straits were significant trade routes, as well as important 
components of Soviet military strategy in Turkey and its other Black Sea neighbours: 
Russia, Romania and Bulgaria, all three of which were militarily aligned.41 The Montreux 
Treaty of 1936 denied these three countries’ right to use the straits as an exit or entry 
point for naval forces traversing to and from the Black Sea. 
 
By the end of the Second World War, the Soviets wanted the Montreux Treaty of 1936 
to be revised to meet their needs. As such, they put heavy diplomatic and political 
pressure on Turkey over the settlement of the Black Sea Straits, a prospect which 
became all the more complicated when the Soviet government once again claimed the 
provinces of Kars and Ardahan in eastern Turkey. 
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The Eastern Mediterranean and the early Cold War, 1945-1949 
 
Consequently, the main reason Greece and Turkey became contentious countries for 
the West, particularly Britain and the Soviet Union, immediately after the Second World 
War was that both powers had the same strategic interests in the Mediterranean and 
the Middle East. Greece and Turkey, located to the north-east of the Mediterranean 
Sea, were highly valued by Britain because of their proximity to British lines of 
communication to the Eastern Empire. Further, they were seen as vital connecting 
routes linking Britain to their oil supplies in the Middle East.42 Greece and Turkey also 
possessed a number of important strategic bases that would benefit Britain in 
strengthening its security interests in the Mediterranean, the Eastern Empire and the 
Middle East.43 
 
Several months prior to the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union returned to 
the Straits issue with more demands, escalating tensions with Turkey. At the Yalta 
Conference in February 1945, Stalin formally raised the question of revising the 
Montreux Treaty of 1936 and suggested that the matter be considered by the 
American, British and Soviet foreign ministers.44 Stalin demanded a naval base at the 
Bosphorus or the Dardanelles and joint control of the Straits.45 In the following month, 
the Soviets denounced the 1925 Soviet-Turkish Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality. The 
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Soviet Union also decided not to renew the treaty when it expired, in November of the 
same year, unless Turkey agreed to its demands in the Straits and its claims over the 
provinces of Kars and Ardahan.46 
 
At the Potsdam Conference (July - August 1945), Stalin articulated these Soviet claims.47 
Churchill and the President of the United States, Harry S. Truman, agreed with the 
Soviets’ demand that the Dardanelles and Bosphorus straits should always be opened to 
the warships of the Black Sea countries and should remain closed to those of foreign 
powers.48 However, they also supported the Turkish government in rejecting Soviet 
demands; in particular that the Soviet Union should be allowed to join in the defence of 
the straits and the demand for Soviet naval bases in the Dardanelles.49 The United 
States worried that the Soviet demand for bases in the Dardanelles might be a ruse for 
the eventual projection of Soviet power into the Eastern Mediterranean and the Near 
East.50 Regarding the territorial claim on Turkey, both Truman and Churchill felt that the 
Soviets went too far, given that the conference protocol concerning the Black Sea straits 
was restricted only to the straits issue.51  
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Soviet claims on Turkey developed into demands when, on 7 August 1946, the Soviet 
Union sent a diplomatic note to Turkey concerning the revision of the Montreux Treaty. 
This led to the Turkish Straits crisis of 1946. The diplomatic note concluded that 
Turkey’s management of the straits was no longer reliable and posed a threat to the 
security interests of its fellow Black Sea countries. The Soviets therefore called for a 
multilateral conference to revise the Montreux Treaty.52 As a result of this crisis, Turkey 
sought aid from the West. In March 1947, Turkey received American economic 
assistance under the Truman Doctrine, the first step in US containment policy.  
 
At the Allied conference in Moscow in December 1945, the Soviet Union turned to its 
other Eastern Mediterranean concern, Greece. The Soviet Union ended its non-
interference in Greek internal affairs by demanding the withdrawal of British forces 
from Greece. Roberts notes that this demand ‘was partly a tactical stance designed to 
counter Western demands for Soviet troop withdrawals from other countries, including 
Iran.’53 In the months after the Moscow conference, a civil war erupted in Greece. 
Although there was no overt interference by the Soviet Union in the Greek Civil War, 
the Western powers, especially Britain and the United States, were conscious of the 
Soviet Union’s policy in Eastern Europe ‘to ensure that the countries which bordered 
the Soviet Union did not have anti-Soviet governments.’54 London and Washington 
‘believed Moscow would welcome a communist-controlled Greece if, as seemed likely, 
the Royalist government collapsed.’55 Therefore, these Western powers believed that 
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the Soviet Union had instructed its satellite countries to assist the communist 
insurgents in Greece. 
 
The Soviet Union’s expansionist policies and its need for warm-water ports clashed with 
Britain’s need to maintain its line of communication through the Eastern Mediterranean 
to India and its desire to protect a vast area which stretched eastward from the Persian 
Gulf.56 The Soviet Union’s ambition to seek a dominant position in South Eastern Europe 
in order to enhance its own security led it to include Greece and Turkey in its sphere of 
interest, alongside other Balkan countries.57 The Soviet Union also hoped to gain 
additional bases in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean,58 making Greece and Turkey 
favourable choices. It was this overlap of strategic interests in Greece and Turkey that 
drove Britain and the Soviet Union, two former members of the Grand Alliance, into a 
war of nerves after the Second World War. 
 
British reactions to Soviet interest in Greece and Turkey, 1945-1947 
 
Developments in Greek and Turkish internal affairs in the early post-Second World War 
period alarmed Britain, specifically Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin and the Chiefs of 
Staff (hereafter COS). This was because these circumstances raised the prospect of 
greater Soviet influence in the Mediterranean. Britain also believed the next Soviet 
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target would be the Middle East, a region dominated by Britain since the defeat of the 
Ottoman Empire in World War One. Bevin spoke in a Cabinet meeting in March 1946 
about the possible danger to the British if the Soviet Union managed to take control in 
the Mediterranean, explaining: 
 
Our presence in the Mediterranean serves a purpose which is vital to our 
position as a Great Power. The Mediterranean is the area through which 
we bring influence to bear on southern Europe, the soft under-belly of 
France, Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey. Without our physical 
presence in the Mediterranean, we should cut little ice in those states 
which would fall, like eastern Europe, under the totalitarian yoke. We 
should also lose our position in the Middle East (including Iraqi oil, now 
one of our greatest assets), even if we could afford to let Egypt go. If we 
move out, Russia will move in and the Mediterranean countries from the 
point of view of commerce and trade, economy and democracy would be 
finished.59 
 
The Middle East was of great importance to Britain because it possessed the largest oil 
reserves in the world and the availability of strategic bases for military facilities.60 
Unfortunately for Britain, the Soviet Union also had the same strategic interests in the 
Middle East. Working Paper No. 15, which was produced from the Russian archives, 
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disclosed that Western Allies’ activities in the Middle East had stimulated Soviet 
interests in the same area.61 This can explain the Soviets’ determination to compete for 
the rights to possess the new-found oil fields in the Middle East.62 
 
British policymakers normally took the Middle East into consideration when discussing 
British policy concerning Greece and Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean. This was due 
to the geographical location of Greece and Turkey, being in close proximity to the 
Middle East. For instance, Kars and Ardahan, provinces claimed by the Soviets from 
Turkey for security purposes, were also strategic routes to break through Turkish land 
into oil-rich Iraq.63 The COS therefore anticipated that if Greece and Turkey fell under 
the domination of the Soviet Union, it would also affect the Middle East region and vice 
versa.64 The COS’ prediction echoed Bevin’s review of the situation in Turkey, which was 
currently being pressured by the Soviet Union: 
 
Turkey presents a natural barrier to a Soviet advance to the Middle East 
and the Eastern Mediterranean. If the Soviet Union were ever to 
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dominate Turkey, the other Middle East States would become 
progressively subservient to the Soviet Union and our ability to defend 
the Middle East would be gravely prejudiced.65 
 
The COS and Bevin believed that an increase in Soviet power in Greece and Turkey 
could seriously endanger British communication networks and oil supplies. Should war 
break out against the Soviet Union, strategic air offensives would also be under threat 
of being conquered by the Soviets.66 In order to secure British strategic interests in the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East, Britain undoubtedly needed to protect Greece and 
Turkey from being overwhelmed by Soviet influence and power, or worse, being 
converted into Soviet satellite countries. The United States, a new superpower in 
Mediterranean and Middle Eastern security affairs, also agreed that Greece and Turkey, 
together with Iran, were strategically important as barrier countries preventing the 
Soviet Union from entering the Middle East.67 Britain, and later the United States, 
therefore assisted Greece and Turkey by formulating and implementing policies that 
could help both countries to combat the Soviet threat. 
 
Britain’s Prime Minister, Clement Attlee (who succeeded Churchill in 1945), initially 
suggested disengaging from the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East in order to 
                                                 
65
 TNA, FO 800/502/Part 2, Review on the situation in Turkey – I. General, 28 July 1948. 
66
 See TNA, CAB 80/99, COS (46) 45 (0), 13 February 1946; See TNA, CAB 131/12, DO (46) 40, 13 March 
1946. See also DEFE 5/3, COS (47) 9 (0) Final, Aide Memoir by the Chiefs of Staff, 23 January 1947. 
67
 See FRUS, 1946, The Near East and Africa, Vol. VII (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1946), p. 895, Memorandum on Turkey Prepared in the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, 21 October 1946. 
See also FRUS, 1950, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Vol. V (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1950), p. 254, Paper Prepared in the Office of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs, Regional 
Policy Statement: Greece, Turkey and Iran: 1. Estimate of the Situation, A. General’, 28 December 1950. 
See also Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in 
Iran, Turkey and Greece, p. xv. 
43 
 
avoid confrontation with the Soviet Union,68 but Bevin, the Foreign Office and the COS 
resisted the idea. They insisted that it would be a major error to cut these commitments 
and thereby lose British dominance in those areas. Their argument was presented in the 
Cabinet meeting as follows: 
 
If we do this, important strategic bases would soon be lost to the Soviet 
Union. This would result in Soviet domination of all of Europe (apart from 
Britain), North Africa as well as the Middle East. Britain would then be 
faced with a ‘threat to its sea communications, coupled with the direct 
threat by air attack and long-range bombardment from the mainland of 
Europe ... the United Kingdom would be reduced to a Malta-type 
existence, contributing little to the main war potential’.69 
 
Ultimately, to ensure the continuation of British possessions and strategic interests in 
the Mediterranean, it was essential for Britain to help Greece and Turkey remain 
independent, given that these countries could not resist outside pressures on their own. 
If the Soviet Union managed to penetrate Greece, ‘this would bring Russian influence 
down to the Aegean, and Turkey would not long remain independent.’70 Britain 
therefore decided to intervene directly in the internal affairs of these countries by 
providing political, economic and military support.71 
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In Greece, there were two main policies carried out by Britain: firstly, political tutelage, 
and secondly, economic and military support. With regard to the first policy, Britain was 
determined to assist the Greeks in their political matters after the Treaty of Varkiza was 
signed in 12 February 1945. The Varkiza agreement gave the new administration of the 
Greek Royalist government authority to restore political and economic stability in 
Greece and also to conduct the plebiscite and free elections. Britain believed that if the 
new administration did not receive firm guidance on these matters it would become a 
dictatorship, which could lead to a revival of EAM/ELAS and a new left-wing revolt.72 
From 1945 until the elections in March 1946, Britain’s utmost priority in Greece was to 
support the policy of restoring law and order to ensure the establishment of a stable 
democratic government. This matter was mentioned by Bevin during the debate on his 
address concerning Greece in the House of Commons in August 1945: 
 
His Majesty’s Government adhere to the policy which they publicly 
supported when Greece was liberated. We then stated that our object 
was the establishment of a stable democratic Government in Greece, 
drawing its strength from the free expression of the people’s will. ... 
Unfortunately, this process was interrupted by an outbreak of violence. 
We then supported the policy of restoring law and order. The purpose of 
restoring order was to create the conditions in which the Greek people 
                                                                                                                                               
Turkey’, 25 January 1947. See also TNA, DEFE 5/3, COS (47) 9 (0) Final, Aide Memoir by the Chiefs of Staff, 
23 January 1947. 
72
 See TNA, FO371/48276/R13143, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, ‘Summary 
on the situation in Greece’ (Drafts), 1 August 1945. See also Robert Frazier, Anglo-American Relations 
with Greece: The Coming of the Cold War, 1942-47 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), p. 75. 
45 
 
could determine the future of their own government and also settle the 
constitutional question.73 
 
The reason behind Britain’s determination to take responsibility for giving political 
guidance to Greece was detailed in a memorandum prepared by the Foreign Office. The 
memorandum stated that Britain required a stable and pro-British government in 
Greece and the sincere friendship of the Greek people if Britain wanted to maintain its 
political and military position in the Eastern Mediterranean and to safeguard its lines of 
communication with the East.74 While pursuing political tutelage in Greece, Britain 
realised it was necessary to also provide economic and military support, given that 
political reform would fail if the desperate economic situation in Greece was not 
improved.75 Civil war between the left-wing and right-wing groups seemed inevitable 
due to the Royalist government’s hostile attitude towards EAM and its supporters.76 It 
was essential that Britain provided military support, given that the Greek government’s 
army was ill-trained and ill-equipped. 
 
The political situation in Greece worsened after the election in March 1946 due to the 
outbreak of the Greek Civil War. The communist insurgents, notably the Communist 
Party of Greece (KKE – Kommounistikó Kómma Elládas), boycotted the internationally-
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recognised government that had been formed after the elections.77 Later, the 
communist insurgents formed a provisional government, namely the Democratic Greek 
Government, in northern Greece. The insurgents fought the Greek government’s army 
using guerrilla warfare, with logistical support from the neighbouring communist 
countries of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania.78 Britain’s military aid was undoubtedly 
needed to support the Greek government’s army in fighting the communist insurgents. 
However, in January 1946, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Hugh Dalton, had urged the 
Foreign Office and the COS to immediately reduce spending on defence due to Britain’s 
economic difficulties.79 Despite this, Foreign Secretary Bevin, the Foreign Office, the 
Defence Minister, Albert V. Alexander, and the COS managed to provide military aid to 
Greece by arguing that a massive reduction of British troops would seriously weaken its 
military backing, which was important for an effective foreign policy.80 
 
By shouldering the responsibility of helping Greece bolster its defence, Britain hoped 
that the Greek royalist government would win the civil war. As noted by Bevin, Britain 
‘accepted responsibility for giving guidance for the training and development of the 
Greek Army in order that they might be able to defend themselves against any attack 
from their neighbours.’81 By helping the Greek government’s army fight the Greek 
communist insurgents, Britain expected Turkey’s safety would also be secured. This had 
been recorded by the British, where it was noted that the Soviet Union ‘seemed content 
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to wait and let the success of its plans in Greece bring about the collapse of Turkey.’82 It 
seems that the Soviet Union believed it would obtain Turkey by first conquering Greece. 
Russian archival records were also consistent with Stalin and Molotov’s thoughts that 
‘the occupation of Greece was equal to the occupation of Turkey because Greece was a 
bridgehead from which to attack Turkey.’83 Evidently, the safety of these two countries 
was closely interlinked, and this seems to be the reason why British policy towards 
Greece and Turkey during this period was identical. 
 
British security interests in Turkey were also at stake due to Soviet demands. Britain was 
keen to ensure that Turkey would not succumb to Soviet pressure and, as in the case of 
Greece, wanted Turkey to remain independent. The first policy implemented by the 
British to achieve this outcome was political support.84 With political support from 
Britain, Turkey was confident about maintaining its independence and that it wouldn’t 
be intimidated or undermined by Soviet pressure.  
 
However, mere political support was insufficient for Turkey to face the Soviet threats. 
When the Turkish Straits crisis escalated in 1946, Britain worried that the Soviet Union 
would make military movements in order to undermine Turkey’s resistance to its 
demands. The Soviet Union had sent substantial Russian ground troops to Romania and 
Bulgaria and concurrently increased its naval presence in the Black Sea on both flanks of 
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Turkey.85 The Soviet Union denied it had any intention of posing a military threat to 
Turkey. Nevertheless, the risk of an upcoming war with Turkey seemed high. In 
response to this development, Turkey raised its defences by increasing the numbers in 
its army. However, the large army imposed a great strain on the Turkish economy.86 The 
Turkish Army was ill-equipped and would be unable to meet the Soviets’ military 
strength should a war erupt. 
 
Bevin had stressed earlier in 1946 that ‘I do not want Turkey *to be+ converted into a 
satellite State. What I want her [Turkey] to be is really independent.’87 Hence, Britain 
came to the conclusion that, like the Greek government’s army, the Turkish Army also 
needed to be reorganised and well-equipped, providing them with an appropriate 
contribution of manpower essential for defence.88 As Bevin said in the Cabinet meeting 
of January 1947: 
 
The Turkish Army has to be reorganised and equipped and an 
appropriate contribution to the manpower for essential defence should 
be provided. [...] I also recommend that we should co-operate in advising 
the Turkish Government on the training and organisation of their armed 
forces, that British Service Representation in Turkey should be 
strengthened for this purpose and that meanwhile the present limited 
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supply of equipment should be continued. Additional equipment which 
the Turkish Army may need should be provided.89 
 
Through the policy of economic support and military aid, Britain expected Turkey to be 
able to confront and resist any Soviet aggression. The same expectation was held for 
Greece, which received similar aid from Britain.  
 
By the end of 1946, Britain could no longer continue its earlier policy towards Greece 
and Turkey due to the rapid deterioration of its own economy. The policy of providing 
economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey proved to be too expensive for an 
impoverished country like Britain, as stated by Attlee earlier in 1946.90 At that time, 
Dalton had already warned that an economic disaster would inevitably occur in Britain if 
there was no immediate reduction in defence spending.91 Yet Bevin and Alexander were 
both of the opinion that British troops should remain in their occupational roles, 
especially in Greece and Turkey.92 However, when the economic crisis in Britain showed 
no improvement by the end of 1946, and worsened due to severe winter storms 
throughout January and February of 1947,93 Bevin, the Foreign Office, Alexander and 
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the COS eventually had to reconsider their decision in continuing their policy of 
economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey.  
 
Towards American assistance to Greece and Turkey, 1945-1947 
 
The Cabinet had a dilemma as to which of Britain’s responsibilities should be given 
priority. The tension was between cost of spending that concerned the Treasury on the 
one hand and strategic importance that concerned the Foreign Office and Ministry of 
Defence on the other. The Treasury felt intense pressure to put domestic concerns first, 
given that Britain desperately needed manpower to run its industries and ensure that 
its plans for economic rehabilitation were successful.94 Dalton therefore raised his 
concerns about the relevance of aid for Greece and Turkey, proposing that the Foreign 
Office and Ministry of Defence end the policy.95 Bevin stressed that he was not 
confident that Greece would be able to counter outside aggression without the help of 
Britain. Therefore, Bevin asked the Treasury to postpone any plans to cut military 
spending on Britain’s overseas commitments. Attlee, who had previously agreed to 
Bevin’s decisions regarding military spending, revised his opinion and saw that the 
commitments needed to be cut and a decision had to be made in February 1947. Bevin 
realised he could no longer fight to sustain aid for Greece and Turkey. As Cook has 
argued: 
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Bevin had long felt that the Labour party and even Attlee did not fully 
grasp how much was at stake in Greece, the effect that a Communist 
takeover would have on the balance of power in the Middle East, *…+ 
Once the decisions were taken in the February crisis to withdraw from 
Palestine and India, Bevin knew that he could no longer carry the case for 
holding on in Greece.96 
 
Bevin eventually surrendered to Attlee and Dalton’s demands to make cuts in military 
spending. The reduction of British forces in overseas theatres was expected to 
commence on 1 April 1947.97 Although the reduction of overseas forces had been 
approved, Dalton worried that it was insufficient to save Britain’s resources and that its 
economy would not fully recover. Dalton then forced Bevin to agree to a complete 
withdrawal of British forces from Greece during the Cabinet’s discussion on 18 February 
1947 and the latter reluctantly agreed.98 Evidently, Britain’s economic condition 
affected its ability to help Greece and Turkey to resist the Soviet threat. It should be 
noted that the new direction in British policy towards Greece and Turkey did not mean 
that Britain ignored these countries, nor did it mean that Britain ignored the territories 
under its control and strategic interests in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. 
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An additional factor influencing the decision to withdraw British forces was made 
because Britain wanted to share the burden with the United States, which it expected 
would agree to assist Greece and Turkey in the future.99 The United States was gaining 
leverage in its world position. With enormous resources and a tremendous amount of 
armed forces, the United States was seen by Britain as the only country that could halt 
Soviet aggression worldwide. Thus, Britain hoped that the United States would become 
Britain’s ally in future conflicts involving the Soviets. Britain also believed that the 
United States was their only hope in guaranteeing Greece and Turkey’s safety, given 
that the UN was unable to provide an effective solution because of the Soviet Union’s 
repeated use of their veto in the UN Security Council.100 
 
Bevin was therefore determined to seek for help from the United States and Dalton 
agreed to this. Bevin instructed the British Ambassador in Washington, Lord Inverchapel 
(Sir Archibald Clark Kerr) to send a note (aide-mémoire) informing the new US Secretary 
of State, George C. Marshall, that Britain’s economic condition would no longer allow it 
to continue as the reservoir of financial and military support for Greece. Thus, Britain’s 
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aid to Greece would end within six weeks.101 The note was received by the US State 
Department on 24 February 1947 with great shock. The US State Department did not 
expect Britain to completely withdraw its forces from Greece at a critical point in the 
Greek Civil War.102 
 
As far as Greece was concerned, Marshall was aware that Britain only wanted to make a 
partial reduction of British forces in Greece.103 Hence, Marshall promptly sent a polite 
protest to Bevin and questioned whether Britain had changed its policy towards Greece. 
After Bevin reaffirmed that there was no change in Britain’s policy but that it could no 
longer carry the burden alone, Marshall subsequently assured Bevin that the United 
States would certainly lighten Britain’s burden in Greece and Turkey.104 Marshall 
promised to give economic aid to Greece and Turkey, pledging to ‘assist free peoples to 
work out their own destinies in their own way.’105 Evidently, Marshall fulfilled his 
promise to Bevin because, shortly after, the United States took a new direction in its 
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foreign policy: the policy of American intervention in world affairs to combat 
Communism.106 Cameron notes that ‘for the first time in its history, the US had chosen 
to intervene in peacetime outside the Americas.’107 It appeared that Bevin’s strategy to 
approach Marshall proved sound because it led to a new American policy towards 
Greece and Turkey.  
 
American policy towards Greece and Turkey, 1947-1949 
 
Between 1945 and early 1947, the period in which the war of nerves in Greece and 
Turkey developed, US foreign policy was based on the principle of isolationism. Under 
this policy, the United States refrained from making any direct commitment to 
countries located outside of the North American continent, instead establishing 
diplomatic relations with them. American policy towards Greece and Turkey during this 
period was largely based on political support, which aimed to provide advice and 
encouragement. The United States was fulfilling its policy towards Greece by 
supervising the Greek election.108 The United States observed Greece’s political 
developments closely, but would not interfere to solve problems that arose throughout 
the process of developing democracy in Greece. In the view of the United States, Britain 
was responsible for Greece’s affairs because of its strategic interests in the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East. British records show that the US State Department 
                                                 
106
 FRUS, 1947, The Near East and Africa, Vol. V, pp. 63-64, Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State 
(Acheson) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson), ‘Implementation 
of Measures for Aid to Greece and Turkey’, 27 February 1947. 
107
 Cameron, US Foreign Policy after the Cold War, p. 8. 
108
 Full records concerning this policy see FRUS: diplomatic papers, 1945, The Near East and Africa, Vol. 
VIII (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945), pp. 98-358 (Greece); FRUS, 1946, The Near East and Africa, 
Vol. VII, pp. 88-288 (Greece). 
55 
 
reminded Britain that Greece was Britain’s headache whenever the Foreign Office 
approached them for help.109 
 
The United States sided with Turkey in its rejection of Soviet demands in the Straits and 
the provinces of Kars and Ardahan.110 This political support was essential for Turkey to 
hold its nerve so that it could successfully counter the Soviet threat. Although Soviet 
activities in the Black Sea, Romania and Bulgaria had heightened tensions with Turkey, 
only Britain decided to provide economic and military aid to Turkey. For the United 
States, the Soviet Union had no intention of using force to achieve its goal vis-à-vis 
Turkey.111 The most apparent reason for the US’ non-intervention policy during this 
period was the isolationist nature of American foreign policy. Therefore, the United 
States did not feel any urgency to protect these two countries from Soviet 
encroachment. 
 
Britain was aware of the importance of having the United States as an ally in the Middle 
East. In order to convince the United States to cooperate with Britain in confronting 
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Soviet hostility, Britain was willing to welcome the United States into the Middle East.112 
This was to ensure that the United States would not feel as if it were being manoeuvred 
by Britain into a position of having to defend a British-dominated status quo in the 
Middle East.113 Britain hoped that, by involving the United States in the Middle East, the 
United States would realise the need to prevent the Soviets from entering the area. 
Accordingly, the United States would understand that the most effective way to keep 
the Soviet Union out of the Middle East was to maintain the freedom of Greece and 
Turkey; hence, it would encourage American resistance to the Soviet threat in both 
countries.114 
 
Britain’s strategy to encourage US interest in Greece and Turkey by involving it directly 
in Middle Eastern affairs seemed fruitful. The strategy of inviting the United States into 
the Middle East was initiated in early 1946115 and later that year the United States 
began to show an interest in Iran, Turkey and Greece.116 At this point the United States, 
specifically Truman, agreed with George F. Kennan’s advice in his famous “Long 
Telegram” which was sent to the US State Department in February 1946. The telegram 
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stated that the United States must pursue a policy of ‘containment’ in order to halt 
Soviet expansion worldwide.117 Britain seemed to have made the right move by 
entangling the United States directly in Middle Eastern oil affairs, as this strategy led the 
United States to realise the importance of Greece and Turkey in safeguarding the 
Middle East. Campbell notes that ‘the United States went into the Middle East after the 
Second World War for two main reasons, oil and the containment of the Soviet 
Union.’118  
 
As a matter of fact, the United States had shown only marginal interest in the Middle 
East before Truman came into office. This interest in the Middle East gradually became 
stronger when officials in the Truman administration became suspicious of the 
maintenance of Soviet troops in northern Iran. The US was also alarmed by Britain’s 
weakness, which it believed would encourage Soviet expansion in the Middle East.119 
While the United States’ concern over Iran heightened, and news about Britain’s 
withdrawal from Greece and Turkey reached the US State Department, Marshall and 
State Department officials believed the time had come for the United States to play its 
part. They therefore decided to make a new turn in American foreign policy, thus 
ending America’s policy of isolationism. This indicated US readiness to implement a new 
policy in Greece and Turkey, changing from a diplomatic policy of political support to a 
containment policy enacted through economic and military support. This new policy 
was predominantly based on the United States’ strategic interest in the geopolitical 
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location of these countries, which would prevent the Soviets and Communism from 
entering the Middle East. As the US State Department stated in its memorandum on 
this matter: 
 
Strategically, Turkey is the most important factor in the Eastern 
Mediterranean and Middle East. By its geographical position, Turkey 
constitutes the stopper in the neck of the bottle through which Soviet 
political and military influence could most effectively flow into the 
eastern Mediterranean and Middle East.120 
 
According to American records, the US State Department’s reaction to Bevin’s note was 
immediate.121 Like Britain, the United States grasped the link between Greece and 
Turkey in regards to security. If Greece fell under Soviet influence, Turkey would be 
next, and this matter was noted by Truman in his diary as follows: 
 
Greece needed aid, needed it quickly, and in substantial amounts. The 
alternative was the loss of Greece and the extension of the Iron Curtain 
across the Eastern Mediterranean. If Greece was lost, Turkey became an 
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untenable outpost in a sea of Communism. Similarly, if Turkey yielded to 
Soviet demands, the position of Greece would be extremely 
endangered.122 
 
Truman’s second consideration, that if Turkey fell first it would also endanger its 
surrounding countries, echoed the US State Department’s opinion on this matter. It was 
clearly stated in the US State Department records as follows: 
 
A Russian-dominated Turkey would open the floodgates for a Soviet 
advance into Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Palestine, Transjordan, Egypt and the 
Arabian Peninsula, all of which are at present still relatively free from 
Russian activities and direct Russian pressure because of their relative 
remoteness from the sphere of Russian dominance. It would also 
dangerously, perhaps fatally, expose Greece and Iran, two countries 
whose governments are already having the greatest difficulty in standing 
up to the Soviet Union and its agents.123 
 
This matter explains the US State Department’s decision to take Turkey into 
consideration while deliberating economic aid to Greece. American records state that ‘a 
crisis of the utmost importance and urgency has arisen in Greece and to some extent in 
Turkey. This crisis has a direct and immediate relation to the security of the United 
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States.’124 It is for this reason the United States treated the security affairs of Greece 
and Turkey as inseparable. Scholar Athanassopoulou used the term ‘Siamese twins’ in 
describing Greece and Turkey, demonstrating the United States’ approach to them from 
a security point of view.125 Based on this principle, the US State Department agreed to 
provide immediate aid to Greece and Turkey to stop the Soviet Union’s advance 
towards the Middle East. US State Department officials, such as Kennan and Dean 
Acheson, wholeheartedly supported the idea of giving economic aid to Greece and 
Turkey.126 They believed ‘the US must either take on Britain’s role as protector of Near 
Eastern states from Russia or witness a major advance for communism.’127 Acheson also 
added that, ‘like rotten apples in a barrel infected by one rotten one, the corruption of 
Greece would infect Iran and all to the east.’128 
 
Only thirteen days after news of Britain’s withdrawal from Greece reached the US State 
Department, on 12 March 1947, the new American policy of giving economic aid to 
Greece and Turkey was delivered through the Truman Doctrine. Greece and Turkey 
would receive $400 million in aid that would become effective in May 1947. The 
ultimate objective of this economic aid was to combat Communism;129 hence, it became 
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the first instalment of the American containment policy. Through this aid, the United 
States would commit itself to defending the free world against totalitarian dictatorships. 
The aid also enjoyed relatively easy approval by Congress, even bypassing the UN due to 
Truman’s argument that the UN was not in a position to extend help of the type 
required by Greece and Turkey.130 Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg agreed with Truman 
and stated that ‘I am frank to say that I think Greece could collapse fifty times before 
the UN itself could ever hope to handle a situation of this nature.’131 
 
In Truman’s memoir he implied that the decision to give aid to Greece and Turkey was 
the turning point in America’s foreign policy.132 Apparently, after Bevin’s note to 
Marshall about Britain’s withdrawal from Greece, the United States ended its hesitation 
towards participating in world affairs and came to Greece and Turkey’s assistance so 
that these countries’ independence could be sustained. Although Britain had decided to 
withdraw completely from Greece within six weeks of 31 March 1947, Cook noted that 
‘the last British troops did not leave Greece until 1950 when the civil war was over.’133 
According to Bevin, British troops remained in Greece due to his arrangement with 
Marshall: ‘I had arranged with Mr Marshall in Moscow in 1947 to keep troops in Greece 
until the end of that year, and now it was nearly another year.’134 It seems that Britain 
and the United States worked together in combating Communism in Greece. This 
matter also shows that, ever since the Truman Doctrine was approved by the US 
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Congress, British and US policies towards Greece were parallel and coherent. Given that 
relations between Britain and the US were strained during the early period after the 
Second World War as a result of American isolationist policies, the Truman Doctrine 
apparently revived their close relationship that had been established during the Second 
World War. 
 
It is accepted by many scholars that the day the Truman Doctrine was proclaimed, the 
Cold War between the Soviet Union and the West became official.135 The consequence 
of the Truman Doctrine on Anglo-American relations was to bring these two English-
speaking nations closer, with each seeing the other as a reliable ally in confronting 
powerful common enemies. The crises in Greece and Turkey had opened the door for 
Britain to pursue a close relationship with the United States. Both countries shared the 
same enemies; hence, it was necessary that they collaborated to ensure that the Soviet 
Union and its communist ideology did not become a dominant power and gain more 
supporters throughout the world. Given that the United States was the world’s 
wealthiest and most powerful country at the time, Truman believed that there was no 
other power capable of tackling the Soviet Union except the United States.136 
Therefore, the United States pledged that ‘wherever and whenever an anti-Communist 
government was threatened, by indigenous insurgents, foreign invasion, or even 
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diplomatic pressure, the United States would supply political, economic, and *…+ 
military aid.’137 
 
The crises in Greece and Turkey created an opportunity for Britain to convince the 
United States to abandon its policy of isolationism, to accept responsibility for 
preserving peace and stability in areas targeted by the Soviet Union and to have a close 
Anglo-American relationship, also known as the ‘special relationship’.138 After the 
Truman Doctrine was extended to Greece and Turkey, Britain and the United States 
cooperated closely to prevent the Soviets and Communism from winning the civil war in 
Greece and gaining authority over the Turkish Straits and the provinces of Kars and 
Ardahan. Since the Truman Doctrine, British and American policy in Europe, the Eastern 
Mediterranean, Atlantic and the Middle East were paralleled and coherent so that they 
could fight Soviet aggression effectively. 
 
The apparent reason why the United States agreed to help Greece and Turkey after 
Britain’s withdrawal from these countries was because of its own strategic interests in 
the Middle East. It is worth noting here that Britain was the one that convinced the 
United States to have an interest in the Middle East. Thereafter, these two countries 
became closer in regards to security cooperation in the region. The United States 
subsequently formed the Northern Tier plan, which positioned Iran, Turkey and Greece 
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as buffer countries preventing Soviet expansion into the Middle East. It seemed that 
American security and strategic interests towards Greece and Turkey were identical to 
those of Britain. This matter became another reason for Britain and the United States to 
continue their cooperation on securing their interests in the Middle East. 
 
Aside from the security of Greece, Turkey and the Middle East, Britain and the United 
States were working to form a new military alliance: NATO. This new military alliance 
was the third instalment of American containment policy after the Truman Doctrine and 
the Marshall Plan. Throughout the early years of establishing NATO, from early 1948 to 
early 1949, Britain and the United States worked closely together. It is well-known that 
the process of establishing NATO was long and strenuous and it could be argued that, 
without the ‘special relationship’ between Britain and the United States, NATO would 
not have been successfully established in April 1949. 
 
A close security and military relationship between Britain and the United States was 
fostered through the establishment of the Truman Doctrine in 1947, the Marshall Plan 
in mid-1947 and later through NATO in 1949. The crises in Greece and Turkey were the 
keystone in building close Anglo-American relations in security and military matters, 
which eventually resulted in NATO in April 1949. It is worth mentioning that Greece and 
Turkey were included in the first and the second American containment policy, but 
were left out of the third instalment. Neither Britain nor the United States suggested 
that Greece and Turkey be invited to join NATO during its negotiations. This matter 
seems strange, given that Greece and Turkey were significant for both Britain and the 
United States in regards to their strategic interests in the Mediterranean and the 
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Middle East. If they were to cite the geographical location of Greece and Turkey as the 
reason for their exclusion, Italy is as geographically close to the Mediterranean Sea and 
as far from the Atlantic as Greece and Turkey. Italy, however, was included as one of 
the twelve original NATO members in 1949. Only after great hardship in bidding for 
membership were Greece and Turkey accepted as new NATO members in early 1952. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Developments in Greece and Turkey in the aftermath of the Second World War drove 
Britain to pursue a policy that could help these countries maintain their liberty. Hence, 
the British secured a sphere of influence and strategic interests in the Mediterranean 
and the Middle East. However, the crises in Greece and Turkey erupted at a time when 
Britain was struggling with its own economic difficulties. This matter was unfortunate 
for Britain because it meant it could no longer confront the Soviet Union in Europe, 
Greece, Turkey and the Middle East alone. Britain believed that the key to facing the 
Soviet challenge to it strategic interests in Greece, Turkey and the Middle East was to 
win the political and military support of the United States. Most importantly, their 
foreign policies must be aligned and coherent in regards to effectively containing the 
spread of Soviet influence and its communist ideology. 
 
Britain needed to convince the United States that the Soviets’ policy in the years 
immediately following the Second World War was aggressive and could threaten the 
security and stability of Europe, the Mediterranean, the Middle East and the United 
States. By attaining cooperation with the United States, Britain hoped to ensure that 
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Greece and Turkey avoided being overwhelmed by Soviet pressure. However, economic 
deterioration in Britain early in 1947 forced the Cabinet to call for a complete 
withdrawal of British forces from Greece and Turkey. Britain, specifically Foreign 
Secretary Bevin, worried that the decision to withdraw from Greece and Turkey would 
jeopardise their future, thus the United States’ assistance in bringing peace to Greece 
and Turkey was crucial.139 Evidently, Bevin’s strategy to send a note to the US State 
Department succeeded in influencing the US State Department to establish the Truman 
Doctrine. It could therefore be implied that the new American foreign policy towards 
Greece and Turkey was indirectly influenced by Britain’s decision to withdraw from 
these countries. Britain and the United States subsequently collaborated in fighting 
Soviet aggression worldwide. This matter had a positive impact on Anglo-American 
relations concerning security and military affairs and led to the establishment of NATO, 
which was regarded by the West as the best mechanism for containing the Soviet’s 
expansion of power. 
 
Overall, this chapter has demonstrated the importance of Greece and Turkey to Britain 
in the early post-Second World War period. The need to secure these interests in the 
wake of the Soviet threat resulted in the war of nerves between the former and 
Britain’s ally, the United States. Later, in 1949, Britain and the United States formed 
NATO. Its ultimate aim was to protect countries that were politically, economically and 
strategically important to Britain and the United States from being threatened by the 
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Soviet Union. Based on these criteria for entry into NATO, it would appear that Greece 
and Turkey should have been invited to join the organisation. However, Greece and 
Turkey’s NATO membership was denied by Britain, a move which appeared 
contradictory to their strategic interest in both countries. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin and delays during NATO’s negotiation years, 1948-
1949: No Greek and Turkish Membership of NATO 
 
Introduction 
 
During NATO’s formative years between early 1948 and early 1949, negotiations had 
suffered from the United States’ attempts to delay the process and issues surrounding 
the question of membership, in particular Italian membership. These caused the talks to 
be protracted and the conclusion of the Atlantic pact, which had been expected to 
conclude by 1 February 1949, to be deferred to April 1949.140 Historians who have 
discussed the United States’ hesitation in forming NATO and reluctance to proceed 
quickly after the opening of the summer Washington Talks in 1948 include Lawrence S. 
Kaplan. Kaplan stated that: 
 
The resulting negotiations that began with the exploratory talks in the 
summer of 1948 were long and drawn out. Some of the responsibility 
for the delay was clearly that of the United States. Despite new 
tensions in June over the Soviet completion of the Berlin blockade 
there was no sense of haste.141  
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Peter G. Boyle argues that ‘an enduring reason for America’s hesitancy *to create NATO+ 
was its ambivalent attitude towards the Soviet Union.’142 This was due to the fact that 
‘wartime propaganda in the United States regarding “our great Soviet ally” *had+ left 
Americans in a mood to regard optimistically the prospects for postwar cooperation.’143  
 
Sir Nicholas Henderson, a British diplomat and representative at the Washington Talks, 
also commented on the delay. Henderson noted that: 
 
During the negotiations in the summer most of the Americans had 
been reluctant to move fast [because] they were not decided among 
themselves what the best outcome of the negotiations would be [and] 
they did not know how congressional and public opinion would take 
the idea of a Pact containing strong provisions for assistance in the 
event of aggression.144  
 
Hence, it was thought ‘there was no point in any case in pushing on too fast inasmuch 
as nothing could be agreed by the Administration until the return of Congress in the 
New Year.’145 Henderson also added that with ‘Congress due back in a week or two, and 
the public opinion apparently strongly in favour of the idea of apact [sic], the US State 
Department’s mood had quite changed and they seemed anxious to get on with the job 
of drawing up a Pact as quickly as possible.’146 
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According to historian Martin H. Folly, ‘the British viewed the American attitude 
following the Pentagon talks with dissatisfaction.’147 The British ‘were too concerned 
about the dangers of assuming military commitments without American partnership 
and about the effects of American inactivity on European morale to view apparent 
American hesitation with equanimity.’148 It should be noted here that the British, in 
particular Foreign Secretary Bevin, were the ones that had suggested NATO.149 Bevin 
undoubtedly believed that a European Recovery Program (ERP) - economic 
rehabilitation that was delivered under the Marshall Plan150 - must be formed. This was 
because the UN was unable to prevent the Soviet Union from forming a political and 
economic block, known as the Cominform, due to the fact that the Soviet Union 
continued to use its veto for to achieve its own political aims.151 Bevin also insisted that 
NATO must be formed without delay due to recent Communist threats, noting that ‘the 
pace set by Russia in Czechoslovakia, then Finland and now Norway, tells us that there is 
no time to lose.’152 
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British diplomats such as Henderson, historians such as Baylis and journalists such as 
Cook also touched upon Bevin’s frustration at the US’ delay. Bevin’s typical démarche to 
tackle these delays was to send letters to the US State Department. Baylis shows that 
one of Bevin’s messages to US Secretary of State Marshall stated that ‘there must be no 
delay, the message said, otherwise, “a favourable opportunity would be missed and a 
fresh impetus would be given to the cause of communism”.’153 According to Henderson, 
the hesitation was due ‘not only to the basic question of the wisdom of having a Treaty 
but to matters of detail, such as Italy and the idea of having different categories of 
membership in the Treaty.’154 As noted by Cook, the United States ‘foresaw difficulties 
with Greece and Turkey if Italy was asked to join. The British were also opposed to 
Italian membership for reasons similar to the American objections.’155 
 
However, during the latter stage of the talks, Italy was accepted as an original NATO 
member. It is interesting to highlight here that neither Henderson, Baylis nor Cook 
elaborated further on the issue of Greek and Turkish membership in their discussion 
about the delays. In other words, they did not link these delays to Bevin’s decision not 
to invite Greece and Turkey to join NATO during its formation years. Henderson, for 
example, only mentioned that Greece and Turkey were given assurances that ‘the 
negotiations for an Atlantic Pact did not imply any lessening of United States and British 
interest in Turkish *and Greek+ security.’156 Baylis, for instance, noted that Kennan 
believed ‘if Italy was included, Greece, Turkey and other countries might claim that they 
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also had a case to join, [meaning the] commitment would then be extended and 
diffused.’157 Baylis makes no further explanation for the exclusion of Greece and Turkey 
from NATO at this stage. Similarly, Cook had left out the question of Greek and Turkish 
membership of NATO, only discussing countries invited to join as original members such 
as Norway, Italy, Portugal, Iceland and Denmark.158  
 
In light of the lack of in-depth discussion of the exclusion of Greece and Turkey from 
NATO, the purpose of this chapter is to discuss this issue from the point of view of the 
British, in particular Bevin. This chapter will show that, despite British strategic interests 
in both countries, Bevin was resolute in the decision to keep Greece and Turkey out of 
NATO because he believed their membership might have brought about further delays 
in NATO’s formation. To elucidate this argument, this chapter will concentrate on two 
correlated matters; first, the delays that occurred during the negotiation years and 
jeopardised Bevin’s ambition to form NATO swiftly and; second, the rise of the Cyprus 
dispute between Greece and Turkey in late 1948. By concentrating on the delays and 
the local dynamic between Greece and Turkey, this chapter demonstrates that 
geographical issues and the prospect of a Mediterranean pact, two factors noted by 
Ekavi Athannassopoulou and Abdulkadir Baharçiçek, were not the only reasons for 
exclusion of Greece and Turkey from NATO.159 Rather, this chapter argues that, because 
the series of delays that occurred throughout the negotiation years had already 
hampered Bevin’s aim of forming NATO as soon as possible, he thus believed that 
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membership of Greece and Turkey, which at that time were in dispute over the future 
of Cyprus, would become another obstacle that hindered NATO’s formation. 
 
To substantiate this argument, several new source materials such as FO 371 file 78328 
and Bevin’s private papers FO 800 file 448 (conference, 1949) will be used. The 
aforementioned FO 371 material contains a record of a conversation between 
Necmettin Sadak, the Turkish Foreign Minister, and Bevin, in which Sadak asked the 
latter why the British government refused to include Turkey as one of the original 
members of NATO. The FO 800 material contains a record of a conversation between 
Bevin and Dirk Stikker, the Foreign Minister of the Netherlands, in which the latter 
asked Bevin why he did not favour the inclusion of Greece and Turkey during the 
Meeting of Consultative Council of the Five-Power Brussels Treaty in London in January 
1949. 
 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section discusses Bevin’s effort to 
create a European “Third Force”, known as the Western Union (WU). Discussion of the 
difficulty in bringing the United States into the WU plan is essential in order to show 
how Bevin devised the idea of NATO and why Bevin wanted NATO to be formed without 
delay. The second section discusses the delays that occurred throughout the 
negotiation years and Bevin’s reaction to them. This section is necessary in order to 
prove two things: the ‘delay’ thesis and Bevin’s determination to form NATO promptly. 
This section is also necessary because it is only by understanding the series of delays 
and growing frustration felt by Bevin that we can understand Bevin’s attitude towards 
Greek and Turkish membership of NATO. The third section discusses Bevin’s negative 
74 
 
attitude towards Greek and Turkish membership of NATO. This section briefly touches 
upon the increase in tensions between Greece and Turkey over the issue of Cyprus in 
late 1948, which coincided with their requests for inclusion in NATO. The section then 
analyses how the Cyprus issue might have influenced Bevin’s refusal to include Greece 
and Turkey in NATO. 
 
Bevin, the European “Third Force” of the Western Union and NATO 
 
The idea for a European “Third Force”, which would be ‘some form of union in Western 
Europe, whether of a formal or informal character backed by the Americans and the 
Dominions’160 was suggested by Bevin after the breakdown of the London Foreign 
Ministers meetings in late December 1947. The meetings broke down due to Soviet 
intransigence over the inclusion of the Soviet-controlled zone in Germany in the ERP. 
John D. Hickerson, the Director of the Office of European Affairs in the US State 
Department, ‘learned from the Foreign Office that Bevin was thinking in terms of two 
circles of defense: an inner, European circle, tightly bound; and an outer one, more 
loosely bound, that would also include the United States and the British Dominions.’161 
Since Bevin’s idea would not be a formal alliance, Marshall warmly agreed to it.162 
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However, Bevin quickly began to favour creating the Western Union as a formal 
alliance. This can be seen during a discussion in the Cabinet on 4 January 1948 and 
during Bevin’s speech in the House of Commons later the same month. On both 
occasions, Bevin stated that ‘I believe the time is ripe for a consolidation of Western 
Europe.’163 Bevin’s speech was lauded in the United States, Europe and Britain itself.164 
However, Marshall and the US State Department officials - who already knew about 
Bevin’s idea for a formal alliance because he had disclosed details of his proposed 
speech in his secret message to Marshall nine days previously165 - felt uncomfortable 
about providing direct military support to the WU for two reasons. Firstly, the intention 
to base the WU on the Dunkirk model – named after the 1947 Treaty of Dunkirk 
between Great Britain and France – was seen as flawed, since this model only intended 
to provide mutual assistance in the event of renewed German, not Soviet, aggression. 
Secondly, there was no evidence of self-defence capabilities among those countries to 
be included in the WU plan. 
 
                                                 
163
 For Bevin’s memorandum to the Cabinet, see TNA, CAB 129/23, CP (48) 6, Memorandum by the 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, ‘The First Aim of British Foreign Policy’, 4 January 1948. See 
appendix E: The Third Force memos. For Bevin’s speech in the House of Commons, see Hansard, 22 
January 1948, Vol. 446, cc383-517, p. 396. 
164
 See TNA, PREM 8/1431, PM 20/48, Minute from Mr Attlee to Mr Bevin, 28 January 1948; TNA, FO 
371/73046/Z 814/273/72/G, ‘Proposed Treaties with the Benelux countries: Conversation with M. Spaak’, 
From Sir G. Rendel (Brussels) to Mr Bevin (Foreign Office), 30 January 1948; TNA, FO 800/460/Eur/48/2, 
From Washington to Foreign Office, 20 January 1948; FRUS, 1948, Western Europe, Vol. III, p. 17, The 
Under Secretary of State (Lovett) to the British Ambassador (Inverchapel), 2 February 1948. See also 
Baylis, The Diplomacy of Pragmatism: Britain and the Formation of NATO, 1942-1949, p. 69; Henderson, 
p. 7. Gladwyn Jebb, Assistant Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, saw Bevin’s speech as very 
clever because it showed that Bevin knew perfectly what he wanted; thereby the speech had a great 
echo all over Europe. See Hubert Miles Gladwyn Jebb, The Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1972), p. 211. 
165
 See FRUS, 1948, Western Europe, Vol. III, pp. 3-4, The British Ambassador (Inverchapel) to the 
Secretary of State, 13 January 1948. See also TNA, FO 371/73045/Z 542/273/72/G, ‘The Western Union’, 
Mr Bevin to Mr Marshall, G31/–/48, Top Secret, Personal, 13 January 1948. See also Kirby, p. 406; Ireland, 
p. 63; Henderson, p. 7. 
76 
 
With regard to the first reason, US State Department officials such as Robert A. Lovett 
(Undersecretary of State), Charles E. Bohlen (the State Department Counsellor) and 
Kennan unanimously agreed that Bevin’s plan for a “Third Force” had serious flaws due 
to the adoption of the Dunkirk Treaty as its basis.166 They believed that focusing on the 
threat of renewed German aggression would render the WU incapable of fighting the 
Soviet threat. Hickerson said that ‘there are some doubts in our minds as to whether in 
the present circumstances it is an adequate one.’167 These American authorities 
alternatively suggested the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro as its basis, because this model 
would provide a more solid basis for the WU.168 This was because the Rio Treaty 
suggested a “one for all and all for one” mentality in its defence measures, meaning 
members of the WU could guarantee one another against aggression from within the 
union as well as from outside it.169 
 
As for the second reason, the US State Department wanted evidence that the Western 
Europe countries were capable of taking the initiative in matters of their own security 
before providing political and military support. This matter was noted by Lovett: 
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When there is evidence of unity with a firm determination to effect an 
arrangement under which the various European countries are prepared 
to act in concert to defend themselves, the United States will carefully 
consider the part it might appropriately play in support of such a 
Western European Union, established presumably in harmony with the 
charter of the United Nations.170 
 
Due to the fact that there was no evidence of Western European countries acting in 
concert to defend themselves, Lovett noted that ‘the United States Government does 
not have any very clear picture of exactly what Mr. Bevin’s proposals for a Western 
Union really are.’171 Lovett then told Lord Inverchapel, British Ambassador to the United 
States, that ‘you are in effect asking us to pour concrete before we see the 
blueprints.’172 
 
Since Bevin was determined to gain US political and military support for the WU, he 
then proceeded to sign the Brussels Treaty between Britain and Western European 
countries as the first step towards the establishment of the WU.173 As these countries 
were formally bound by the same treaty, a mechanism for self-defence could be 
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devised which would prove their capability in this matter, as was demanded by the US 
State Department.174 Furthermore, Bevin had adopted the Rio model as the basis of the 
WU.175 However, the US State Department still refused to commit political and military 
support to the WU for two reasons. Firstly, the US State Department worried a ‘new 
and extensive military and political commitment might well adversely affect the 
prospects for the ERP to get approval by the US Congress.’176 Secondly, it assumed ‘that 
the Soviet Government has no present desire for war.’177 
 
While the US State Department refused to commit to US forces operating in Europe 
through the WU, the Soviet Union had extended its area of control. This was the result 
of the Communists in Czechoslovakia forcibly taking control of the government and 
Finland signing a “treaty of friendship” with the Soviet Union which was to include close 
cooperation in economic and military affairs.178 Norway was believed to be the next 
target for a friendship treaty and Bevin asserted that ‘nor can we afford at this moment 
to risk a Norwegian defection which would involve the appearance of Russia on the 
Atlantic and the collapse of the whole Scandinavian system.’179 Bevin added:  
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We may thus be shortly confronted by two serious threats, the strategic 
threat involved by the extension of the Russian sphere of influence to 
the Atlantic and the political threat to destroy all our efforts to build up a 
Western Union.180  
 
Worried about these threats, Bevin had thought to include Norway and other 
Scandinavian countries in the WU so that they would be more confident ‘to turn down 
any approach they might receive from the Soviet Union.’181 Yet the WU itself would not 
suffice to help the Scandinavian countries against Soviet pressure. Bevin stressed that 
‘this would be a mistake since France and the United Kingdom with the Benelux 
countries could not by themselves effectively defend Scandinavian countries in regard 
to the whole problem of Atlantic security.’182 In stressing by themselves, Bevin implied 
that the US State Department’s refusal to commit US forces to the WU contributed to 
the alliance’s inability to defend the Scandinavian countries. As the threat to Norway 
could not be neglected, Bevin therefore suggested ‘a scheme of Atlantic security with 
which the United States would be even more closely concerned’ as ‘the most practical 
course in his view’ in his aide-mémoire to Marshall dated 10 March 1948.183 This 
Atlantic security system would also consist of the Brussels community of the WU as its 
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members.184 After Marshall received the note, he did not hesitate to agree to Bevin’s 
proposal and stated that he was ‘prepared to proceed at once in the joint discussions 
on the establishment of an Atlantic security system.’185 These secret meetings became 
known as the Pentagon Talks and took place between 22 March 1948 and 1 April 1948. 
They were attended by government delegations from the United States, Britain and 
Canada.  
 
It is worth pointing out here that Marshall’s positive response to Bevin’s NATO proposal 
indicated that he was ready to commit US forces to a system that would also be joined 
by countries of the WU. This was a new development in the State Department’s 
attitude, given that its officials were previously reluctant to commit US forces to the WU 
plan. Since Marshall indicated that he was ready to move swiftly on this matter, Bevin 
therefore insisted that this Atlantic system must be formed without delay due to recent 
Communist threats in Czechoslovakia, Finland and Norway. Bevin said ‘I am convinced 
therefore that we should study without any delay the establishment of such an Atlantic 
security system, so that if the threat to Norway should develop we could at once inspire 
the necessary confidence to consolidate the West against Soviet infiltration.’186 
 
Although Bevin failed to bring the United States into the WU plan, he did however 
succeed in bringing the United States into the security affairs of Western Europe 
countries, albeit under a different defence system. This was due to the fact that the 
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countries of the WU would have become original members of NATO. What is more, 
NATO membership could prove more beneficial to Western Europe because the United 
States would be even more closely involved in NATO than it was expected to be in the 
WU. Before the Pentagon Talks were adjourned, the US representatives ‘agreed that a 
treaty [original emphasis] should be accomplished as soon as possible, the optimum 
possibility being that it might be accomplished prior to the end of the current session of 
Congress.’187 Unfortunately, NATO’s signing took place in April of the following year due 
to a series of delays that caused a setback in NATO’s creation. Since Bevin’s ultimate 
objective was that NATO be formed as soon as possible, these delays directly hampered 
his aim. This study believes that these delays influenced Bevin’s opinion on Greek and 
Turkish membership, namely that their inclusion might bring about a further delay to 
the formation of NATO. To elucidate this argument, the delays and Bevin’s reaction to 
them will be analysed and discussed in the next section. 
 
Delays in forming NATO, April 1948 to March 1949 
 
Throughout the negotiation years, a series of delays arose which meant the formation 
of NATO could not be achieved earlier than April 1949. To be precise, there were four 
delays that slowed the negotiations down. These were: US hesitation on continuing 
negotiations after the Pentagon Talks were adjourned; the United States delegates 
refused to progress swiftly after the next round of talks – the Washington Exploratory 
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Talks on Security - were opened; problems regarding Article 2 of NATO; and, the 
problem regarding Italian membership. 
 
US hesitation in opening the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, and Bevin’s 
reaction 
 
The first sign that the United States was hesitant to open the next round of talks could 
be sensed when Hickerson told Lord Inverchapel, during their private session a day 
before the Pentagon Talks were adjourned, that ‘quadripartite talks could not begin 
before the end of next week at the earliest.’188 This was due to the fact that ‘there were 
signs that Hickerson [was] encountering resistance to his idea of a pact [NATO] during 
soundings of his colleagues in *the+ State Department.’189 Seeing that US State 
Department officials were in a critical stage in making up their own minds, Lord 
Inverchapel asked Bevin to send a personal message to Lovett, via Marshall, asking for 
presidential assurances of support for the Western Europe countries until the 
conclusion of an Atlantic treaty.190 
 
Lovett’s response to Bevin’s letter confirmed the first delay in NATO arrangements: that 
the United States was reluctant to open the next round of talks. Lovett explained he 
could ‘foresee the obstacles that would probably stand in the way of a formal pact at 
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this stage.’191 There were two apparent reasons why Lovett was determined not to 
commit to the next round of talks in the near future. The first was that a military 
alliance would complicate congressional approval of the ERP. Lovett said that, ‘if 
Congressman Taber for instance got wind of any negotiations for a pact, he would see 
to it that his Appropriations Committee would obstruct the grant of funds for E.R.P.’192 
The second reason was Lovett doubted the military strength of the Brussels powers, as 
shown in the following: 
 
What was of immediate concern to him [Lovett] was this: that in the eyes 
of most people here [in the USA] the Brussels Treaty would remain a 
piece of paper until its signatory got to work upon active plans for their 
own security. It was clear that, if attacked, they would have to look after 
themselves until *the+ United States could step in and cut the enemy’s 
jugular vein. So far as he knew no steps had yet been taken towards 
serious military talks between the five countries concerned.193 
 
Lovett, who had the authority to call for the next round of talks, asserted that he would 
take this next step only after the idea for an Atlantic pact was approved by a higher 
authority, in particular the President and the Senators; but, he had yet to present it 
before them.194 Lovett’s delays caused disappointment to Bevin, who said: ‘Quite 
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frankly I regard Lovett’s attitude as most disappointing.’195 Bevin added that Lovett’s 
attitude had somehow affected other officials in the United States government when 
Lewis W. Douglas, US Ambassador to the United Kingdom, informed Bevin ‘that the 
United States Government was “still not clear in their policy in relation to the Five 
Power Treaty”.’196 Bevin, however, was determined to overcome the delays as he 
believed ‘the morale of Western Europe may deteriorate unless the United States can 
agreed to hold Four Power conversations in the near future.’197 
 
For the first initiative to counter US hesitation in resuming negotiations, Bevin adopted 
a joint approach with Georges Bidault, the French Foreign Minister, in pressing Marshall 
to open the quadripartite talks. The pair did so by ‘referring to his *Marshall’s+ letter of 
March 25th in which he said that the Four Power discussions would open “very shortly”’ 
as the basis for their argument.198 Since this joint message was delivered to Marshall via 
Lovett, the latter was the first to respond. By this time Lovett had already presented the 
Atlantic pact proposal before his higher authorities, and as far as Bevin knew, Lovett’s 
presentation went well.199 This could be the reason why Bevin confidently asked Lord 
Inverchapel to propose to Lovett that he call for the quadripartite talks in May 1948.200 
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Again, Lovett was still not ready to call for the next round of talks because ‘he found 
them *his political leaders+ sympathetic but “realistic in *the+ sense that they need to be 
convinced that the Five Allies are at work on some plan of their own”.’201 Seemingly, 
Lovett and his political leaders’ views on this matter echoed one another. Lovett 
stressed that ‘all he needed in order to make a start was some visible proof that 
Western Europe was getting together to fight its own battles or at any rate the earlier 
stages of these battles until American forces could come into action.’202 Similarly, 
Marshall ‘fully agreed on the desirability and urgency of coordinated planning to meet 
possible emergencies’ and he ‘hope*d+ to be able by next week to suggest the definite 
date.’203 However, that was the last thing that Bevin heard from Marshall, and after 
several weeks had passed there was still no date given by the US State Department. 
According to Henderson, ‘if patience is the proof of diplomacy, the Brussels Treaty 
Foreign Ministers, and particularly Bevin, were severely tested in the weeks which 
followed Marshall’s telegram on April 22.’204  
 
Due to Lovett’s insistence on seeing evidence of the Brussels powers’ self-defence 
mechanism, Bevin adopted his second initiative in order to persuade Lovett to continue 
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the negotiations. On 22 April 1948, Bevin set up a permanent military committee in 
London in order ‘to tackle the problem of military conversations’ and informed Lovett 
about it the same day.205 It should be noted here that this military committee would 
later become the Permanent Commission of the Brussels powers. Although Lovett 
welcomed this effort because it was ‘easier to deal with a going concern than with a 
union that existed only on paper,’206 Lovett’s decision not to call for the next round of 
talks remained virtually unchanged. This was due to the present situation in the US 
State Department, with anti-Treaty officials such as Kennan and Bohlen clashing with 
pro-Treaty officials such as Hickerson and Theodore C. Achilles, the Director of the 
Division of Western European Affairs. 
 
This division of opinion in the US State Department was the third reason that influenced 
Lovett’s decision not to open the next round of talks. Kennan and Bohlen were highly 
doubtful about the necessity of forming a new security alliance. Bohlen, for instance, 
argued that ‘the idea of concluding an Atlantic pact, to which the United States should 
be a party, appeared to him to be mistaken’ because he believed ‘an Atlantic pact 
would cause undue provocation to the Soviets.’207 Kennan, therefore, ‘maintained that 
the best deterrent action on their part was to make it plain that the United States was 
prepared to give military support to the Western European countries for the purpose of 
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supplying their deficiencies in war material.’208 These internal differences of opinion 
could also be the reason why Marshall failed to give an exact date for the next round of 
talks as promised to Bevin on 22 April 1948. Hickerson had admitted previously ‘that the 
US State Department had run into certain political objections to United States 
participation in a defence pact,’ thus ‘the US State Department would not be in a 
position to propose a date for the opening of quadripartite talks.’209 
 
To deal with Kennan and Bohlen’s opposition, Bevin adopted another tack. On 14 May 
1948, Bevin sent a telegram to the pair, for communication to Marshall, in the hope 
that they would understand how important NATO was to the psychological state of the 
Western Europe countries. Bevin argued that ‘the mere fact that the United States was 
prepared to enter into some kind of regional defensive system would, by itself, 
encourage the democratic forces all over the world and be far the best deterrent to any 
Soviet miscalculation which, *…+ probably constitutes the only serious danger of war in 
the near future.’210 It is important to highlight here that Bevin’s message reached 
Kennan and Bohlen in the midst of Vandenberg’s working paper being endorsed by the 
United States government.211 Passed on 11 June 1948, the Vandenberg Resolution 
advised the United States to support the security of Europe and the Atlantic and had 
great influence on anti-Treaty officials in the US State Department like Kennan and 
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Bohlen.212 Bohlen, for instance, had previously told Lord Inverchapel that he would 
accept NATO if Vandenberg’s working paper was endorsed by the Senate.213 Kennan’s 
views echoed those of Bohlen.214 It seemed then that, although Bevin’s message made 
a persuasive argument which mellowed Kennan and Bohlen somewhat, far more 
important was that his message arrived at the right moment. Whether this was a wise 
move on Bevin’s part or he was simply lucky in this matter is debatable. In the following 
months, Kennan and Bohlen’s resistance progressively reduced. According to Kennan, 
Bevin’s message was an ‘invaluable contribution’ to the debate which was being waged 
in the US State Department.215  
 
Although the internal differences in the US State Department had been resolved, that 
1948 was an election year was the fourth reason that prevented Lovett and Marshall 
from agreeing to open the next round of talks. This was evident when Lovett and 
Marshall did not agree with Bevin’s suggestion for ‘the quadripartite talks with the 
limited agenda,’ while Hickerson suggested ‘the opening of the quadripartite talks ought 
in any case to be delayed more than *…+ another fortnight or three weeks.’216 Marshall 
said: 
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Hasty or ill-prepared action could easily promote disunity rather than 
unity both in the United States and among European countries. It will be 
clear to Mr Bevin that there is no possibility of completing the necessary 
negotiation of these matters in time to permit congressional 
consideration at the present session.217 
 
Kennan and Bohlen, now new supporters of the NATO plan, also believed it was 
impossible to conclude a treaty in an election year. It was stated that ‘there could be no 
question of the Senate’s ratifying a pact at this session of Congress *due to+ the 
domestic difficulties in the way of opening actual negotiations in an election year.’218 
Bevin however, disagreed with the decision to resume the talks after the election. 
 
Bevin again sent a letter to Marshall to persuade him to change his mind regarding this 
matter. Bevin said ‘I cannot agree that the situation in Europe will not further 
deteriorate if conversations on security are postponed until after Congress rises.’219 
Bevin added ‘I would therefore earnestly beg him to consider the possibility of holding 
the “quadripartite” talks as soon as possible, if only on the “limited agenda” proposed 
by Hickerson.’220 As defence for this suggestion, Bevin argued that ‘the summoning of 
the talks would probably in itself hold the position for a period and it would enable the 
Western Powers to advance their own ideas as regards general regional security, even if 
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these are not immediately acceptable to the Americans.’221 Marshall, however, said that 
it was not yet a suitable time to start the negotiations but confirmed that ‘sooner or 
later the United States Government would take some action.’222 Although the 
Vandenberg Resolution was passed in mid-1948, it seemed that Marshall was convinced 
that the best time to resume negotiations was after the election in November. As a 
result, all Bevin could do was sit back and wait patiently. 
 
There was one additional reason that prevented Lovett from calling for the next round 
of talks: the issue of Palestine. It is worth mentioning here that the Anglo-American 
relationship was strained over the question of Palestine. The United States and Britain 
held differing opinions towards the adoption of Resolution 181(II) by the UN General 
Assembly on 29 November 1947, which recommended the partition of Palestine into 
Arab and Jewish states.223 The United States supported this partition resolution and 
voted for it, but Britain abstained in the vote.224 Since 1945, Bevin had criticised the 
United States for being dishonest in handling the problem of Palestine. In Bevin’s view, 
Truman backed Zionism - the ideology pushing at that time for a Jewish state - because 
of his need for Jewish votes, money and influence in the presidential elections of 
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1948.225 Truman, on the other hand, felt that Bevin was deeply prejudiced by the 
situation on the ground in Palestine and favoured the Arabs as opposed to the Jews.226 
 
As a matter of fact, since the beginning of the Pentagon Talks, Bevin had anticipated 
that the issue of Palestine would disrupt the discussions. At that time, Bevin avoided 
this issue. Bevin asked Gladwyn Jebb, advisor to the British Ambassador to the UN, 
through Frank K. Roberts, the Principle Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary, to 
avoid this issue in order to make sure the meeting went smoothly. This matter was 
noted by Roberts as follows: 
 
The Secretary of State [Bevin] is most anxious that [the] Palestine 
question should not be brought in any way into your talks on Atlantic 
Security and on United States support for [the] Brussels Treaty. You 
[Jebb] should therefore carefully avoid being drawn into any (repeat any) 
discussions in Washington [the Pentagon Talks] about Palestine.227 
 
This was apparently because Jebb was in some way connected with the Palestine 
discussions in the UN Security Council in New York.228 The issue of Palestine was a cover 
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story for Jebb to attend the secret tripartite talks in the Pentagon, meaning his real 
purpose of attending the discussions about NATO could be concealed effectively.229 
Nonetheless, this issue was unavoidable. Jebb stated that ‘at the end of our discussions 
today Americans betrayed nervousness regarding my own cover.’230 Jebb managed to 
avoid this issue by saying to the US delegates that ‘it may be best for me to fly up to 
New York when Palestine next appears in the agenda of the Security Council.’231 
 
However, the US State Department officials still could not leave the issue of Palestine 
out, as it was one of Lovett’s reasons for his reluctance to resume negotiations. Lovett 
said ‘I also think it right to mention that leading State Department officials are at the 
moment labouring under a sense of keen disappointment at the apparent failure until 
now to reach any meeting of minds about the Palestine issue.’232 What is more, this 
issue was also of concern to the Senators. During a closed session to support 
Vandenberg’s working paper held between Lovett and the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee in May 1948, Senator Wherry and Senator Brewster tacked on 
‘amendments relating to Palestine.’233 In this circumstance, Lovett and the other US 
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State Department officials comprehended that ‘an understanding over Palestine was 
necessary if the security pact to be concluded.’234 
 
Bevin therefore adopted an attitude of tolerance in discussing the Palestine issue so 
that the negotiations could be resumed at the nearest opportunity. However, Bevin at 
first seemed to remain firm in his stance over this issue. This matter was noted in British 
records as follows: 
 
While the Secretary of State [Bevin] does not wish to mention Palestine 
directly in this letter, he wishes to make the point that while Anglo-
American relations must, of course, be very close, it is essential that the 
impression should not get about that we in Britain are tied to the 
American chariot wheel. This impression is, of course, strengthened if 
American foreign policy appears to shift with every wind and we are then 
expected to shift with it.235 
 
It seemed that Bevin worried Britain’s appearance of independence in policymaking 
would be damaged if it were to change its position on the Palestine question. In this 
circumstance, Mr Hamilton Fish Armstrong, an American diplomat in Britain, had a 
conversation with Bevin and ‘expressed some anxiety about the danger of Britain and 
the U.S.A. drifting apart, not only over Palestine but as a result of the 
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misunderstandings in connection with the Bedell Smith-Molotov exchanges.’236 Bevin 
responded to Hamilton that ‘whatever misunderstanding there might be, he never 
himself had any suspicions about American intentions on this matter in which we were 
moving in full consultation.’237 It was apparent that Bevin was willing to compromise 
and was willing to keep discussing this issue until an agreement or settlement could be 
reached between these two governments. Bevin explained his approach by saying to 
Hamilton that ‘he realised that America had not as much experience in foreign affairs as 
we had and that while she was developing a sense of responsibility remarkably well, 
there must occasionally be setbacks to which he did not attach excessive 
importance.’238 Moreover, Bevin and the Foreign Office’s central aim was to secure the 
involvement of the United States in NATO. It was therefore important to make sure that 
problems over Palestine did not prevent the achievement of this objective.239 
 
The US State Department eventually resumed negotiations on 6 July 1948, four months 
prior to the presidential election. This decisive shift in the US State Department’s 
attitude towards NATO arrangements was taken due to the imposition of the Berlin 
blockade by the Soviet Union on 24 June 1948.240 Numerous historians, including Baylis, 
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have argued that this crisis was a significant turning-point in the history of the 
formation of NATO.241 The crisis apparently succeeded in pressing the US State 
Department to end its hesitation and open the next round of talks, the Washington 
Exploratory Talks on Security. Nevertheless, the United States continued with its 
hesitations when its delegates refused to proceed quickly during the talks. These delays 
deepened Bevin’s frustration in light of his ambition to form NATO promptly. 
 
The US delays in the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security and Bevin’s reaction 
 
The Washington Exploratory Talks on Security took place between 6 July 1948 and 9 
September 1948. Since the opening of these talks was against the will of US State 
Department officials – they wanted the talks to be resumed after the election – they 
were therefore half-hearted in making rapid progress. The US State Department officials 
admitted to Henderson, the British representative in the talks, that ‘the State 
Department feel that nothing can be done in the direction of summoning the formal 
Conference until after the Presidential Elections.’242 In Lovett’s word of welcome to the 
Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, he asserted that his government was aware 
of the need to proceed swiftly, but it had to move very cautiously, particularly in an 
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election year, so that it would have the backing of the vast majority of the American 
people.243 As a result, the US repeatedly delayed the talks. 
 
The first attempt at delay was clearly evident when the United States delegates did not 
put forward a proposal of their own throughout the first five meetings.244 According to 
Reid, the United States government ‘insisted that since it was the Brussels powers 
which had requested these discussions; it was up to the Brussels powers, not the United 
States, to make the proposals.’245 Lovett said he ‘would leave it to the representatives 
of the Brussels Treaty signatories to make the decision since their governments were 
responsible for these conversations being held.’246 This indicated that Lovett was 
demanding that the Brussels powers make their initiatives before further progress could 
be made by the United States government. Reid also agreed that ‘the fact that no paper 
was put before the participants in these talks resulted in diffuses, discussions, confusion 
– and a slow rate of progress which was probably what the United States wanted.’247 
 
Bevin closely supervised the negotiations through the British delegation, in particular Sir 
Oliver Franks, the new British Ambassador to the United States who was involved in the 
NATO negotiations. Bevin was keen to see NATO formed promptly, and as such did his 
best to overcome these delays. However, the Brussels delegations only realised after 
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the fifth meeting that the US delegates had not put forward any proposals of their own, 
meaning Bevin could do little to tackle the US’ attempts at delay. 
 
The second attempt to delay progress was evident in Lovett’s doubt over the military 
strength of the Brussels powers.248 The powers were not ready to invite the United 
States observer to London because, as noted by the COS and as was agreed by the 
Foreign Office, ‘it would be premature at this stage for a U.S. observer to attend 
meetings of the Military Committee.’249 However, since the first meeting of the 
Washington Talks, Lovett still clung to the question of the Brussels powers’ capacity for 
self-defence. This was evident in the minutes of the meeting which noted that ‘self-help 
and mutual aid, Mr. Lovett said, are the two basic criteria to which he made reference 
earlier.’250 Insofar as military talks in London were concerned, Lovett expected the 
Brussels powers would send formal invitations to military observers of the United 
States, and presumably Canada, since the United States had only ‘received informal 
invitation to send qualified officers.’251 Lovett then took the line that: 
 
Before we could deal definitely with Item (4) [Nature of U.S. Association 
under Vandenberg Resolution with European Security Arrangements], 
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much more information would be needed on what arrangements had 
actually been made in Europe. The United States would need the views 
of its military representatives on their return from London.252 
 
Lovett’s statement was understood by the Foreign Office to mean that no decisions 
could be reached in the Washington Talks until American military observers had been to 
London and returned to Washington with a complete picture.253 
 
Furthermore, because the military capabilities of the Brussels powers were not yet 
proven, the United States government worried it might over-extend itself. A phrase 
used in the Senate was that ‘the United States could not afford “to re-build a fire trap,” 
in other words, that European security must be rebuilt on a much sounder basis than in 
the past.’254 In this context, ‘Lovett ha*d+ emphasised the difficulties which the United 
States would experience in meeting the requirements of Western Europe for military 
equipment.’255 Lovett also made ‘elaborate circumlocutions’ in the early stages of the 
talks, which some of the other delegates saw as ‘a sinister design aimed at giving the 
Western European countries the illusion but not reality of American support.’256 This 
vague description of the United States position could be regarded as its third delaying 
tactic, since the Brussels powers delegations, and particularly the French, continued to 
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demand precise wording before the discussions could progress to any other 
questions.257 This matter was shown in American records as follows: 
 
Mr Hoyer Millar [the British representative] and Mr. Bérard [the French 
representative] suggested more precise language for Article 3 of the Rio 
Treaty, which provides that an armed attack against one Party shall be 
considered as attack against all Parties, and requires each Party to assist 
in meeting the attack.’258 
 
In response to these second and third delaying tactics, Bevin agreed to extend formal 
invitations to the United States and Canadian governments to send military experts to 
London.259 Considering that it was still premature for the Brussels powers’ self-defence 
plans to be presented before these military observers, this matter indirectly proved that 
Bevin was determined to push the US delegates to move faster. He sought to show that 
the Brussels powers were not bluffing about their own self-defence arrangements. This 
démarche might also nudge the United Sates government to end its third delaying 
tactic, since the military arrangements initiated by the Brussels powers indicated that 
they would not be too dependent on American military assistance. 
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The French delegates also caused delays when, in mid-August 1948 Henri Bonnet, the 
French Ambassador to the United States who participated in the talks, demanded short-
term assistance to France from Marshall.260 Bonnet also threatened that ‘the French 
would only accept an Atlantic security pact on the following three conditions: unity of 
command at once; immediate movement of US military supplies to France; and 
immediate movement of US military personnel to France.’261 Marshall was furious and 
decided that no further discussions would be taken until this problem had been 
settled.262 This French proposal had an adverse effect on Kennan and Bohlen, who once 
again began to question whether it was necessary to form NATO. According to 
Henderson, Kennan had stressed that ‘if the French do not want a treaty, we had better 
drop the idea after all.’263 For France, the meetings were merely about how to increase 
European security; hence, it saw the opportunity to secure American aid to Western 
European countries and itself in particular. Nonetheless, the United States government 
took France’s demand too seriously, meaning it seems likely that the US State 
Department officials took advantage of this matter and positioned it as their fourth 
delaying tactic. 
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To tackle the delay caused by the French, Bevin immediately adopted a diplomacy 
démarche by instructing Jebb to persuade Jean Chauvel, the Secretary-General of the 
French Foreign Office, and Robert Schuman, the new French Foreign Minister, of the 
need to distinguish between immediate and long-term security problems.264 This 
initiative resulted in the French government agreeing to withdraw its demand. Jebb 
noted that ‘on the instructions of the Secretary of State *Bevin+ I went over to Paris on 
August 23rd and had long conversations first with M. Chauvel and subsequently with M. 
Schumann and M. Chauvel. These conversations, on the face of them, appear to have 
been very satisfactory.’265 In volunteering to handle this problem, Bevin proved his 
determination to push the United States delegates to stop their delaying tactics and 
allow the discussions to continue. 
 
However, January 1949 was to bring two last-minute problems that dragged the 
discussions out longer, meaning the convocation of the talks that was expected to be 
concluded in early February 1949 had to be postponed. These last-minute problems 
were the issue surrounding Article 2 of the Atlantic treaty and the French government’s 
demand for Italian membership and the inclusion of Algeria. These new matters were 
also connected to Marshall and Lovett’s retirement; Acheson succeeded Marshall as the 
new Secretary of State and replaced Lovett as the new chairman of the Committee of 
Ambassadors in January 1949. 
                                                 
264
 FO 371/73073/Z 5819/2307/72/G, ‘Washington Security Talks and meeting at The Hague of Brussels 
Treaty Powers: proposed visit of Mr Jebb to Washington’, From Washington to Foreign Office, 16 July 
1948. For details about the meeting between Jebb and Chauvel and later Schuman, see TNA, FO 
371/73075/Z 6947/2307/72/G, ‘Atlantic Security Pact: conversation between Mr Jebb and M. Chauvel in 
Paris on August 23
rd
’, Foreign Office minute, Mr Jebb, Top Secret, 23 August 1948; and TNA, FO 
371/73075/Z 6999/2307/72/G, ‘Atlantic Security Pact: conversation between Mr JEBB and M. 
SCHUMANN on August 24
th
’, Foreign Office minute, Mr Jebb, Top Secret, 24 August 1948. 
265
 TNA, FO 371/73075/Z 6947/2307/72/G, ‘Atlantic Security Pact: conversation between Mr Jebb and M. 
Chauvel in Paris on August 23
rd
’, From Foreign Office to Washington, 25 August 1948. 
102 
 
 
Delays regarding Article 2 and Bevin’s reaction 
 
Article 2 of the Atlantic treaty concerns the pledge for economic, social and cultural 
collaboration among the pact members. It was proposed by the Canadian 
representatives during the Pentagon Talks and was supported by the United States 
representatives, in particular by Lovett.266 However, the article was opposed by the 
British government, in particular Bevin. This was due to the fact that Bevin thought ‘it 
would *…+ be a mistake to risk duplicating the work of the Organisation for European 
Economic Co-operation (OEEC) and the Brussels Treaty machinery, which was beginning 
to work well.’267 However, the rest of the Brussels powers would have no objection to 
including this article ‘if such duplication were clearly avoided.’268 Lester B. Pearson, the 
Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, met Bevin personally and urged him to 
avoid prolonged discussions about Article 2 based on his opposition to it. Bevin 
therefore agreed to yield, as he was keen that NATO be formed without delay. 
Pearson’s argument to Bevin was as follows: 
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He [Pearson] urged that it would be rash to hold a Conference of 
Governments until agreement on all the main principles had been 
reached. What was needed was a draft treaty to which the Conference of 
Governments could put the finishing touches, and could sign when the 
details had been agreed. It would be disastrous, he said, to call a 
Conference and then to find that so much was unsettled that the 
Government representatives had to separate before a definite 
agreement had been made. It should be our principal objective to avoid 
this danger.269 
 
Yet, when Acheson replaced Marshall as Secretary of State and replaced Lovett as the 
chairman of the Committee of Ambassadors in January 1949 he decided to drop Article 
2, claiming ‘the Senators were worried about Article 2 as at present worded. It 
detracted from the main purpose of the Treaty and got involved in social and economic 
questions which might raise internal political problems.’270 The Canadian government 
would face ‘great political difficulty in Canada if there were no article in the Treaty of a 
non-military nature.’271 Canada therefore sought British government support, because it 
was thought Article 2 ‘might well be an invaluable instrument for an approach to a 
solution of the intractable problems of United Kingdom-Canadian financial relations.’272 
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Although Bevin was still disinterested in this economic provision, he was however 
willing to compromise with Canada over Article 2 because of the delay that this matter 
might have brought to the conclusion of the NATO treaty. This was shown in Bevin’s 
letter to Sir Oliver Franks, British ambassador to the United States and British 
representative in the NATO talks, as follows: 
 
I [Bevin] agree that some wording on the lines suggested by the 
Canadians might prove of great value, but it is hardly surprising that the 
Americans should be chary about accepting a clause the object of which 
is to commit them to giving assistance in regard to Anglo-Canadian trade. 
You [Sir Oliver Franks] should give as much support as you can to the 
Canadian proposal, but I do not regard this as a point on which we ought 
to hold out if there is any risk of it causing a delay in the signature of the 
Pact. You may if you wish so inform your Canadian colleague.273 
 
It is clear that the prospect of delay was Bevin’s main concern when he agreed not to 
oppose the inclusion of Article 2. This matter was also agreed upon by Baylis, who 
stated that ‘the Canadians obviously felt that the issue was so important that the British 
government was reluctant to jeopardise the treaty at this late stage by continuing their 
opposition to what was regarded as a minor issue.’274 
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Acheson eventually accepted Article 2 as part of the treaty after the British government 
and the Brussels powers unanimously gave their support to it, because the ‘inclusion of 
such an article would render Pact more acceptable to public opinion.’275 His acceptance 
was also driven by the fact that Humphrey Hume Wrong, the Canadian representative 
and Canadian Ambassador to the United States, told Acheson ‘that unless we get an 
article on these lines in the treaty the Canadian government would have to review its 
position towards the whole project.’276 
 
Soon after the problem with Article 2 was resolved, the French representatives caused 
another delay by refusing to accept Acheson’s new decision to retract US support for 
the inclusion of Italy in NATO. The French demanded the inclusion of Italy, as well as 
Algeria, and linked these demands to Norwegian membership. This matter impelled the 
Committee of Ambassadors to discuss the issues again, posing another last-minute 
delay to the conclusion of the NATO treaty. 
 
Prolonged discussion and last-minute delays regarding Italian membership and Bevin’s 
reaction 
 
Italian membership was proposed by Hickerson, the United States representative, 
during the first meeting of the Pentagon Talks. At that time, in April 1948, the Italian 
Communist Party looked likely to win the Italian general election. Hickerson said that 
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‘Italy, more even than Norway, is now most directly menaced.’277 Hickerson’s proposal 
for Italian membership was supported by his fellow colleagues, such as Ambassador 
Douglas, Achilles, General Grunther (representing Forrestal) and George Butler 
(representing Kennan). All believed a country like Italy, which was facing ‘political 
change favourable to an aggressor’, should be given the necessary assistance in order to 
preserve its ‘territorial integrity and political independence’278 
 
The inclusion of Italy in NATO was seen by these United States officials as giving 
practical aid to Italy. They stated that ‘such *an+ invitation prior to the Italian elections 
on April 18 would be of assistance to him [De Gasperi, Prime Minister of Italy] in the 
election campaign.’279 However, the British representative, Lord Inverchapel, worried 
that Bevin would not agree to Italian membership, reporting back to Bevin that ‘I fear 
that the results of this discussion may not seem altogether satisfactory to you.’280 Lord 
Inverchapel was aware that Bevin preferred for Italy to be grouped in a Mediterranean 
system together with Greece and Turkey.281  
 
Although Bevin would rather include Italy in a Mediterranean pact, he was however 
willing to compromise. He therefore replied to Lord Inverchapel saying ‘I am 
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disappointed at [the] American attitude, but I agree that our best course is to explore 
the possibilities and endeavour in the process to push the Americans along.’282 Bevin’s 
reaction to this matter of Italian membership implied that he was keen for the talks to 
run smoothly so that the Atlantic pact could be formed as soon as possible. Thereafter, 
the British delegation took the following position: ‘we have also agreed, on strong 
American insistence, to do our best, with their support, to extend the full Brussels 
system to Scandinavia and if possible also to Italy.’283 
 
When the NATO talks were resumed in July 1948, the United States no longer wanted 
Italy in NATO because the Communists were soundly defeated in the Italian general 
election.284 This decisive shift over Italian membership was made by Marshall, Lovett, 
Senator John Foster Dulles and Senator Vandenberg when they met two days after the 
Italian general election. They all ‘felt that the inclusion of Italy, unless it had theretofore 
become a member of the Brussels pact, would be a mistake since it would destroy the 
natural geographic basis of the North Atlantic area.’285 According to Lovett, if Italy was 
included, the Atlantic community ‘would get out of the North Atlantic and begin to get 
into a mid-European, Near Eastern or Mediterranean group.’286 Kennan, who had been 
absent during the Pentagon Talks, also agreed with his fellow officials’ opinion and 
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stressed that membership of NATO must be confined ‘strictly to the North Atlantic 
area.’287 Kennan argued that ‘it was most important to avoid doing anything which 
might tend to split Europe into two halves and thus make more difficult the eventual 
achievement of [a] European federation.’288 
 
This new US stance on Italian membership was supported by the rest of the Brussels 
powers representatives in the Washington Talks. The British representatives argued 
that their Foreign Secretary believed Italy would demand the return of some of its 
former colonies, as well as some revisions to the Italian peace treaty as its price for 
entering NATO. In Bevin’s letter to Sir Oliver Franks, Bevin said: 
 
I have given very careful consideration to this whole question of the 
inclusion of Italy in the Atlantic Pact. *…+ And whilst I am on this point I 
may say that I am disturbed at Mr. Dewey’s public engagements to 
support the return of all the Italian colonies. If he has his way, Italy’s 
destiny will be so linked with the Middle East that she should more 
appropriately join a Mediterranean than an Atlantic Pact *…+ you should 
say that I cannot now agree to the inclusion of Italy.289 
 
Other representatives, for example the French, asserted that their governments 
believed Italy ‘should belong to another defensive system covering both shores of the 
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Mediterranean and extending to Persian Gulf and Northern Iran frontier.’290 In a similar 
manner, the Netherlands Ambassador to the United States who representative at the 
talks said ‘that his government feared that membership in the Atlantic pact might be so 
widened that certain countries, particularly Italy, would be included which were more of 
a liability than an asset.’291 It seemed that all delegations in the Washington Talks had 
unanimously agreed to Italian exclusion from NATO. Yet Hickerson, who initially 
suggested Italian membership, was ‘very unhappy at the idea of leaving Italy out’ and 
‘felt that to exclude Italy would have a most unfortunate effect on the Italian political 
situation, and would encourage Italy to turn to the East rather than to the West, etc.’292  
 
However, during the December 1948 meetings, the issue of Italian membership was 
raised again when French representatives ‘said that their Government strongly favoured 
the inclusion of Italy.’293 This issue was complicated further when the French 
representatives demanded the extension of the Atlantic pact to Algeria, since ‘it would 
be extremely difficult for France to leave part of its metropolitan territory out of the 
area. Algeria was a part of France and in the same relation to France as Alaska or Florida 
to the United States.’294 The British representative, Jebb, thought that the French 
government’s support for Italian membership was merely a bid to get Algeria into 
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NATO, believing it would enhance ‘the solidarity between them and their allies in the 
event of any nationalist movement in Algeria being stimulated by the Russians or the 
Arabs, or both.’295 
 
With regard to Italian membership, only the British and Canadian representatives 
remained against the inclusion of Italy.296 The rest of the Brussels powers weren’t 
adamant in their opposition to Italian membership. The Belgian representatives, for 
example, said that ‘their Government was not opposed in principle to the inclusion of 
Italy if this were favoured by the other Governments.’297 On the United States’ side, 
Lovett ‘said that the United States had no firm position at the present time’;298 hence, 
he ‘referred the question to Mr. Kennan.’299 Yet Kennan had strongly resisted Italian 
membership, stating earlier in November 1948 that ‘the Policy Planning Staff is of the 
opinion that the scope of a pact of this sort should be restricted to the North Atlantic 
area itself, and that attempts to go further afield and to include countries beyond that 
area might have undesirable consequences.’300 Kennan therefore firmly stated that Italy 
would not become an original member of NATO, but rather it was preferable for Italy to 
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hold ‘simultaneous association in some mutually acceptable form with the Brussels and 
Atlantic Pacts.’301 
 
However, during the January 1949 meetings, the Committee of Ambassadors 
unanimously agreed to include Italy in NATO. This decision was the result of Hickerson’s 
initiative in the period between Lovett’s retirement302 and Acheson’s appointment as 
new Secretary of State and chairman of the Committee of Ambassadors. Hickerson sent 
a message expressing US support for Italian membership to the Permanent Commission 
of the Brussels powers in Lovett’s name, despite the fact that Lovett had already left the 
State Department on 19 January 1949. The message noted that the ‘US position 
remains substantially as stated Annex C Dec 24 but we would accept Italian inclusion in 
Council of Europe as sufficient evidence of close Italian ties with Brussels Treaty 
countries to warrant inclusion of Italy in Atlantic Pact.’303 Hickerson’s message was 
passed to the Commission through Paul-Henri Spaak, the Belgian Prime Minister and 
Foreign Minister. According to Alan Goodrich Kirk, the United States Ambassador to 
Belgium, Spaak ‘wondered how *the United States+ proposed a draft pact providing for 
Italian inclusion. He *Spaak+ said, however, *…+ if we *the United States+ feel strongly 
that Italian inclusion is essential he will certainly not oppose it.’304 Given that the United 
States and the rest of the Brussels powers supported Italian membership, the British 
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government therefore took the same position.305 This matter indicated that, regarding 
the issue of Italian membership, Bevin had once again acted tolerantly and in doing so 
proved his determination to form NATO without further delay.  
 
However, the United States changed its mind again when Acheson, the new chairman of 
the Committee of Ambassadors, spoke out against the decision to include Italy in NATO 
during the February 1949 meetings. Acheson said ‘it would be well if the question of 
Italian membership could be deferred until the treaty had been ratified. United States 
government would prefer not to have to carry the burden of Italy through the debates 
in the Senate ratification.’306 Acheson also argued that ‘if Italy were brought in, Greece, 
Turkey, Iran and other countries might claim to be only slightly removed.’307 It seems, 
therefore, that US diplomacy suffered from a lack of consistency over Italian 
membership. However, it is worth remembering here that the United States’ message 
of support for Italian membership a month earlier had been sent to the Brussels powers 
by Hickerson, without first consulting Acheson. This explains the change in the United 
States’ position regarding Italian membership at this stage. Acheson’s new proposal to 
exclude Italy was supported by all representatives, except Bonnet, the French 
representative. 
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It could be argued that Acheson’s decision to postpone the inclusion of Italy was a 
catalyst for the French government to react against it, thereby causing a last-minute 
delay to the conclusion of the NATO treaty. The French government wanted Italy in 
NATO because it would give a strong precedent to make the claim for Algerian inclusion. 
As reported in the American documents, ‘Bonnet in extraordinary exhibition insisted 
that all govts [sic] under consideration as prospective members particularly Italy be 
invited simultaneously.’308 Bonnet said that his government would only accept Norway 
in NATO if Italy and Algeria were also included. This matter was recorded as follows: 
 
The attitude the French adopted at yesterday’s meeting, in suddenly 
linking Norway and Italy and saying that Norway could not be invited to 
join the talks unless a similar invitation was extended to Italy, has created 
a deep and unfortunate impression on the Americans from Acheson 
down. They are resentful of tactics which they regard as near blackmail 
and which are wounding to their moral sense. The Canadian Ambassador 
feels equally strongly on this subject.309 
 
The discussions became yet more difficult when Bonnet said that ‘the French 
Government would have to reconsider its position as far as its own participation was 
concerned’ if Norway was included without Italy and Algeria.310 The French 
government’s threat to withdraw its participation was regarded as serious. The 
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Committee of Ambassadors therefore agreed to include Algeria in the NATO pledge in 
order to secure Norwegian membership.311 The British Ambassador, Franks, sought 
Bevin’s help and asserted that ‘anything you can do to help to sort this out *the French 
linking Norway and Italy+ would be a real contribution to a speedy conclusion.’312 
Bevin’s reply to Franks was as follows: 
 
The French, however, have demanded – and rightly so I think – that the 
question of Italy should now be decided one way or the other. Our line is, 
broadly speaking, the same as it has always been, namely that we 
ourselves are not (repeat not) keen on Italy acceding to the Pact, but that 
if both the Americans and the French insist we should not raise 
objections.313 
 
It seemed that, at this late stage, Bevin was determined not to jeopardise the Atlantic 
pact treaty by continuing his opposition to Italian membership. Besides Bevin, US higher 
authorities such as President Truman, Senator Vandenberg, Senator Tom Connally and 
Senator Walter F. George were also concerned about the delay in concluding the treaty 
when Acheson approached them for advice on Italian membership.314 Acheson noted 
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‘the President and the Senators thought that it would be dangerous to delay further the 
drafting of the terms of the Treaty and the publication of the Treaty once agreed.’315 
 
Since the possibility of delay was one of the main issues of concern to Acheson’s higher 
authorities, all representatives in the Committee of Ambassadors acknowledged their 
support and officially accepted Italian membership during the 1 and 4 March 1949 
meetings.316 After a year of painful debate over the question of membership, Italy, 
which had originally been considered for a Mediterranean system along with Greece 
and Turkey, eventually became an original member of NATO. To avoid Greece and 
Turkey demanding the same NATO membership, the United States and Britain agreed to 
assure both countries that the negotiations for an Atlantic Pact did not imply any 
lessening of American and British interest in Greek and Turkish security.317 
 
To conclude, the complex process that had to be undertaken in regard to Italian 
membership strengthens the ‘delay’ thesis. The issue of Italy and other delays had 
apparently ruined Bevin’s aim for NATO to be formed as soon as possible. In order to 
tackle these obstacles, Bevin had repeatedly compromised with the US, Canadian and 
French governments when they used delaying tactics, insisted on Article 2 and 
demanded Italian membership. The question of Italian membership also showed that 
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the French government made considerable efforts to secure Italian inclusion in NATO. 
The fact that Bevin did not do the same for Greece and Turkey, despite both countries 
being of great strategic value to Britain, suggests there must be an additional reason for 
Bevin’s decision not to include them in NATO’s initial negotiations. This additional 
reason will be discussed in the next section. 
 
Delays and the Cyprus issue: Bevin’s negative attitude towards Greek and Turkish 
membership 
 
It is interesting to highlight here that, at the beginning of Bevin’s initiative for a new 
security arrangement of the WU, he had considered including Greece in this union. This 
was evident in his Third Force Memos in January 1948, in which he noted that ‘I believe 
therefore that we should seek to form with the backing of the Americas and the 
Dominions a Western democratic system comprising, if possible, Scandinavia, the Low 
Countries, France, Portugal, Italy and Greece.’318 Considering that countries of the WU 
were to be absorbed into NATO, it seems that Greece initially had potential to be a 
member of NATO. However, Bevin no longer considered Greece when he proposed an 
Atlantic pact in March 1948.319 
 
During a conversation between Lange, the Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and 
Bevin, in which the former sought clarification about the Atlantic pact, Bevin had 
mentioned the third system saying ‘that we should work out a Mediterranean security 
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system affecting Italy, Turkey, &c.’320 Although Bevin only mentioned Italy and Turkey, it 
was understood that Greece would also be included in this third Mediterranean pact 
system. This was due to three factors: all were Mediterranean countries; a 
Mediterranean pact was originally proposed by Turkey;321 and, the security affairs of 
Greece and Turkey were invariably treated in a fraternal way.322 It was therefore better 
that both countries be included in or excluded from any security system. Since Bevin 
preferred Greece and Turkey to be grouped in the third system of a Mediterranean 
pact, the British representatives did not suggest that Greece and Turkey be included in 
NATO during the Pentagon Talks, even though they had a chance to do so when 
Hickerson decided to include Italy in NATO as opposed to a Mediterranean pact.323 
 
It is worth noting here that Greece and Turkey would be taken into account when the 
three representatives of the United States, Britain and Canada in the Pentagon Talks 
discussed Italian membership. According to Achilles, who was involved in the 
negotiations, of all the countries considered eligible to join NATO, Italy was the most 
controversial and most opposed by various governments. This was because it went 
‘beyond the strictly “Atlantic” framework; *…+ thereby opening the gates for other 
nations to apply’ such as Greece, Turkey, Germany and Spain.324 A number of factors 
meant that Bevin could have followed Hickerson and made the claim for Greek and 
Turkish NATO membership: both were of great importance to British strategic interests 
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and were experiencing Soviet threats, thus meeting the criteria for NATO 
membership.325 Both were also interested in joining NATO326 and were similar to Italy in 
regard to their geographical location and proposed membership in the Mediterranean 
system. What is more, given that Bevin was initially disinterested in Turkey’s proposal for 
a Mediterranean pact,327 he could have dismissed the third system plan by inviting 
Greece and Turkey to join NATO. Nevertheless, Bevin was consistent in his preference for 
a Mediterranean pact. 
 
This position became stronger when all the representatives in the summer Washington 
Talks agreed that Italy would be included in the Mediterranean system after the 
Communists were soundly defeated in the Italian general election. When Hickerson, 
who favoured including Italy in NATO, expressed his objection to this decision during the 
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meeting in August 1948,328 the British representatives said it was impossible to include 
Italy without Greece and Turkey and that a Mediterranean system was the best option 
for these three countries rather than the Atlantic system.329 Up to this point, the 
geographical issue and the prospect of a Mediterranean pact appeared as the obvious 
reasons influencing Bevin and the Foreign Office’s denial of Greek and Turkish 
membership in NATO.330 However, we should remember that Italy was one of the 
original members of NATO when the treaty was signed on 4 April 1949. Thus, these two 
aforementioned arguments could be challenged with the example of Italy. Since Italy 
was the only country that slipped out of the Mediterranean system, it appears there 
must be another explanation for Greece and Turkey being left behind. It should be 
noted here that a Mediterranean pact had never been established. Although Bevin had 
promised to pursue it after NATO was successfully formed,331 it remained on paper until 
it was dismissed completely in 1951. This study believes the dispute between Greece 
and Turkey over the future of Cyprus could be the reason why these two countries were 
left out of NATO. 
 
Since this study argues that the issue of Cyprus is a contributory reason for Bevin’s 
decision to leave Greece and Turkey out of NATO, it is worth touching briefly on the 
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background of this issue. Historically, when Greece and Turkey had quarrelled over 
Cyprus, the island was still under British rule due to its status as a British Crown Colony 
since 1925. Initially, the Cyprus dispute was a conflict between the British government 
and the people of Cyprus, due to the latter’s demand for self-determination. However, 
this friction eventually shifted from a colonial dispute to an ethnic dispute between the 
people of the island themselves, namely the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots. 
These two ethnic groups became rivals because they had different ideas on the future 
settlement of Cyprus. The Greek Cypriots demanded that Cyprus be united with Greece, 
famously referred to as enosis.332 Yet the Turkish Cypriots preferred Cyprus to be 
annexed to Turkey, instead of forming a union with Greece. The Turkish Cypriots 
strongly believed that Cyprus belonged to Turkey, since it had been part of the Ottoman 
Empire prior to British rule. However, because of the small number of Turkish Cypriots 
compared to the Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriots changed their aim from 
annexation to a partition of the island, known as taksim.333 Since then, the Cyprus 
dispute was understood as a problem of opposing nationalisms between these two 
major populations inhabiting the island of Cyprus. This ethnic dispute became more 
complicated when both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots dragged their mother 
countries, Greece and Turkey, into the conflict.334 Greece became involved and 
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supported Greek Cypriots and their enosis movement in July 1948.335 Turkey, 
meanwhile, intervened in the Cyprus dispute later than Greece, in November 1948, due 
to massive pressure from the press and the public in Turkey.336 As a consequence of 
Greece and Turkey’s intervention in Cyprus, the issue quickly became a contentious 
matter and affected the inter-governmental relationship between them. 
 
By the time the Turkish government decided to help the Turkish Cypriots combat enosis, 
the US presidential election of 1948 had just ended and the Committee of Ambassadors 
was due to resume NATO negotiations. The Turkish government sent a formal request 
for inclusion in the Atlantic pact to both the British and the United States governments 
in late November 1948.337 It is worth mentioning here that, earlier in October 1948, 
Necmettin Sadak, the Turkish Foreign Minister, had approached Bevin, Marshall and 
Roberts (Bevin’s Private Secretary) to enquire whether the questions of a 
Mediterranean pact and Turkish accession to NATO had been considered at the meeting 
of the Brussels treaty powers.338 For the former, both governments replied that ‘it was 
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better to leave the question of a Mediterranean pact until after the American 
elections.’339 With regard to the latter, Roberts ‘said that this was not of course a 
question of direct interest to the Benelux Powers and that as far as I knew it had not 
therefore been discussed among the Five Powers.’340 Due to the fact that the prospect 
of a Mediterranean pact was vague, the Turkish government, afraid that communism 
might make gains in Asia and consequently affect Turkey,341 decided it wanted to join 
the Atlantic pact instead. Greece took the same move. This was evident when the Greek 
Ambassador, Vassili Dendramis, approached the US State Department and expressed 
his government’s enthusiasm to be included in the Atlantic pact.342 
 
The significance of these Greek and Turkish requests for inclusion in NATO in late 1948 
is twofold: firstly, it came when the Committee of Ambassadors became tangled in the 
question of Italian membership, leading the discussions to become protracted. 
Secondly, Greece and Turkey were in a bitter disagreement over Cyprus. These two 
issues are believed by this study to be additional factors that influenced Bevin’s 
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opposition to the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in NATO, in addition to the 
geographical issue and prospect of a Mediterranean pact discussed in available 
literature.343 
 
With regard to the delays surrounding Italian membership, it should be remembered 
here that Italian membership would have implications for Greek and Turkish 
membership too. It is also worth highlighting that, since the beginning of the efforts to 
establish NATO, US representatives had never thought to consider Greece and Turkey 
as possible members of NATO. This was evident when Hickerson, during the Pentagon 
Talks, was determined to include only Italy in NATO. He said that ‘joint assurances might 
at the same time be given Greece, Turkey and Iran by the US and UK’344 so that these 
countries would not demand the same NATO membership as their fellow 
Mediterranean country, Italy. Similarly, during the December 1948 meetings of the 
Washington Talks Lovett had not favoured Italian membership because it would fuel 
Greek and Turkish membership aspirations. This matter was shown as follows: 
 
The inclusion of Italy would have repercussions, in other capitals, namely 
Athens and Ankara. Although he [Lovett] would not attempt to gauge the 
sentiment that would prevail in those capitals, should it be known that 
Italy was being taken into the Pact, while Greece and Turkey were being 
kept out – In spite of certain definite overtures which they had already 
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made – he was sure that their reaction was foremost in the minds of the 
Governments that were to be parties to this Pact.345 
 
Equally Kennan, who strongly opposed Italian membership, also argued that if Italy was 
included this would encourage Greece and Turkey to apply too. Kennan said that ‘in the 
first place, the admission of any single country beyond the North Atlantic area would be 
taken by others as constituting a precedent, and would almost certainly lead to a series 
of demands from states still further afield that they be similarly treated.’346 In light of 
these attitudes towards Italian, Greek and Turkish membership it could be said that, had 
Bevin instructed the British representatives to suggest Greek and Turkish membership 
at this stage, the talks would become protracted and delay the conclusion of the 
Atlantic pact. Debates over the inclusion of Italy and Algeria had already proved this 
could be the case. Lovett said that: 
 
time and urgency were of paramount importance. Should the 
Governments concerned become involved in delicate and intricate 
negotiations on far-reaching matters, having no direct relations with the 
North Atlantic security, they might be faced with complications that 
would retard the speedy conclusion of the Pact.347 
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Lovett’s anticipation of delays was vindicated when Sir Oliver Franks also reported to 
Bevin that the Italian and Algerian questions had complicated the December 1948 
meetings. Franks said ‘the main problem has been that of Italy and French North Africa 
*Algeria+.’348 In addition, when Bohlen replied to the French Ambassador’s inquiry about 
the date for the next meeting of the Committee of Ambassadors in early January 1949, 
his answer that ‘there were two questions which still remain unsolved which might be 
handled by drafting formulas, namely, the question of the reference to North Africa by 
which the French Government had in mind particularly Algeria and Italy’;349 proves that 
the Italian and Algerian issues caused the negotiations to become complicated and 
protracted. 
 
Given that Italian membership had already dragged out the discussions and that US 
State Department officials constantly responded negatively to the possibility of Greek 
and Turkish membership even if Italy was included, this study believes these two 
matters nurtured Bevin’s opposition to Greek and Turkish inclusion in NATO. 
Fundamentally, Bevin was convinced that these new membership proposals might have 
brought another delay in NATO’s formation. This matter was evident in a conversation 
between Bevin and the Turkish Foreign Minister Sadak, who came to London before 
proceeding to Paris in connection with the OEEC meeting in early February 1949. Bevin 
and Sadak had a long and cordial conversation about various matters pertaining to the 
establishment of the Atlantic pact. However, details of this discussion disclosed the 
ulterior motive of the visit: The Turkish government wanted to hear from Bevin himself 
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why Britain had not suggested including Turkey in the Atlantic pact. In justifying Britain’s 
opposition to the inclusion of Turkey, Bevin first mentioned the case of Italian 
membership. Bevin took Italy as his reference because, at the time the conversation 
was being held, the February 1949 meetings in Washington under Acheson had decided 
to exclude Italy from becoming an original member of NATO. Bevin’s explanation was as 
follows: 
 
As to the proposal declaration in respect of countries not concerned in 
the Atlantic Pact, I would like first to consider the case of Italy. I had been 
against the inclusion of Italy in the Pact. The reason was not because I 
was against Italy – any more than I was against Greece or Turkey – but 
because I was convinced that we would be better advised to create a 
well-organised nucleus before widening our organisation and thus 
diffusing out potential resources. I had told the Italian Government that 
it was not politics or prestige that should govern our thinking on this 
matter but the strictly practical issues.350 
 
Bevin also added that ‘if the Pact were too wide at the beginning, we [Britain] had felt 
that there would be a greater danger of the US Congress not accepting it.’351 Bevin’s 
answer validates the argument of this study: that Bevin was more focused on speed so 
that the Atlantic pact could be formed at the soonest opportunity. Bevin, although 
aware that Turkey was keen to join NATO, worried any response from Turkey in regard 
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to its exclusion would bring unnecessary delays. Bevin thus suggested that ‘perhaps his 
Excellency might instruct the Turkish Ambassador in Washington to keep in touch with 
His Majesty’s Ambassador and the representatives of the other countries engaged in 
negotiating upon the Pact in order that they should be apprised from day to day of 
Turkish reaction. This would be a helpful way of avoiding delays.’352 
 
Earlier in the conversation, Bevin had expressed his concern to Sadak about the 
problem with Article 5. The United States had wanted to water down the wording of 
Article 5 - which would bind the United States with the automatic commitment to go to 
war - further delaying the conclusion of the Atlantic pact.353 Bevin told Sadak that he 
had been in agreement with the original text of Article 5, ‘but Acheson had discussed 
the matter with Senators Vandenberg and Connolly, as a result of which a new text had 
been evolved which was feebler than the original. This was the cause of Bevin’s 
disquiet.’354 This matter indirectly implied that Bevin would not have let any other issue 
that could cause more delays, such as Italian or Turkish (and Greek) membership, be 
brought into the talks and risk jeopardising the quick formation of NATO. With Greece 
and Turkey still in dispute over Cyprus, their membership was too complicated to 
handle when discussions in Washington had already suffered from delays as a result of 
the Italian and Algerian cases.  
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Sadak also questioned Bevin as to why he and the other Brussels powers were keen to 
speed up arrangements to create the Atlantic pact. Bevin’s answer was as follow: 
 
We had decided to work on similar lines to those adopted in respect of 
the Marshall Plan – namely to help ourselves in so far we could and to 
seek aid from the United States to meet those requirements which could 
not be met from our own resources.355 
 
It seemed that Bevin saw the Atlantic pact as the main mechanism for assisting Britain 
in solving its economic difficulties and thus restoring its superpower status and prestige. 
Seemingly, Britain’s weakness in defence matters as a result of its economic problems 
was of the utmost concern to Bevin, which explains his determination to bring the 
Atlantic pact into existence as soon as possible. 
 
It is also worth mentioning here that, before the conversation come to an end, Sadak 
had frankly put before Bevin a further point concerning the issue of membership. ‘The 
Turkish government had, he said, been told that the Atlantic pact was designed on a 
geographical basis *…+ but if Italy were included, that would change the situation.’356 
Sadak also stated that ‘it would be difficult for Turkey to understand why Italy should 
figure in a North Atlantic Pact and why Turkey should be excluded.’357 As a matter of 
fact, Bevin had indirectly revealed why Britain had accepted Italian membership. He 
noted that, due to the US and French governments’ keenness to bring Italy in, Britain 
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‘had, therefore, been under considerable pressure’ to acquiesce to these two 
governments’ preference for Italian membership.358 Bevin’s statement validates further 
the argument of this study, that the geographical issue that happened to exclude 
Greece and Turkey from NATO was no longer the primary concern when Bevin 
compromised on Italian membership. It also strengthens the argument that the delays 
that occurred throughout the negotiation years had influenced Bevin’s negative attitude 
towards Greek and Turkish membership.  
 
Besides Sadak, the Greek Ambassador to London, M. Mostras, also visited the Foreign 
Office and asked one of its officials, J. W. Russell, about the Greek government’s 
membership of NATO. Similarly, Russell’s answer to Mostras was also concerned with 
the possible delay that the Greek government might have brought about if it insisted on 
joining NATO at this critical stage. Russell’s reply to Mostras was as follows: 
 
Mostras was now enquiring on behalf of [Greek diplomat Panagiotis] 
Pipinelis for what role, if any, Greece was being cast in the present 
deliberations on the Atlantic Pact. Russell replied that discussions were 
still going on, and that they were at a critical stage; that no firm decisions 
had yet been reached as to what, if any, other countries were to be 
invited to join the Pact; that various candidates had been mentioned; 
that Italy, as he has doubtless read in the press, had been the subject of 
lively discussions but no decision had yet been reached; that it seemed 
unlikely that any other Mediterranean powers [Greece and Turkey] 
                                                 
358
 Ibid., p. 3. 
130 
 
would be invited to join; *…+ The North Atlantic Pact was not yet drafted: 
it was still in any case to be accepted in Congress and in the Canadian 
House of Representatives; when it was signed we would be able to see 
the next step more clearly.359 
 
Russell’s statement indirectly implied that it was better for NATO to get congressional 
approval before any decision could be taken regarding Greek and Turkish membership 
in NATO. The Foreign Office, like Bevin, preferred NATO to be formed without delay, 
believing any new proposal for membership would further complicate the discussions. 
 
As for the second issue, namely that of Cyprus, this study’s argument that this also 
contributed to Bevin’s negative attitude towards Greek and Turkish membership of 
NATO became evident during the meetings of the Committee of Ambassadors in 
January 1949. It is worth mentioning here that, throughout the negotiations years, the 
Committee of Ambassadors did not favour the inclusion of countries that were 
struggling with domestic difficulties, namely Spain, Italy and later Algeria because these 
countries were presumed to be a liability rather than an asset.360 During these January 
1949 meetings, the Committee of Ambassadors was concerned by the idea of Algeria 
being covered by NATO’s pledge. It should be mentioned here that, although the British 
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and other Brussels powers’ representatives were not in favour of Algeria being covered 
by NATO’s pledge, their position was not rigid. The British government, for instance, 
due to its sympathy with the French position, ‘had been thinking of the inclusion of all 
Africa north of latitude 30° north’ which would encompass Algeria, Libya and Egypt.361 
Similarly, Mr. Van Kelffens, the Dutch representative, noted that ‘if the majority thought 
it wise to include North Africa, the Netherlands would not oppose it.’362 However, the 
United States and Canadian representatives strongly opposed the inclusion of French 
North Africa ‘on the ground that it set a precedent for other colonial areas and posed 
the risk of drawing them into colonial conflicts.’363 
 
It seemed that the US and Canadian representatives were worried that, if Algeria was to 
be included, this would present the opportunity for other ambassadors and their 
respective governments, which also possessed colonial areas, to claim a place for their 
colonies in NATO. Although these two representatives did not specifically mention 
which other ambassadors, this study believes they were surely referring to the British 
Ambassador Franks and the British government, whose Crown Colony of Cyprus was 
currently experiencing political unrest due to enosis. Bevin planned to use British bases 
in Cyprus for NATO purposes, which he noted in his memorandum as follows: 
 
Provided we can organise a Western European system such as I have 
outlined above, backed by the power and resources of the 
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Commonwealth and of the Americans, it should be possible to develop 
our own power and influence to equal that of the United States of 
America and the U.S.S.R. We have the material resources in the Colonial 
Empire if we develop them [Cyprus base], and by giving a spiritual lead 
now, we should be able to carry out our task in a way which will show 
clearly that we are not subservient to the United States of America or to 
the Soviet Union.364 
 
The US and Canadian representatives were worried that the British government might 
try to do for Cyprus what the French did for Algeria. If this were to occur, they worried 
their respective governments would inevitably become involved in the Cyprus dispute. 
Since the US and Canadian representatives refused to admit countries suffering 
domestic political difficulties, like Algeria and Cyprus, in the Atlantic pact, the suggestion 
of Greek and Turkish membership, two countries at that time in dispute over Cyprus, 
could be regarded as an unwise move. This was apparently because the Committee of 
Ambassadors might require further meetings to discuss this matter, thus dragging the 
negotiations out longer. This happened before the issue of Italian membership was 
raised again in the January 1949 meeting and was recorded as follows: 
 
The question of the inclusion of Italy in the Pact had been brought to the 
front by a formal request on the part of Italy. He [Lovett] regretted that 
the request had been made because it could prove to be a complicating 
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element in Italian internal affairs. However, since the request had been 
made, it was necessary that it be considered.365 
 
It is worth pointing out again here that the Greek and the Turkish governments’ 
requests for membership coincided with the rise of the Cyprus dispute and also 
coincided with Bevin and the British representatives’ struggle against the delays caused 
by the question of Italian membership, from late 1948 until early 1949. Since Italian and 
Algerian memberships had already complicated the talks and delayed the conclusion of 
the Atlantic pact treaty, this study believes that Bevin refused to complicate the 
situation further and cause more delays by suggesting Greek and Turkish membership. 
Bevin’s perception of another delay was evident in his answer to the Foreign Minister of 
the Netherlands, Dirk Stikker, when the latter asked Bevin about why Portugal, Greece 
and Turkey were not included in the Atlantic pact. This conversation took place during 
the Meeting of Consultative Council of the Five-Power Brussels Treaty in London, 
between 27 and 29 January 1949, during which Bevin answered Stikker as follows: 
 
Mr. Bevin said there were some political difficulties here. He noticed 
Ireland was left out. He would not mind Ireland coming in and he was 
open to discussion about Portugal, but he did think Turkey and Greece 
might present some difficulties. Switzerland also was a problem since, if 
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we invited her, we might get a rebuff. He thought it most important to 
avoid that.366 
 
Although Bevin did not explain what ‘some political difficulties’ meant, given the 
political hostility between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus it seems likely he was 
referring to this issue.  It is possible that, if Bevin suggested that these two problematic 
countries be invited to join NATO alongside their Mediterranean neighbour, Italy, the 
other representatives, in particular those of the United States and Canada, would have 
delayed discussions until the British representatives dropped the idea. Moreover, it 
would have been difficult to obtain the approval of the US Congress on Greek and 
Turkish NATO membership. This was because, when Acheson had approached Senators 
Vandenberg, Connally and George for advice about Italian membership in late February 
1948, they rejected Italian membership on the same grounds as Greek and Turkish 
membership. This matter was recorded as follows: 
 
The Senators were unanimous in their view that the wisest course at 
present would be not to have Italy an original signatory. They expressed 
considerable doubt as to the wisdom of having Italy in the pact at all. 
However, they were maintaining open mind upon this point. They 
thought that the presence of Italy in the pact would not be a help in 
putting it through the Senate, but would probably be a hindrance. The 
points that they raised were: First, the difficulty which this raised as to 
the pact’s regional character; second, the problems which it raised in 
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regard to Greece and Turkey; third, the problem that with Italy in, Tito 
might be forced to closer relations with Russia.367 
 
In conclusion this section proves that, in light of further archival research using British 
records, it was Bevin who refused to bring Greece and Turkey into NATO during the 
negotiation years. This was mainly due to Bevin’s personal aim for NATO to be formed 
without further delays. Based on the analysis and discussion in this section, one can 
argue that the Cyprus issue might also have influenced Bevin to leave Greece and 
Turkey out of NATO during its formative years. It should be noted that Bevin’s decision 
not to invite Greece and Turkey to join NATO did not mean that he had underestimated 
the importance of these countries to British strategic and security interests. Bevin had 
repeatedly asked Sir Oliver Franks to remind the United States government about the 
need to provide Greece and Turkey some assurance of security so that their 
independence and integrity could be secured.368 This matter proves that Bevin never 
neglected Greece and Turkey and thus his decision to exclude them from NATO was 
merely because the question was not yet appropriate to be discussed because it would 
cause more delay in concluding the Atlantic pact treaty. This was the circumstance that 
Bevin wanted to avoid. 
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Conclusion 
 
On 4 April 1949, NATO was founded without Greek and Turkish membership. Only Italy 
managed to become one of NATO’s original members, while Algeria was included within 
the coverage area of this treaty. The geographical location of Greece and Turkey and 
the prospect of a Mediterranean pact are two common reasons that can be found in 
available literature to explain why the British government did not propose that Greece 
and Turkey be included in NATO, despite these countries’ significance to British 
strategic interests.369 However, by analysing this rejection in light of Bevin’s concerns 
over the delays that hampered his aspiration to form NATO as soon as possible, the 
importance of the Cyprus issue increases. This was because the protracted and delayed 
negotiations that resulted from the United States’ hesitations, as well as the 
complicated issues of Italian and Algerian membership, had led Bevin to conclude that 
Greek and Turkish membership of NATO was not yet appropriate to be tabled and 
discussed at that time given their bitter dispute over Cyprus.  
 
The Cyprus issue has been considered by other historians as irrelevant or is absent from 
the literature. This explains why previous historians have made less effort in 
investigating the correlation between the Cyprus issue and Britain’s rejection of Greek 
and Turkish membership of NATO during the negotiation years. It is worth emphasising 
here that without considering the circumstances, namely the delays in NATO 
arrangements; Bevin’s enthusiasm to have NATO formed as soon as possible; and the 
rise of the Greco-Turkish Cyprus conflict, it seems likely the geographical issue and 
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prospect of a Mediterranean pact would remain the only two reasons considered to 
have influenced Bevin and the Foreign Office to exclude Greece and Turkey from NATO. 
 
Once again, this study believes that these reasons no longer could be defended when 
Italy, a country that was supposed to be included in a Mediterranean pact together with 
Greece and Turkey, was invited to join NATO. What is more, when considering that 
Greece and Turkey were significant for both Britain and the United States in regard to 
their strategic interests in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, it seems unnatural to 
see Italy included in NATO without Greece and Turkey. This matter also indicates that, 
although Greece and Turkey were important to Britain due to its strategic interests and 
the need to prevent these countries falling under Soviet domination, it seems that 
Bevin’s objective to form NATO swiftly was his utmost priority at that time. Hence, this 
study argues that the Cyprus dispute between Greece and Turkey had inflicted damage 
on these countries’ chances of becoming NATO members. This was apparently because 
Bevin believed the proposal for these countries’ membership might have posed another 
delay to NATO’s formation. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Cyprus Issue and Turkish Interest in joining NATO: the MEC as a Means to Prevent 
Turkish, and thus Greek, Membership in NATO, 1949-1950 
 
Introduction 
 
Historians studying the rejection of NATO enlargement and the exclusion of Greece and 
Turkey have largely focused on the point of view of smaller NATO members, namely the 
Scandinavian countries and the Brussels countries.370 These smaller members were 
reluctant to accept Greece and Turkey as new NATO members for various reasons, most 
notably the geographic issue. Yet they had to acquiesce to the decision of NATO’s key 
ally, the United States, which strongly favoured Greece and Turkey’s admission into 
NATO.371 The perspective of Britain also has been studied by historians and two reasons 
for its rejection of Greece and Turkey have been considered: the geographic location of 
these countries and the MEC plan.372 Considering the fact that the United States had 
already supported their inclusion in NATO, both were of great importance to British 
strategic interests in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, and both countries had 
yet to participate in any security systems, Britain’s continued rejection of Greece and 
Turkey’s inclusion in NATO during the high Cold War period could be regarded as 
bizarre. 
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The purpose of this chapter is to further inspect Britain’s reasons for rejecting Turkish 
requests for membership of NATO in 1950 as they relate to the Cyprus issue. This will 
help to understand why Britain, especially Bevin and the Foreign Office, remained 
uninterested in accepting Greece and Turkey in NATO during the period after it was 
formed. This chapter also reassesses the question of the MEC, which is regarded by 
previous historians as a key reason for Britain’s continued refusal to include Greece and 
Turkey in NATO. This chapter argues that the British government, in particular Bevin and 
the Foreign Office, used the MEC as a means to prevent Turkish, and thus Greek, 
membership of NATO due to the Cyprus issue.  
 
To explain these arguments, this chapter is divided into three main sections. The first 
section is a discussion of the Cyprus dispute between Greek Cypriots and Turkish 
Cypriots, which had affected Anglo-Greek and Greco-Turkish relationships between late 
1949 and 1950. Discussion of this matter is essential in order to understand how the 
Cyprus issue had diminished Greece and Turkey’s chance of becoming members of 
NATO in 1950. The second section is the crux of this study’s argument: that the British 
Foreign Office used the MEC as a means to keep Greece and Turkey outside NATO. To 
substantiate this, a prelude to Turkey’s inclusion in the MEC is touched upon. It 
discusses first the Turkish Republican People’s Party (RPP) government’s concern over 
the defence of the Middle East, which had been ongoing since late 1949. This matter 
had heightened its interest in joining NATO, leading to a formal request for Turkish 
membership in NATO in early May 1950. The British Foreign Office’s two prominent 
efforts towards the defence of the Middle East, in cooperation with the Egyptian 
government before May 1950, will also be discussed. In both these efforts, no thought 
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was given to including Turkey as a member. The British Foreign Office’s move to bring 
Turkey into the defence of the Middle East only after the latter formally requested 
membership in NATO in May 1950, suggests the MEC was used as a means to exclude 
Turkey from NATO. The third section discusses the British Foreign Office’s justification 
for rejecting Turkey’s second request for NATO membership in August 1950, which is 
linked to the Cyprus issue. To elucidate this argument, this section briefly touches upon 
circumstances that brought the United States to accept this second request. It then 
analyses the British Foreign Office’s judgment against NATO enlargement that was 
influenced by the Cyprus issue. 
 
Britain, Greece, Turkey and the ‘Cyprus question’, 1949-1950 
 
The new position of Bevin and his Foreign Office regarding the continuation of British 
rule in Cyprus was indirectly responsible for the trouble between Greece and Turkey 
over the island.373 The change of decision was made in late 1946, when the situation in 
Greece deteriorated further due to invasion, occupation, resistance, reprisals and the 
danger of civil war.374 As Bevin said to the Greek Ambassador in London, M. Aghnidis, it 
was ‘senseless to hand Cyprus to Greece if that country was on the point of going 
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communist.’375 The determination of Bevin, the Foreign Office and the COS to retain 
British sovereignty in Cyprus was reinforced by Britain’s relative decline in the Middle 
East region and the loss of other regional assets, including Palestine in 1948, Egypt’s 
challenge to Britain over the Sudan and the Suez base, and Prime Minister Mohammed 
Mussadiq’s open defiance of Britain in Iran in the early 1950s.376 Britain saw Cyprus as 
the better option and believed it should be retained under British possession. As noted 
by the War Office in 1951, ‘much instability has been caused in the Middle East by 
moves and rumours of moves of British troops. A stable and firmly held British 
stronghold on Cyprus is therefore of the greatest strategic importance.’377 
 
Moreover, according to the COS in April 1948, Cyprus could provide a base for military 
offensives against the Soviet Union in the midst of the Cold War, since the Soviet Union 
was within bomber range of the bases in Cyprus.378 Britain therefore put forward the 
Winster Constitutional Proposals of 1948 in order to stay in Cyprus.379 In response to 
Britain’s initiative, the Greek Cypriots brought their mother country Greece into the 
local conflict to combat the Winster Proposals and to fight for enosis in mid-1948. As 
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the Greek Cypriots turned to Athens, the Turkish Cypriots sought help from their 
mother country, Turkey, to assist them against the enosis movement.380  
 
Britain’s determination to maintain control of Cyprus, even after the abortive 
constitutional offer,381 worsened the situation between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots 
and generated more problems between Greece and Turkey.382 At the domestic level, 
the demand for enosis became stronger when a Cypriot communist party, the 
Progressive Party of the Working People (AKEL – Anorthotiko Komma Ergazomenou 
Laou) initiated the first notice of a plebiscite - a collection of signatures to support or 
oppose union with Greece - in September 1949 by publicly offering the Ethnarchy383 
(the Right) its co-operation in promoting the cause of enosis before the UN.384 This 
initiative became more organised when the Ethnarchy agreed to sponsor the plebiscite 
in the domestic domain by extending the propaganda campaign in two stages. This 
matter was noted by Sir Andrew B. Wright, Governor of Cyprus in the late 1940s, to the 
British Secretary of State for the Colonies, Sir Arthur Creech Jones, as follows: 
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First, a plebiscite to be carried out in the churches. Second, formal 
election (in accordance with local procedure of electing archbishop) of 
persons (? to go) to Greece to represent Greek people of Cyprus in 
Parliamentary Chamber in Athens in imitation of historic coup adopted 
for Crete.385 
 
In the same telegram, without mention of the churches, Wright reported that the first 
stage had already been adopted by the Ethnarchy.386 This circumstance prompted the 
Turkish Cypriot political parties, which had the same aspirations against enosis, to 
abandon their differences and merge into a single Federation of Turkish Associations 
(FTA) and hold a rally in Nicosia on 12 December 1949 against the plebiscite.387 The FTA, 
therefore, demanded that if the British left the island it should be returned to Turkey.388 
According to historian Stefanidis, the FTA also demanded that Governor Wright stop the 
plebiscite.389 Wright and the British government had already taken a series of actions to 
prevent plebiscite propaganda, including demanding a removal of the Greek Consul-
General in Nicosia, Alexis Liatis, from his position due to his association with the 
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plebiscite movement,390 placing a ban on enosis meetings in Cyprus391 and warning 
against signing the referendum.392 Yet despite these measures, the Ethnarchy and AKEL 
managed to proceed to the second stage on 15 January 1950. The result of this 
plebiscite was as follows: 
 
The “plebiscite” held in Cyprus on the 15th of January, 1950 and 
throughout the following week resulted, as expected, in an 
overwhelmingly large vote in favour of union with Greece (Enosis). It is 
estimated that about 96% of the Greek population of the island signed. 
(One fifth of the population is Turkish and is strongly opposed to 
Enosis).393 
 
The Greek government had supported the Ethnarchy and AKEL’s active effort in 
pursuing enosis since late 1949. For instance, the King and Queen of Hellenes conveyed 
their support for enosis during the meeting with Koumparides, Secretary of Cyprus 
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Ethnarchy.394 In addition, ten deputies in the Greek Parliament supported proposals for 
the union of Cyprus with Greece during a motion tabled on 13 December 1949.395 The 
increased support of Greece for the enosis movement and a heightened plebiscite 
campaign in January 1950 provoked Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish press. The FTA 
organised an anti-plebiscite movement and sent a delegation to Ankara ‘to present their 
views on the “Enosis” question to the Turkish Government.’396 The British Ambassador 
to Turkey, Sir Noel Charles, informed the Foreign Office that ‘most leading Istanbul 
papers report student demonstrations against cession of Island to Greece and against 
proposal to hold a plebiscite.’397 The Turkish government reassured the delegation and 
the public that ‘there was no risk of the island being handed back to Greece.’398 This 
matter was evident in a letter sent by the Southern Department of the Foreign Office to 
the British Ambassador in Athens, which stated that ‘His Majesty’s Government are not 
at present in a position to give the question [enosis] further consideration or to settle it 
in a manner favourable to Greece.’399 The Turkish government also stressed ‘that the 
Turkish Government had made it clear to His Majesty’s Government that if by any 
chance we were to leave Cyprus, Turkey would expect to be consulted.’400 
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After the plebiscite and the result favouring union with Greece, the Ethnarchy and AKEL 
sent a separate delegation to Athens, London and the United States in order to present 
the plebiscite results. These Greek Cypriot political parties’ efforts to publicise the 
plebiscite had considerable success in Athens.401 The communist delegation was warmly 
received by the Greek Left, while the Speaker of the Chamber accepted a volume 
containing plebiscite signatures brought by the Ethnarchy.402 Large and enthusiastic 
meetings in favour of union were held and the Greek Orthodox Church in Athens was 
now well engaged in the enosis campaign.403 
 
In response to these developments, the Turkish Cypriots made more serious efforts to 
prevent Cyprus from ceding to Greece. During the Ethnarchy delegation’s visit to 
London in early August 1950, the FTA staged anti-enosis demonstration in Cyprus, 
Turkey and London, exhibiting placards reading “Long live union of Cyprus with Turkey” 
and “Cyprus belong to us”.404 Meanwhile in Turkey, the Turkish government established 
the ‘Cyprus is Turkish’ Society in order to oppose the possibility of Cyprus being ceded 
to Greece.405 According to the British Ambassador to Turkey, Noel Charles, the Turkish 
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government was determined to remain friendly with Greece, but it could not allow any 
change of sovereignty in Cyprus in a manner harmful to Turkish interests.406 As noted by 
Charles regarding the Turkish attitude to the Cyprus question: 
 
He *Turkish Foreign Minister Sadak+ concluded by saying that Turkey’s 
policy was against acquiring new territories or reclaiming parts of their 
old empire; they had parted with many islands close to their coast but 
Cyprus was so much nearer Turkey than to Greece and it would raise a 
grave issue if there were a possibility of the island being handed back to 
Greece.407  
 
Seemingly, the plebiscite caused the dispute between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots to 
become more intense and contributed to a further deterioration in relations between 
their respective mother countries, Greece and Turkey.408 
 
Regarding the visits to London and the United States, London refused to meet both the 
AKEL409 and the Ethnarchy delegations.410 Since these delegations could not discuss the 
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plebiscite in London, they proceeded with their plan to bring the Cyprus question 
before the UN by visiting the US State Department in order to get American support.411 
However, only the Ethnarchy delegation had a chance to meet the Assistant Secretary 
for Congressional Relations, Jack McFall, in the State Department on 13 September 
1950 since the communist delegation had been denied entry to the United States.412 
The communist delegation, therefore, travelled to the capitals of Eastern Europe and 
notified the Eastern Bloc of the plebiscite results.413 
 
It is worth mentioning here that, two months before the Ethnarchy delegation reached 
the United States, John Martin, the British Under-Secretary for Colonial Affairs, was sent 
to the United States. He was tasked with winning American support for the retention of 
British sovereignty in Cyprus by clarifying the strategic importance of the island and 
seeking assurances that the Cyprus question would not be discussed at the UN.414 
Although Martin received an unsatisfactory answer on the former matter,415 the 
                                                                                                                                               
410
 See enclosed report by Mary Fisher of the Colonial Office to Mr R. C. Barnes of the Southern 
Department of Foreign Office about ‘Visit of Cyprus Ethnarchy Delegations to the United States’ in TNA, 
CO 67/370/4, From Cyprus to Foreign Office, 31 August 1950 for further discussion on London’s reasons 
for rejection that were given to the Ethnarchy delegation. See also SHC, Coughlan, Volume XI, Enosis and 
the British: British Official Documents 1878-1950, VIII. Visit of Cyprus Ethnarchy Delegations to the United 
States, 1950 (CO 67/370/4), p. 250; TNA, FO 381/87723/RG 1081/176, ‘Demand for the Union of Cyprus 
with Greece’, Colonial Office (on behalf the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Jim Griffiths) to the Bishop 
of Kyrenia, 12 August 1950; TNA, FO 381/87723/RG 1081/178, Southern Department (Mr R. C. Barnes) to 
Church of England Council on Foreign Relations (Dr G. L. Prestige), 23 August 1950; Stefanidis, Isle of 
Discord: Nationalism, Imperialism and the Making of the Cyprus Problem, p. 15; Crawshaw, p. 59. 
411
 See Ibid. See also Ibid. 
412
 Stefanidis, Isle of Discord: Nationalism, Imperialism and the Making of the Cyprus Problem, p. 16. 
413
 Ibid. See also enclosed report by Mary Fisher of the Colonial Office to Mr R. C. Barnes of the Southern 
Department of Foreign Office about ‘Visit of Cyprus Ethnarchy Delegations to the United States’ in TNA, 
CO 67/370/4, From Cyprus to Foreign Office, 31 August 1950. See also SHC, Coughlan, Volume XI, Enosis 
and the British: British Official Documents 1878-1950, VIII. Visit of Cyprus Ethnarchy Delegations to the 
United States, 1950 (CO 67/370/4), p. 249. 
414
 For the proposed discussion with the Americans on the possibility of the Cyprus question being raised 
at the UN General Assembly, see TNA, FO 371/87721/RG 1081/147, Miss M. Fisher (Colonial Office) to Mr 
Barnes (Southern Department), 29 June 1950. 
415
 See record of discussion on Cyprus held at the State Department on July 10th, 1950 enclosed in TNA, 
FO 371/87722/RG 1081/158, British Embassy Washington to Sir Anthony Rumbold (Southern 
149 
 
officials of the US State Department agreed with the latter issue. They worried ‘the 
A.K.E.L. would ask the Soviet Delegation or any of the Satellite Delegations to sponsor 
this issue at Lake Success [New York, USA - then home of the United Nations+.’416 
However, if the Cyprus question succeeded in being placed on the General Assembly 
Agenda, the US officials suggested to Martin that the Greek government should be 
persuaded ‘to settle this issue at a suitable moment by direct negotiations with the 
United Kingdom within the framework of traditional Anglo-Greek friendship.’417 
Although Martin did not favour this suggestion during the meeting,418 the Colonial 
Office later agreed to it when Mr Frederick Hoyer Miller, the UK Deputy at the North 
Atlantic Council, informed the Foreign Office the possibility of Cyprus being raised at the 
UN.419 As stated by Mary Fisher of the Colonial Office to Mr R. C. Barnes of the Southern 
Department of Foreign Office: ‘Lobby the Greeks to stick to the line taken by General 
Plastiras that this was a purely Anglo-Greek question and not one for the United 
Nations.’420 The Colonial Office believed that, if the Cyprus question were to be brought 
before the UN, it would create trouble rather than solve the issue. This matter was 
noted by Mary Fisher in the same letter to Mr Barnes as follows:  
 
We had no reason now to expect that the Cyprus question would be 
brought forward by the Egyptians or the Syrians. It seemed to us much 
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more likely that it would be raised by one of the Eastern European 
countries. (As you know of A.K.E.L. delegation arrived in Prague in the 
course of last month). The object would, or course, not be to achieve 
Enosis but to make trouble.421 
 
Accordingly, when the Ethnarchy delegation visited the US State Department in 
September 1950, McFall told them that the US government preferred the Cyprus 
question to be settled within the framework of Anglo-Greek relations. McFall stated 
that ‘the *Cyprus+ question concerned the British government alone and, in any case, it 
was improper to raise it in such a time of crisis *the Korean War+.’422 What is more, 
according to Kelling, since the Cypriot Ethnarchy delegation was not a member of the 
UN, it could not submit a resolution without a sponsor.423 Even if a sponsor had been 
forthcoming, Cyprus had in fact already missed the deadline for the forthcoming 
session, since the Assembly’s agenda had already been circulated, approved and 
allocated to committees.424 
 
As a matter of fact, on the same day the Ethnarchy delegation arrived in Athens, on 24 
May 1950, the Greek Prime Minister, Alexandros Diomidis, announced at the close of a 
debate on Cyprus in the Greek Chamber that he preferred the Cyprus question to be 
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settled with the British government within the framework of traditional Anglo-Greek 
friendship.425 Diomidis’ speech was as follows: 
 
The Greek Government feels deep emotion at the presence in Athens of 
the national mission of the people of Cyprus, which is bringing the 
island’s universal message in favour of old-established Anglo-Greek 
friendship, a friendship which we want to see undisturbed, and in 
conformity with the proven liberal traditions of that great democracy, we 
express the hope that satisfaction will be given to the universal desire of 
all Greeks for enosis, which is destined to make warmer still the bonds 
between, and to serve the common interests of the two countries.426 
 
The Greek Prime Minister’s speech was well received by all speakers in the Chamber. 
The speakers agreed that ‘the Greek government should accept the Cypriot offer of 
enosis and take the matter up with the British Government,’ rather than a recourse to 
the UN.427 The Greek Prime Minister wanted to avoid souring the relationship between 
the Greek and British governments over the Cyprus question. This is evident in the fact 
that, earlier in mid-December 1949, at the early stage of the plebiscite movement, the 
Greek Prime Minister had voiced concerns that ‘further enosis agitation might endanger 
Greece’s international position.’428 The Greek Prime Minister then stressed that 
‘friendship with our allies must remain unshaken since the solution of all our problems 
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depends on it.’429 The question of Greek security was one of the utmost problems 
concerning the Greek government, given that Cold War tension was on the increase.430 
Furthermore, Greece had yet to become a member of any security system, having been 
excluded from NATO during its formative years and a Mediterranean pact still existing 
only on paper.431  
 
It is worth mentioning here that the Greek government had started to ask both the US 
and Britain about being included in NATO in late 1949.432 This was due to a number of 
factors: first, the forthcoming reduction in the Greek Armed Forces and the withdrawal 
of British forces from Greece due to the civil war coming to an end in October 1949.433 
Secondly, Britain and the United States refused to form a Mediterranean pact 
imminently, since both believed ‘it was premature to consider the setting up of an 
Eastern Mediterranean Pact.’434 Furthermore, the Greek government believed that 
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Britain’s security guarantee to Greece, which had been given in 1939 and implemented 
in 1940, was ‘no longer operative.’435 Due to these circumstances, the Greek 
government told the US government that it ‘felt that it was necessary to do something 
to prevent undesirable developments in Greece.’436 To ensure the safety of Greece in 
the midst of the Cold War, it was crucial to maintain a good relationship with the 
Western powers and, in the case of Cyprus, with Britain in particular. Seemingly, the 
Greek government walked a tightrope between the demands of the Greek Cypriots for 
enosis and the struggle to maintain a good relationship with the British government. 
 
Although the Greek government needed to avoid a confrontation with Britain because 
of Cyprus, the Turkish government operated under different circumstances. The Turkish 
government could maintain good relations with the British government without much 
worry, since both they and the Turkish Cypriots believed the best way to prevent enosis 
was by supporting the retention of British rule in Cyprus.437 The Turkish Foreign Minister 
Sadak’s position can be observed in the following: 
 
In reply to my [British Ambassador Charles] question M. Sadak said very 
confidentially that the Turkish Government and people would be 
fundamentally concerned if a change of sovereignty were envisaged. 
Turkey’s interest was mainly stratigic *sic], and so long as the island 
remained in British hands they felt quite happy as it would afford 
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protection to Turkey and the port of Iskenderun besides assuring supply 
of military and other assistance in the event of war.438 
 
Sir Mehmed Munir, the Turkish representative on the Governor’s Executive Council to 
the Foreign Office, also made the same remarks on this matter: ‘They [the Turkish 
Cypriots] were supporting the regime [British rule] because they disliked the prospect of 
union with Greece.’439 Nevertheless, due to the Turkish government’s support for the 
Turkish Cypriots, the Cyprus question caused damage to Greco-Turkish relations. As 
remarked by Under-Secretary for Colonial Affairs, Martin, during a meeting with US 
State Department officials in July 1950 regarding the Cyprus question, ‘any such 
agreement would come as a disagreeable shock to the Turks and would damage Greco-
Turkish relations.’440 
 
Overall, although the Greek Cypriots’ efforts were fruitless in bringing the 1950 
plebiscite to the UN, they did however worsen their conflict with the Turkish Cypriots. 
As the mother countries of these two ethnic communities, relations between Greece 
and Turkey, as well as their internal politics, were affected by this conflict. Greco-
Turkish rivalry over Cyprus has since brought these two countries to the brink of war.441 
As the sovereign power in Cyprus, Britain’s involvement in this bitter conflict was 
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inevitable and diplomacy between the three countries became increasingly 
complicated. 
 
Given that the relationship between Greece and Turkey deteriorated further between 
late 1949 and 1950 as a result of the plebiscite, and given that, at the same time, both 
countries were in a search for security with the Western powers, this study believes 
Greco-Turkish rivalry over Cyprus affected these countries’ chances of becoming 
members of NATO during the period after it was successfully established. This in turn 
leads to a new insight into the MEC, which this study believes was a means of keeping 
Turkey, and thus Greece, outside of NATO. To elucidate this argument, Turkey and 
Britain’s initiatives in the defence of the Middle East during this period will be analysed 
in-depth. 
 
The MEC as a means of preventing Turkish, and thus Greek, membership of NATO 
 
The MEC was a regional defence pact of the Middle East pursued by Britain, with the 
ultimate aim of safeguarding this vital strategic area from Soviet penetration.442 The 
idea for this military arrangement that would consist of Britain, Egypt, Israel and the 
Arab States had emerged in late 1945 due to the Egyptian government’s demand for 
unconditional withdrawal of British troops from Egypt and the Suez Canal Zone.443 The 
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Foreign Office and the COS anticipated that the Soviet Union would manage to take 
over the Suez Canal Zone and subsequently military facilities comprising fighter 
squadrons and bomber bases in Egypt if Britain agreed to evacuate.444 Given that Egypt 
and the Suez Canal Zone were vital positions for the defence of the Middle East, this 
situation would bring about Soviet domination in the region and ‘would heighten the 
probability of world war in which we [Britain] should be massacred.’445 Britain was 
convinced that, by turning the Suez Canal Zone into an Allied base and offering Egypt an 
equal partnership in a regional defence effort (which became officially known as the 
MEC in early 1951),446 Soviet penetration in the Middle East could be avoided even if 
British troops had evacuated this zone. 
 
As regards to the question of NATO membership, Greece and Turkey had been excluded 
from NATO when the treaty was signed in April 1949. However, neither had given up 
hope of joining and continued to ask about the possibility of their inclusion between 
late 1949 and 1950. It is worth mentioning here that Turkey’s efforts were made in a 
more demanding manner than those of Greece. This was noticeable when only Turkey 
requested membership in NATO in early May 1950. There are several matters that may 
have caused Greece to be less persistent in asking for its inclusion in NATO than Turkey. 
Firstly, Greece was, during that period, recovering from a civil war. Secondly, the Greek 
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Cypriots demanded Greece’s support for enosis and their plebiscite movement. The 
Greek government was also satisfied with the Anglo-American “Joint Declaration” to 
Greece and Turkey, which provided an alternative safety guarantee to countries that 
were not included in NATO.447 Furthermore, Greece still hoped that a Mediterranean 
pact would be formed by the Western powers, as shown by the fact that it once again 
advocated for this pact in February 1949.448 
 
Therefore, in order to understand Turkey’s efforts, this section focuses on its initiative 
to obtain membership of NATO between late 1949 and early 1950 through its active 
involvement in the defence of the Middle East. Where the discussion touches upon the 
question of Turkish membership of NATO, its security partner, Greece, will also be 
mentioned. As discussed in Chapter One, Britain and the United States treated the 
security affairs of Greece and Turkey in a fraternal way. When the issue of the extension 
of NATO had been touched upon, the United States had asserted that ‘it would be 
unrealistic to include Turkey if Greece were not included.’449 This consideration had 
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generated a belief that Greece and Turkey were to be treated under one category and 
that they should be considered together, either both included or both excluded from 
NATO.450 
 
Turkish interest in NATO and the defence of the Middle East, late 1949 to early May 1950: 
Towards Turkey’s inclusion in the MEC 
 
When the Western powers finalised the treaty of NATO in April 1949 without Turkey as 
a member, the Turkish RPP government felt that Turkey was ‘being abandoned and left 
outside the thinking of the Western powers as regards security arrangements.’451 
Turkey also believed it was ‘the most exposed position of all European countries as 
regards pressure and possible attack from Soviet Russia.’452 The Turkish RPP 
government was therefore relentless in its pursuit of security guarantees from the 
Western powers. In response, the Western powers, in particular Britain and the United 
States, offered Turkey two solutions for defence matters: the Anglo-American “Joint 
Declaration” to Greece and Turkey and a Mediterranean pact (also known as an Eastern 
Mediterranean pact) that would be established under the Anglo-French-Turkish Treaty 
of Alliance of 1939. 
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Turkey, however, regarded these two solutions as inadequate to guarantee its safety. In 
regard to the first solution, Turkey was not satisfied with the American declaration since 
it was not delivered formally like Bevin did in the House of Commons:453 rather, 
Acheson broadcast the declaration only on US national radio, with no official support 
from the Senate.454 Turkey therefore believed that the American declaration would not 
be strong enough to fulfil its purpose.455 In regard to the second solution, a 
Mediterranean pact, Turkey ‘recognised that there was no other Eastern Mediterranean 
country, with the possible exception of Israel, which could provide any force capable of 
assisting Turkey in case of a major war.’456 Hence, a Mediterranean pact could bring 
Turkey nothing ‘but added complications and burdens.’457 Turkey did press the United 
States for a political arrangement, in which the US would at least associate itself with 
the Anglo-French-Turkish Treaty of Alliance of 1939. Turkey also proposed a 
Mediterranean pact that would be established under this 1939 Treaty and be linked to 
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NATO, so that the strength of the Mediterranean pact could be enhanced.458 However, 
the United States’ position appeared inconclusive regarding these suggestions.459 
 
These developments led Turkey to seek admission in a stronger defence pact, namely 
NATO. To do so, Turkey approached the British government first in early November 
1949, in particular Bevin and Strang.460 Unfortunately, both indicated that no extension 
could be considered at that time, stating that ‘the Atlantic Pact itself does not cover the 
Eastern Mediterranean and the Atlantic Powers as such will not themselves be 
discussing Eastern Mediterranean questions.’461 Although Turkey had yet to approach 
the United States, it had already been made aware of America’s reluctance to enlarge 
NATO when, earlier in October 1949, Acheson rejected the Greek Foreign Minister Mr 
Tsaldaris’s request for Greek inclusion in NATO. Acheson rejected Greek inclusion 
because he believed that NATO must be made to work first in Western Europe, before 
its extension to other countries could be considered.462 
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The American position against NATO enlargement became more explicit when George 
C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African 
Affairs, told the Turkish President, İsmet İnönü, and Turkish Foreign Minister, Sadak, 
that the United States preferred to give direct military assistance to Turkey, Greece and 
Iran during his visit to Ankara in December 1949. This visit took place after the 
Conference of American Chiefs of Mission in the Near East at Istanbul, Turkey, held 
between 26 and 29 November 1949.463 The Turkish RPP government thus ‘had gained 
the impression that there had been a lessening of interest in Turkey on the part of the 
United States as compared with what M. Sadak had found some months ago in 
Washington.’464 Turkey subsequently inquired once again about the possibility of 
American association with the Anglo-French-Turkish Alliance and a Mediterranean pact 
linked to NATO and begged the British Foreign Office to support the initiative.465 The 
Foreign Office refused to cooperate, believing it was not yet the opportune time to 
discuss the security of Turkey.466 However, the Turkish Ambassador to the USA, Feridun 
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Cemal Erkin, had already approached the US Deputy Under Secretary of State, Dean 
Rusk, on 5 December 1949 regarding these proposals. Again however, ‘Rusk could say 
no more than that the Department was continuing its studies of the question.’467 
 
Another reason Turkey was so keen on achieving American association with the Anglo-
French-Turkish Alliance and a Mediterranean pact linked to NATO in late 1949 was 
because the United States did not see the security of the Middle East as its priority. This 
attitude was shown clearly when the Conference of American Chiefs of Mission in the 
Near East at Istanbul, chaired by McGhee before his visit to Ankara, concluded that the 
United States would not associate itself with defence plans for the Middle East.468 
McGhee told the Turkish Foreign Minister, Sadak, that the reasoning behind the 
decision was that ‘Russia was now on the defensive and was unlikely to attack, and that, 
in any event, the Middle Eastern countries were now “communist-proof”.’469 Sadak 
however, disagreed with McGhee’s view, a matter which was reported by Strang as 
follows: 
 
The [Turkish] Ambassador said that M. Sadak did not agree with Mr. 
McGhee’s optimistic view. He thought that the only way to stop the 
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Russians was to make plain that Turkey, the United Kingdom and the 
United States would act together in the event of a Russian attack on 
Turkey. It would be necessary to convince the Russians one hundred per 
cent that Turkey and the Middle East would not be left undefended.470 
 
Turkey believed that if the Soviet Union succeeded in penetrating the Middle East, 
Turkey would become the next target.471 Furthermore, ‘the Turks were alarmed at the 
speech made by [Georgy] Malenkov [Secretary of the Central Committee] last 
November in which Turkey was indicated as one of the principal countries hostile to 
Russia lying along the Russian borders.’472 The Turkish RPP government had therefore 
convinced themselves of ‘the Kremlin intent sooner or later to pick a quarrel with 
Turkey.’473 Hence, towards the end of 1949, Turkey was keen to obtain Britain’s support 
for its efforts to acquire American association with the Anglo-French-Turkish Alliance 
and a Mediterranean pact linked to NATO. To do so, the Turkish Ambassador to London, 
Cevat Açikalin, had repeatedly emphasised to members of the Foreign Office, such as 
Michael Wright, the Foreign Office Under-Secretary, and Bevin ‘that he thought the 
Middle East was the area in which the Soviet Union were most likely to seek to cause 
trouble in the near future.’474 Açikalin’s suggestion was as follows: 
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He [Açikalin] thought that some form of Middle East Pact with American 
participation was most desirable in the interests of stability and 
resistance to Communist penetration. He wondered whether thought 
might also be given to American adherence to the Anglo-French-Turkish 
Treaty. He had heard that the American Middle East representatives at 
Istanbul had expressed confidence in the resistance of the Middle East to 
Communism. He thought that unless some action [sic] were taken this 
was an over-optimistic picture.475 
 
Wright told Açikalin that he could not, of course, speak for the United States 
government and could only give him his informal impressions: that the American 
Congress would not agree to ‘American participation in the near future in any regional 
agreements over and beyond the Atlantic Pact.’476 In his response to Açikalin, Bevin 
meanwhile took the same line, explaining in late November 1949 that ‘until we and the 
Americans had completed the work upon which we are now engaged he would not be 
able to say what our ultimate intentions as regards the security of Turkey might be.’477 
Thus, the efforts of Turkey in Washington were made without support from the British 
Foreign Office. As mentioned earlier, this approach to the United States met with 
frustration. 
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Turkish fear of a Soviet attack continued to increase when, in early 1950, Açikalin 
undertook a general tour of the Balkans, China and South East Asia and ‘found all 
shades of opinion convinced that Russia would, before long, begin to probe against 
Turkey and the Middle East.’478 It seemed to Turkey that ‘the United States policy of 
attempting to defend Western Europe, while leaving doors in the Middle East and the 
North-East Mediterranean wide open, was a grave political and strategical [sic+ error.’479 
Charles H. Bateman, Assistant Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs (Northern and 
Southern Europe) had rationalised the US attitude by arguing that ‘it was surely a 
question of timing [and] the United States could hardly be expected to undertake all at 
once the defence of every focal point on the globe’s surface.’480 Açikalin, however, 
‘continued to maintain that Turkey and the Middle East ought to receive priority from 
the United Kingdom and the United States.’481 
 
Yet despite Turkey’s efforts, the United States maintained its ‘present endeavouring to 
defend Western Europe because they felt that to be a crucial point.’482 Turkey felt that, 
in hesitating ‘to give Turkey a political guarantee such as adhering to the Anglo-French-
Turkish Alliance, they [the United States] were in fact encouraging the Russians to have 
a crack at Turkey.’483 Furthermore, Açikalin ‘seemed to think that the U.S. 
Administration often exaggerated for bargaining purposes the difficulties they have with 
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Congress.’484 These developments encouraged the Turkish RPP government to adopt a 
new direction in its foreign policy towards the Middle East: to become actively involved 
in Middle Eastern affairs, in particular defence matters, in cooperation with the 
Western powers, notably Britain, whose strategic interests rested largely in this region. 
 
As a matter of fact, Turkey had shown interest in the defence of the Middle East since 
the conference in Istanbul, in late 1949, concluded that the United States would not 
involve itself in defence plans for the Middle East. As reported by Strang, ‘it was also 
desirable that there should be regular informal contacts, at any rate between U.K. and 
Turkish Representatives, so that the Turkish Government could be continuously 
informed of what was going on in Middle Eastern affairs, particularly from the point of 
view of defence.’485 Turkey was deeply concerned with the defence of the Middle East 
because its security was linked to that of the broader region. If the Middle East fell 
under Soviet domination, it would also affect the eastern Mediterranean and vice 
versa.486 When the United States still refused to commit itself to the defence of the 
Middle East and remained uncertain about associating with the Anglo-French-Turkish 
Alliance and a Mediterranean pact, Turkey felt frustrated given its insistence that the 
risk of an imminent Russian attack was high.487 
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Worried with the safety of the Middle East, as well as its own, Turkey therefore 
approached Britain. Britain was currently reinstating efforts for a regional defence pact 
in the Middle East in cooperation with the Egyptian government, but faced the latter’s 
intransigence over the Suez Canal Zone which caused Anglo-Egyptian negotiations to 
reach an impasse. This initiative was carried out by the Turkish Foreign Minister, Sadak, 
who spoke with Bevin at Strasbourg and Paris on 1 and 5 April 1950 respectively. Sadak 
told Bevin about his government’s readiness to play an active role in the defence of the 
Middle East by proposing Anglo-Turkish cooperation in the region and also offered 
Turkish assistance in Anglo-Egyptian talks for a new settlement regarding the Suez Canal 
Zone.488 
 
However, this new Turkish approach towards the defence of the Middle East had a 
hidden agenda. By collaborating with Britain in the defence of the Middle East and 
playing an honest broker in the row between Britain and Egypt regarding their conflict 
over the Suez Canal Zone, Turkey was actually bidding for its place in NATO. This was 
evident when, immediately after Turkey told Britain about these aforementioned 
matters, in April 1950, Turkey for the first time requested admission into NATO through 
its aide-mémoire. Dated 3 May 1950, the aide-mémoire was sent to the British, the 
United States and French governments and contained a request for Turkish NATO 
membership, ‘urg*ing+ her *Turkey’s+ ally Great Britain, who is naturally concerned with 
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the security and independence of Turkey and the Middle East, to bear in mind the 
question of Turkey’s security at the London Conference, where vital security and 
defence are to be discussed.’489 Moreover, the Turkish Ambassador Açikalin’s statement 
to Bateman that was made two days after the aide-mémoire was circulated seems to 
validate the claim that the Turkish démarche to Britain was a gambit for securing 
Turkish accession to NATO. Açikalin’s statement was as follows: 
 
If Turkey were to help British policy vis-à-vis Egypt and the Arabs 
generally, it was insufficient for Turkey to rely solely upon the 1939 
Treaty. The Egyptians, Arabs and Israelis knew perfectly well that Turkey 
was the ally of Great Britain and this rather vitiated her position as a go-
between. If, on the other hand, Turkey were politically bound with a 
larger group [NATO], this would not only serve to warn Russia off, but 
would also materially assist Turkey in any steps she might be able to take 
towards the advancement of British policy in the Middle East.490 
 
However, the British Foreign Office’s reaction to the Turkish request for membership in 
NATO was not as Turkey had expected. Instead of concurring with its request, Bevin and 
the Foreign Office decided to bring Turkey into a regional defence pact of the Middle 
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East. This unexpected decision by the British Foreign Office convinces this study that the 
MEC was likely a means for blocking Turkey, and thus Greece, from joining NATO. 
 
To justify this interpretation of the MEC, that it was treated by Bevin and the Foreign 
Office as a means of excluding Greece and Turkey from NATO, the next subtopic will 
analyse the fact that Turkey was not considered by the British Foreign Office during 
their efforts to initiate the MEC with the Egyptian government, in 1946 and early 1950, 
both of which were before Turkey first requested membership in NATO in early May 
1950. 
 
Anglo-Egyptian efforts for a regional defence of the Middle East, 1946 and early 1950: An 
analysis of the MEC as a means of excluding Turkey from NATO 
 
A regional defence pact for the Middle East was considered by Britain when there 
seemed little prospect for Britain to retain its predominant power and influence in 
Egypt and the Suez Canal Zone. This was due to the Egyptian government’s demands for 
a complete evacuation of British troops from its land since early 1945. It should be 
noted that the participation of Egypt in the British plan for a regional defence of the 
Middle East was the most important criterion for ensuring the effectiveness of this 
military arrangement. The reason for this was explained in the British records as follows: 
 
Egypt is the key strategic area of the Middle East. Not only is she the 
gateway to Africa, whose penetration by Communism would be a 
disaster to Western civilisation, but she forms a vital link in the 
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communications between the Atlantic Powers and their allies in the 
Indian and Pacific Oceans. Furthermore, Egypt is the only country in the 
Middle East possessing the facilities and resources for the conduct of a 
major war and on which the defence of any part of the Middle East can 
be based. Without a fully prepared base in Egypt, the defence of the 
Middle East (including Egypt itself) cannot be attempted.491 
 
The British government’s attempted negotiations with other potential members of this 
regional defence pact, such as Israel and the Arab States, will not be touched upon. This 
subtopic focuses only on Anglo-Egyptian efforts for the establishment of this military 
arrangement, since without successful Anglo-Egyptian talks regarding this military 
arrangement, negotiations with other potential members would have been futile. 
 
The first prominent Anglo-Egyptian effort for the defence of the Middle East occurred in 
1946. Bevin managed to persuade the Egyptian Prime Minister, Ismail Sidky, to agree to 
the establishment of an Anglo-Egyptian defence alliance that would produce combined 
military arrangements in the event of war.492 Sidky’s agreement was an act of 
compromise in return for Bevin’s agreement to gradually withdraw British troops from 
Egypt, which would be completed by September 1949 as stipulated in the Bevin-Sidky 
Treaty of 1946 (also known as the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty).493 Unfortunately, this 
                                                 
491
 See Appendix I: Co-operation with Egypt – Brief for the Chief of the Imperial General Staff in TNA, CAB 
131/9, DO (50) 40, Co-operation with Egypt, Report by the Chiefs of Staff, 19 May 1950. 
492
 See The New York Times, 20 October 1946 [https://www.nytimes.com/1946/10/20/archives/bevin-
sidky-parley-on-treaty-continues.html]. See also Anglo-Egyptian Treaty enclosed in TNA, FO 
800/457/Eg/46/56, Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, Memorandum by the Prime Minister, 25 October 1946. 
493
 See evacuation protocol enclosed in TNA, FO 800/457/Eg/46/56, Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, Memorandum 
by the Prime Minister, 25 October 1946. 
171 
 
stillborn Bevin-Sidky treaty was soon to be buried due to growing differences over 
policy towards Sudan.494 
 
Although the disagreement between Bevin and Sidky over the issue of Sudan seemed to 
be the reason for the collapse of the treaty, it later became apparent that the real 
reason was that the Egyptians wanted unconditional withdrawal of British troops from 
Egypt and the Suez Canal Zone. As noted by Bevin in January 1947, ‘Nokrashi *the new 
Egyptian Prime Minister after Sidky resigned in late 1949] was still asking me [Bevin] to 
accept his proposal. In doing so he was, in effect, asking His Majesty’s Government to 
enter into a treaty with the Egyptian Government to swear away the rights of a third 
party. His Majesty’s Government could not do this.’495 This matter also indicated that 
the Egyptian government would not agree to an Anglo-Egyptian military defence as long 
as British troops still occupied Egypt and the Suez Canal Zone. This matter deadlocked 
Anglo-Egyptian efforts to arrange a regional defence of the Middle East. Hence, at this 
first prominent attempt, the British Foreign Office could not put forward an official 
proposal for this military arrangement. 
 
In regard to the MEC being a means for excluding Turkey from NATO, it is important to 
note here that Turkey was not actually considered as a potential member of a regional 
defence for the Middle East during Bevin’s first attempt to reach this military 
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arrangement in 1946. This was evident when, in late 1945, the Chief of Imperial General 
Staff (C.I.G.S.), Field Marshall Alan Brooke, who was tasked with informing Middle 
Eastern countries about some form of Middle East Defensive Confederation backed by 
Great Britain, did not visit Turkey.496 This forms the basis of the notion that the MEC 
was used as a means of exclusion, because it indicates that there was no reason for 
Turkey to be included in this regional defence pact given that its involvement was less 
significant than that of Egypt, Israel and the Arab States. However, the Egyptian 
government proved difficult to deal with, leading Bevin and the Foreign Office to fail in 
reaching a formal proposal for a regional defence pact of the Middle East on their first 
attempt. Although the collapse of the Bevin-Sidky Treaty had jeopardised the chance of 
Egypt’s involvement in this military arrangement, the COS turned this problem into an 
opportunity by using the breakdown of the agreement as a reason to perform a slow 
evacuation from the Suez Canal Zone: on 31 August 1947, 126,600 British personnel still 
remained in Egypt.497 
 
However, when the new Egyptian government dominated by the Wafd party renewed a 
strong demand for unconditional British troop withdrawal from Egypt and the Suez 
Canal Zone immediately after it came into office on 3 January 1950, Bevin began a new 
effort for a regional defence pact for the Middle East. Bevin accordingly visited the 
Egyptian Foreign Minister, Mohammed Salaheddin, and the Egyptian Prime Minister, 
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Mustapha Nahas Pasha, in Cairo in late January 1950. Bevin argued ‘that the countries 
of that area [the Middle East], together with the United Kingdom, would have to work 
together to ensure the security of this whole area. If it were left weak and undefended, 
it would be a temptation to the Russians to advance.’498 Bevin held out hope that Anglo-
Egyptian cooperation in the MEC would preserve British base rights in Egypt and the 
Suez Canal Zone. This was because Bevin ‘wanted to get away from the principle of 
occupation in favour of joint arrangements on a mutual basis – perhaps something in 
the nature of Joint Defence Boards.’499 
 
Although Salaheddin agreed that ‘from the point of view of general security, the Middle 
East still constituted a missing link,’500 he however still yearned for the unconditional 
withdrawal of British troops from Egypt and the Suez Canal Zone. This was noted in 
Bevin’s record as follows: 
 
On the other hand, he [Salaheddin] could not quite agree that the 
position as between Egypt and the United Kingdom was comparable to 
that existing between the United Kingdom and the United States with 
regard to the provision of bases. The United States and the United 
Kingdom were acting on a basis of complete equality. The Egyptian 
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Government had their own public opinion to reckon with [unconditional 
British troop withdrawal] and this added to the difficulty.501 
 
Nahas Pasha also told Bevin that ‘Egypt did not wish to be the victim of any new 
*defence+ arrangements which were come to.’502 The deep concern of the Egyptian 
Authorities over the presence of British troops in the Suez Canal Zone had been a 
hindrance to a smooth establishment of a regional defence pact of the Middle East. This 
was because, from Bevin’s meeting with Salaheddin and Nahas Pasha in late January 
1950 until March 1950, Anglo-Egyptian official negotiations on this military 
arrangement had yet to start. The Egyptian government asserted that it would consider 
negotiating and cooperating in a regional defence of the Middle East only after the 
British forces had fully evacuated the Suez Canal Zone. This matter was stated by 
Salaheddin in his message to Bevin in March 1950 as follows: 
 
It is noteworthy that Egyptian public opinion is of primary importance in 
the Middle East. It had grown to believe, after successive bitter trials, 
that it would be futile to proceed with negotiations unless based on the 
immediate withdrawal of British forces and the safeguarding of the unity 
of Egypt and the Sudan under the Egyptian Crown, and that Egypt cannot 
contribute her full share to World Peace before her National Rights have 
been completely secured. Should the British hasten to agree to the 
aforesaid bases, the Egyptian Government would welcome entering into 
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talks with Great Britain with the object of arriving at an understanding 
over the measures to be taken for confronting the dangers that threaten 
international security and the independence of nations, and with a view 
to reaching a practical settlement which would ensure the complete 
independence of Egypt and the Sudan as one integral whole, and would, 
at the same time, secure wholehearted collaboration in the sustained 
efforts for repelling international Communist danger.503 
 
However, Bevin preferred formal arrangements for a regional defence of the Middle 
East to be made before British troops could be evacuated.504 As asserted by Bevin to 
the Egyptian Ambassador, Amr Pasha, he ‘felt that Egypt would not be able to defend 
that vital territory by herself and that assistance must be given to her.’505 Since both the 
British and Egyptian governments refused to compromise regarding the Suez Canal 
Zone, during this second attempt to reach an agreement it was difficult for Bevin to 
make any progress such as putting forward a formal proposal for the creation of a 
regional defence pact of the Middle East. 
 
It is interesting to note here that, during Bevin’s new attempt to formulate the regional 
defence pact of the Middle East with the Egyptian government in early 1950, he still did 
not envisage Turkey’s involvement. This matter was indirectly reflected in Bevin’s 
answer to Amr Pasha, who suggested bringing Turkey into some arrangement in order 
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to break the deadlock in Anglo-Egyptian talks. This matter was recorded by Bevin as 
follows: 
 
Amr Pasha then asked me [Bevin] whether I thought it would be possible 
to bring Turkey into some arrangement, which would give us all the 
facilities we required. I replied that, if the problem were limited to 
defence only, his suggestion was one which we could consider, but I was 
very worried about the phrases in his note concerning the Sudan. I was 
afraid that his Government’s approach to the problem of the Sudan 
would turn out to be absolutely impracticable. In the end, however, I 
gave an understanding that His Majesty’s Government would study the 
position again. I said I thought much more work would have to be done 
on the military side than had yet been achieved.506 
 
Given that the British government intended to maintain its base rights in Egypt and the 
Suez Canal Zone through a partnership with the Egyptian government in a regional 
defence of the Middle East, its interest in this Anglo-Egyptian military arrangement was 
not limited only to defence matters. Therefore, it is evident that at this time Bevin 
thought Turkey’s involvement in this regional pact was not necessary. This matter thus 
proves that Turkey was not at the forefront of British consideration in regard to matters 
of the defence of the Middle East, both in 1946 and early 1950, which is important for 
strengthening the thesis that the MEC was used as a means for excluding Turkey from 
NATO. 
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Another point that should be highlighted here to underpin this interpretation of the 
MEC is that, in Bevin’s response to Amr Pasha’s suggestion regarding Turkey, he 
thought that much more work would have to be done on the military side if the British 
government revised its position on this matter. This was because Bevin was well aware 
of the present state of the Turkish Armed Forces, which were still unfit for modern war, 
as commented by the British military attachés in Ankara in late 1949.507 There were 
several reasons for this. Firstly, the process of modernising Turkish infantry divisions – in 
which these units would be reorganised and issued with modern equipment – had not 
yet started. Secondly, matters of supply and communications were, until recently, 
completely neglected by the Turkish General Staff. The mentality of the average Turkish 
soldier was also ill-adapted to deal with modern wireless. The Turkish Air Force had no 
front line aircraft that were not obsolescent or obsolete, and the Turkish Navy was at 
present hardly a serious operational force, consisting of a pre-1914 obsolete battle 
cruiser, a handful of British and US destroyers and submarines, and having no long 
range anti-aircraft defence. Thus, the effectiveness of the Turkish Armed Forces was 
probably limited to minesweeping and operating nets and booms.508 This matter 
seemed to have considerable influence on Bevin’s position in March 1950: that Turkey’s 
involvement was less-favourable for consideration because it would impose an extra 
load on a military arrangement which had still yet to begin.  
 
Ten days after Bevin had a conversation with Amr Pasha, the Turkish Foreign Minister, 
Sadak, told Bevin at Strasbourg that the Turkish government favoured the closest 
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cooperation with the British government in all matters concerning the Middle East, in 
particular in serving as a bridge between Britain and the Arab States, adding it would do 
all it could to help the British as regards Egypt, notably the Anglo-Egyptian dispute over 
the presence of British troops in the Suez Canal Zone.509 According to Sadak, ‘the 
continued presence of the United Kingdom in Egypt and North Africa was essential for 
Turkey, and His Majesty’s Government *British+ could always count on the support of 
the Turkish Government on this issue *the defence of the Middle East+.’510 As regards 
Egypt, Bevin was keen for the Turkish government to take the initiative. As said by Bevin 
to Sadak during their follow up meeting in Paris, after the Strasbourg conversation:  
 
Mr. Bevin said that he thought it might be possible in this way for the 
Turkish Government to find out a little more about what was in the 
minds of the Egyptians. They continued to harp on the need for the 
evacuation by the British of the Canal Zone, but this could not be 
accepted. *…+ Perhaps it might then be possible for the Turkish 
Government to say something to the Egyptians about the desirability of a 
settlement. In the meanwhile he did not wish to conduct official 
negotiations with the Egyptians.511 
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Considering that, earlier in March 1950 Bevin had not favoured Turkey’s involvement in 
a regional defence of the Middle East, this new attitude was likely because Bevin was 
desperate to break the deadlock in the Anglo-Egyptian talks. Given that Bevin had 
agreed to Turkish assistance in the Anglo-Egyptian settlement, it seemed to be 
axiomatic that Bevin still had not thought of bringing Turkey into this regional defence 
of the Middle East. This was clear in that this subject had not been touched upon with 
Sadak in either Strasbourg or Paris. This indicates that, until April 1950, the British had 
still not considered Turkey’s involvement in this military arrangement. The continuing 
stance against including Turkey might have been influenced by further reports, in March 
and April 1950, by Ambassador Charles about the strength of the Turkish Armed Forces. 
These reports stated ‘that the Turkish Army could not as yet really stand on its own 
feet’ and ‘the capacity of the Turkish Army to resist aggression would depend on the 
strength of the attack.’512 
 
As discussed in earlier subtopics, the Turkish government’s efforts to tie itself closer to 
the Middle East on defence matters formed part of its initiative in lobbying for Turkey’s 
membership in NATO. In respect to this démarche, the Turkish RPP government 
requested membership of NATO in the following month, through its aide-mémoire 
dated 3 May 1950. The Turkish RPP government wanted the question of including 
Turkey in NATO to be placed on the agenda of a meeting of the Foreign Ministers in 
London due to take place the following week, given that the request was sent to Britain, 
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the United States and France, which these three Foreign Ministers’ governments.513 Yet 
neither the British government, in particular Bevin and the Foreign Office, nor the 
Foreign Ministers at the London Conference, responded to this request.514  
 
However, before the conference had opened, Bevin and the Foreign Office had arrived 
at a decision to include Turkey in a regional defence of the Middle East.515 When Bevin 
relayed this notion to Acheson and Schuman at the end of the Conference, both agreed. 
They hence agreed to issue a statement about Turkey’s inclusion in a regional defence 
of the Middle East on 19 May 1950.516 An official statement that mentioned Turkey’s 
participation in this military arrangement was reflected in British records as follows: 
 
The ideal military arrangement in the Middle East would be a regional 
pact consisting of the United Kingdom, the Arab League States, Israel, 
Turkey, Persia and possibly Greece, in which Egypt, as a willing partner, 
would provide the base facilities required.517 
 
The idea that the MEC was a means of excluding Turkey from NATO, rather than reason 
for doing so, is derived from this situation – that Bevin and the Foreign Office made the 
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decision to include Turkey in a regional defence of the Middle East after the Turkish 
government requested membership in NATO in early May 1950. This aspect of the MEC 
has been neglected by historians, who argue that it was the main reason Bevin and the 
Foreign Office rejected Turkish requests for membership in 1950. This was apparently 
because, before the Turkish RPP government had propounded its NATO membership 
request, Turkey was absent from British thinking in regard to countries that should 
participate in the regional defence of the Middle East. Moreover, the weakness of the 
Turkish Armed Forces at that time, as discussed earlier, also attributed to Bevin’s 
unfavourable response to include Turkey in this military arrangement.518 Hence, it 
grows ever clearer to this study that the MEC was a means of exclusion, since although 
Turkey could contribute little militarily, Bevin and the Foreign Office were still willing to 
bring Turkey into this regional defence pact anyway. 
 
It is also interesting to mention here that the decision to bring Turkey into a regional 
defence of the Middle East was made without telling the Turkish government in 
advance. This matter was reflected in a report by head of the Southern Department, Sir 
Anthony Rumbold, to the Foreign Office as follows: 
 
The Turkish Ambassador [Açikalin] called on Sir William Strang on the 
31st May and again on the 1st June. He had two complaints to make; first 
that no reply had been sent to his memorandum [aide-mémoire dated 
3rd May 1950], and secondly that he had learnt for the first time from 
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the newspapers of the parallel statements about Turkey, Greece and 
Persia [Iran] made by the Secretary of State [Bevin] and Mr. Acheson on 
19th May.’519 
 
Strang explained to Açikalin that the reason why neither Bevin nor Acheson had 
informed the Turkish government was that ‘the decision to issue the statements had 
been taken at the last minute and it had not therefore been possible to inform the 
Ambassador in advance.’520 However, from the point of view of this study, this 
démarche – not telling Turkey in advance – is another point that substantiates the 
argument that the MEC was used as a means of exclusion. Whatever the reason for not 
informing Turkey, if Bevin and the Foreign Office were genuine about bringing it into a 
regional defence pact of the Middle East, with no hidden agenda relating to its request 
for membership in NATO, the British should have refrained from publicising the decision 
until Turkey had been informed. All these points convince this study that the decision to 
bring Turkey into the MEC in May 1950 was not primarily because Bevin and the Foreign 
Office wanted Turkey in the agreement, but rather because they wanted to avoid 
Turkey, and its security partner Greece, joining NATO.  
 
It is important to emphasise here that, although Bevin and the Foreign Office had not 
stated explicitly that the MEC was their démarche in ensuring Greece and Turkey 
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remained outside NATO, two actions demonstrate their subtle move. Firstly, that 
neither Greece nor Turkey had been considered for inclusion in a regional defence pact 
of the Middle East since the idea was initiated by the British in late 1945. Secondly, the 
decision to put Turkey in this military arrangement was made after it requested 
membership in NATO in early May 1950. These two decisions appear to substantiate 
this study’s interpretation that the MEC was seen as a means of exclusion in British 
thinking. 
 
There is one more aspect of the British Foreign Office’s plan for a regional defence of 
the Middle East that could further support the argument of this study: that only Turkey 
was confirmed to be brought into this military arrangement. It should be noted that in 
the official statement dated 19 May 1950, which mentioned the new participation of 
Eastern Mediterranean countries in a regional defence of the Middle East as 
aforementioned above, Bevin and the Foreign Office seemed unsure about including 
Greece, using the word ‘possibly’ before mentioning it.521 The British, and also Acheson, 
preferred to give direct support to Greece if there was an attack from the Soviet Union. 
This matter was reported by Wright as follows: 
 
The Secretary of State *Bevin+, on the 19th May *1950+, reaffirmed “that 
H.M.G. remain vitally concerned in the independence, integrity, and 
security of Greece, Turkey and Persia *…+ H.M.G. are *sic] determined to 
continue their policy of direct support and to other countries who are 
striving through military and economic efforts to safeguard their 
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independence and territorial integrity.” Mr. Acheson spoke in similar 
terms.522 
 
This matter shows that Greece was not considered by the British for inclusion either in 
the MEC or NATO. Evidently, the uncertainty of the British about Greece being included 
in a regional defence of the Middle East was linked to the Cyprus issue. This matter was 
reflected in the outline of disadvantages that could arise if Cyprus were handed back to 
Greece given by Under-Secretary for Colonial Affairs, Martin, to US State Department 
officials during his attempts to obtain American support for the British retaining their 
sovereign power in Cyprus, in July 1950. The outline was as follows: 
 
(A) There was no certainty of political stability in Greece. A future Greek 
Government might withdraw such facilities as had been granted. 
(B) Any such agreement would come as a disagreeable shock to the 
Turks and would damage Greco-Turkish relations. 
(C) It would also endanger the British political and strategic position 
generally in the Middle East. 
(D) It might in particular give the Egyptian Government occasion to think 
that we were “on the slide” and thus lead to increased Egyptian 
pressure for the evacuation of the Canal Zones. 
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(E) It was in any case doubtful whether in an area as small as Cyprus the 
maintenance of satisfactory base facilities was compatible with the 
surrender of sovereignty over the island as a whole.523 
 
Points B and C of this outline remarked that Bevin and the Foreign Office were wary of 
having Greece in a regional defence of the Middle East if there was ill-feeling between 
Greece and Turkey over Cyprus, since this situation would negatively affect the military 
arrangement. Hence, only Turkey was confirmed to be included in this regional defence 
arrangement. This study believes the reluctance to include Greece in the MEC was 
motivated by the same reason Bevin and the Foreign Office refused to accept the 
Turkish request for membership of NATO. This was because the security of Greece and 
Turkey were dovetailed together, in that Turkey in NATO would have dragged Greece 
into NATO too, even though the latter did not apply for membership.524  
 
Seemingly, the decision to bring only Turkey into the MEC, without its security partner 
Greece, not only clarifies further that the MEC was used as a means of exclusion but 
also demonstrates that one of the reasons Bevin and the Foreign Office refused Turkish 
requests for membership of NATO was the Cyprus issue. That this issue – the struggle 
between the British and Greek governments over the sovereignty of this island and the 
rapid deterioration in relations between the Greek and the Turkish governments due to 
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their own preference for its future – had affected Greece and Turkey’s chances of 
becoming members of NATO, will be discussed thoroughly in the next section. 
 
The British Foreign Office against NATO enlargement: An analysis of the Cyprus issue as a 
contributory reason for this stance 
 
Since the previous section discusses this study’s perception that the MEC was a means 
to prevent a NATO enlargement that would include Greece and Turkey, it is essential to 
ask here why the British government, in particular Bevin and the Foreign Office, still 
refused to include Greece and Turkey in NATO when this military pact had been 
successfully established over a year ago. As this study is looking at the correlation 
between the Cyprus issue and British Foreign Office’s decision to keep Greece and 
Turkey outside NATO, it is important to note here that, although reasons relating to the 
Cyprus issue could be sensed in late 1949, they only became apparent after the newly-
elected Turkish Democrat government, which won the Turkish elections of 14 May 
1950, submitted a new request for Turkey’s NATO membership in early August 1950 
and the United States accepted this appeal. This was due to the fact that, prior to this, 
Bevin and the Foreign Office had used American reasons for rejecting NATO’s expansion 
as their own. However, they could no longer continue with this strategy, since they did 
not agree with the new US position to support NATO’s extension. The British, therefore, 
had to present their own argument for not favouring Greece and Turkey as new 
members of NATO. It was only then that it became apparent the Cyprus issue was their 
reason for rejection.  
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Britain’s démarche, namely copying the US stance in rejecting Greece and Turkey, was 
evident in Strang’s response to the Turkish Ambassador to the UK, Açikalin, on 31 May 
and 1 June 1950. Strang’s response explained why it had not been possible for the 
British Foreign Office to agree to the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in NATO.525 Those 
reasons were outlined by Rumbold in his reply to a question posed in the British 
Parliament as follows: 
 
(i) The United States is not in a position to enter into further political 
commitments at present, 
(ii) It is not possible for the United States to enter into military 
understandings in the absence of military commitments, and 
(iii) Military undertakings and staff talks between Great Britain and 
Turkey would be meaningless without the participation of the United 
States since British and American plans for this area are dovetailed 
together.526 
 
This British Foreign Office’s approach, to adopt the same reason for refusing the 
inclusion of Greece and Turkey in NATO as the United States, had been adopted since 
November 1949 when the Turkish Foreign Minister, Sadak, and the Greek Foreign 
Minister, Tsaldaris, separately asked Bevin about a NATO enlargement that would 
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include both countries during their encounter in Paris.527 The British approach of 
copying the American stance was noticeable when Jebb, now British Ambassador to the 
United Nations, double-checked the American position on NATO enlargement before 
Bevin had a meeting with the Turkish Ambassador to the UK Açikalin (after the former 
returned from Paris) and he told Bevin that there was no question of NATO being 
extended in scope to cover Turkey and Greece because the United States had not yet 
agreed to extend this Atlantic Pact beyond the Europe theatre.528 
 
It is interesting to mention here that the British Foreign Office’s negative attitude 
towards NATO enlargement as it related to the Cyprus issue could already be sensed at 
this point, in November 1949. This was due to Bevin’s less enthusiastic response to 
Tsaldaris but not to Sadak, even though both Foreign Ministers had asked the same 
question regarding NATO enlargement to include their respective countries. This matter 
was reported by Bateman as follows: 
 
M. Tsaldaris asked whether Greece could be brought within the purview 
of the North Atlantic Treaty and whether Greek Staff talks could be held 
with Lord Montgomery’s organisation. In reply the Secretary of State said 
that Lord Montgomery’s Mandate did not extend to South-East Europe, 
that he could give no direct answer to the question of bringing Greece 
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under the cover of the North Atlantic Treaty, but that he would discuss 
these questions with Mr. Acheson and later bring them before the 
Cabinet. M. Sadak, the Turkish Foreign Minister, asked whether the plans 
now under consideration for the implementation of the North Atlantic 
Treaty could be made to cover the Eastern Mediterranean and whether 
in that case contact could be established with the Turkish General Staff. 
According to the records of the conversation, the Secretary of State 
answered both queries in the affirmative.529 
 
The same matter was also reported by Bevin’s Principal Private Secretary, Roderick 
Barclay, who stated that ‘the Secretary of State [Bevin] was, as the records show, 
decidedly more forthcoming to M. Sadak than to M. Tsaldaris.’530  
 
There were three situations that subtly demonstrated Bevin’s negative attitude towards 
Tsaldaris in regard to Greece’s inclusion in NATO. Firstly, Bevin promised Tsaldaris 
something that was not going to happen – ‘that he would discuss these questions with 
Mr. Acheson’ – a promise that could be considered pointless because, as noted by 
Barclay, ‘there was in fact no opportunity to take the matter up with Mr. Acheson in 
Paris.’531 Secondly, Bevin did not fulfil his promise to Tsaldaris – ‘bring them *the talks 
between the Greek Staff and Lord Montgomery’s organisation+ before the Cabinet’ – 
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when he suggested only that ‘there should be contact between British military 
authorities and the Turkish General Staff.’532 Thirdly, Bevin only followed up on this 
matter with the Turkish Ambassador to the UK, Açikalin, after his return from Paris. As 
Bateman noted, ‘the Turkish Ambassador should be told not more than that the matter 
is under review.’533 This explains why Bateman and Rumbold only prepared a paper for 
Bevin to hold a conversation with Açikalin in order to answer Sadak’s inquiry about 
NATO enlargement.534 
 
It should be mentioned here that, in the reports by Bateman and Barclay that detail 
Bevin’s less-favourable response towards Tsaldaris’ inquiry about Greek inclusion in 
NATO, neither explained the reason why Bevin behaved that way. Yet this study is 
convinced that Bevin would not respond negatively towards Tsaldaris for no reason. 
Since there was no exact explanation for this situation, it is essential to look at this 
matter in a wider perspective in order to understand Bevin’s reasoning. Apart from the 
subject of NATO enlargement, Bevin and the Foreign Office were at the same time 
dealing with the Greek government over the issue of Cyprus. As discussed in the first 
section of this chapter, the Greek government appeared to favour the idea of Cyprus 
being returned to Greece, as initiated by the Ethnarchy and AKEL in a new wave of the 
plebiscite movement at that time.535 
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The Greek government’s support for the plebiscite might have irritated Bevin, because 
it would have seemed ironic that the Greek government was hankering after closer 
defence guarantees from the British government but at the same time supporting the 
union of Cyprus with Greece. Given that this union could jeopardise British strategic and 
defence interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East – as had been 
clearly outlined by Martin during his meeting with the US State Department536 – it 
seems plausible that the Cyprus issue could be the reason for Bevin’s negative reaction 
towards Tsaldaris. What is more, the statement by the Greek Prime Minister the 
following month - that if Greece’s international position were to be secured, the 
relationship with the British government must not be affected by enosis agitation537 - 
could also substantiate the argument that the Cyprus issue was prevalent in Bevin’s 
thinking when he refused to consider seriously the inclusion of Greece in NATO. 
 
The other Cyprus issue – the rapid deterioration in relations between the Greek and 
Turkish governments – is also believed by this study to have been influential in shaping 
the stance of Bevin and the Foreign Office against NATO enlargement in 1950. As 
mentioned earlier, this reason only became apparent after Turkey made its second 
request for inclusion in NATO, in August 1950, by which time the United States was 
ready to adopt a new stance on NATO enlargement. There are two reasons for this 
change in stance on the part of the United States. Firstly, the United States had, in early 
1950, adopted the formal strategy of ‘forward defence’ that derived from NSC-68 
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document, which prompted the United States to create NATO’s southern flank that 
should ideally be supported by Greece and Turkey.538 Secondly, the United States was 
greatly impressed with Greece and Turkey’s contributions in the Korean War (which 
broke out on 25 June 1950) and believed these two countries could provide the same 
military commitment if they were brought into NATO.539 According to historian John M. 
Vander Lippe, ‘what forced a change in American attitudes and led to Turkey’s entry 
into NATO was Turkey’s participation in the Korean War.’540 
 
It should be noted here that Turkey used the Korean War as a stepping stone to 
become a member of NATO.541 Lippe contends that ‘the Turks tied their commitment to 
the United Nations effort in Korea to enter into NATO.’542 The Korean gambit was 
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evident when, only a week after announcing it would commit its troop to Korea (25 July 
1950), on 1 August, the Turkish Democrat government requested that three key NATO 
allies, namely the United States, Britain and France, consider Turkey’s membership of 
NATO. This consideration could be made in a meeting of foreign ministers in New York 
due to take place in September 1950, particularly given that the first request, made by 
the former Turkish RPP government in May 1950, had been neglected by these same 
foreign ministers during their London meetings. Fortunately for Turkey, the United 
States accepted this appeal and subsequently began to advocate for the inclusion of 
Greece and Turkey in NATO.543 Britain and France, however, were still reluctant to 
accept Greece and Turkey’s NATO membership. France initially said that it would 
support the inclusion of Turkey in NATO, but changed its mind when the smaller 
members of NATO ‘indicated opposition to extending the treaty to Turkey.’544 
 
In the case of Britain, in particular that of Bevin and the Foreign Office, before key 
figures became aware of the new American position on NATO enlargement they still 
seemed to want to follow the American stance, believing the United States government 
would turn the Turkish request down again. This was noticeable on several occasions 
before the British Foreign Office learned about the American new position regarding 
Turkish, and thus Greek, membership of NATO. First, the Foreign Office prepared an 
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outline for Bevin in order to reply to the new Turkish Foreign Minister, Fuad Koprulu, if 
he asked about the British government’s opinion of the second Turkish request for 
membership in NATO during their upcoming meeting in Strasbourg, in early August 
1950, on the same lines as Strang’s discussion of these subjects with the Turkish 
Ambassador to the UK, Açikalin, on 31 May 1950. The outline was as follows: 
 
(1). As the Turkish Government have already been informed by the 
United States Government, the United States cannot enter into any 
further political commitments at present and it would scarcely be 
possible for them to enter into military understandings in the 
absence of political commitments; 
(2). British military plans for the Middle East are dovetailed into those of 
the United States and military understandings between Great Britain 
and Turkey would have little meaning without the participation of 
the United States, a participation which is at present impossible 
because of the political commitments involved; 
(3). It is therefore at present difficult to make any definite plans for 
military understandings for the future, apart from contacts which 
already exist at Ankara between the British, the Americans and the 
Turks.545 
 
Second, during the meeting between Strang and the French Ambassador on 3 August 
1950, who questioned whether the Foreign Office had come to any conclusion about 
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the Turkish request for membership in NATO, Strang said that this was a very 
complicated question to which the Foreign Office was giving thought. Thus it was 
important to know ‘whether the United States would be willing to assume the further 
commitment involved in Turkish membership.’546 Third, during the meeting at 
Strasbourg between Bevin and the new Turkish Foreign Minister two days later, 
Koprulu, Bevin’s tendency to follow the American decision was obvious when he asked 
Koprulu whether he had discussed this proposal with the United States government.547 
Fourth, every time the Turkish Ambassador to the UK, Açikalin, frequented the Foreign 
Office and raised the question of Turkey’s desire for inclusion in NATO, the officials who 
had the meeting with him such as Pierson Dixon (Head of the offices of Deputy Under-
Secretary of State, Foreign Office), Strang and Bevin kept giving the same answer: that 
this matter was under discussion and it would depend upon the view of the United 
States government.548 Moreover, the British Ambassador to Turkey, Charles, also spoke 
in similar terms when Koprulu and the Turkish Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, asked 
him about this matter.549 Strang and Rumbold also maintained the same answer when 
other NATO members, such as France, Norway, Denmark, Belgium and the Netherlands 
asked them about the British Foreign Office’s thoughts on Turkey’s application to join 
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NATO.550 It is worth pointing out here that this British Foreign Office position, that any 
decision depended upon the stance of the United States, had disguised its own reasons 
for rejecting the Turkish request for membership of NATO. 
 
Although Bevin and the Foreign Office did not clearly define their reason for not 
accepting the Turkish request, nevertheless their rejection was apparent in the outline 
they had prepared for Bevin before the Strasbourg meeting with Koprulu. Bevin also 
tried to convince Koprulu that Turkey’s membership in NATO was less beneficial than 
other security solutions that had already been received by Turkey. This matter was 
depicted as follows: 
 
Mr. Bevin replied that this was a new problem. In the meanwhile he 
thought it most important that Turkey should not under-rate the value of 
assurances given by President Truman under the “Truman Doctrine,” 
which had been endorsed by both Republicans and Democrats and 
provided for American assistance to Turkey both in the military and in 
the economic field. Indeed, he felt that the “Truman Doctrine” might in 
some respects be more advantageous to Turkey than membership of the 
Atlantic Pact.551 
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It is interesting to highlight here that there were some issues raised by Strang and Bevin 
during their meetings with the French Ambassador and the Turkish Foreign Minister on 
3 and 5 August 1950 respectively that might hint at their reason for rejecting the 
Turkish request for membership of NATO. This study believes this reason was the 
Cyprus issue, which had caused the fractious relationship between Greece and Turkey. 
 
The first incident that demonstrates the Cyprus issue was forefront in British thinking 
was when Strang talked about the possibility of including only Turkey in NATO, without 
its security partner Greece. This matter was reported as follows: 
 
Turkey was a neighbour of the Soviet Union in a vital strategic area and 
her membership would thus import a new element into the Treaty 
situation (Norway was, of course, also a neighbour, but in a rather more 
remote sense). There was also the question whether Turkey could be 
brought in without Greece; and what view Persia would take if Turkey 
were admitted and Persia were not.552 
 
Evidently, Strang did not deny to the French Ambassador that the Foreign Office agreed 
Turkish membership would enhance NATO’s strategic and military strength in an area in 
close proximity to the Soviet Union. Yet, it was odd that Bevin and the Foreign Office 
continued to refuse Turkish requests for membership of NATO. However, since Strang 
mentioned that the Foreign Office had considered leaving Greece behind, even though 
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it was well aware of the fact that these two countries were bound together in terms of 
security matters,553 this is seen by this study as proof that the Cyprus problem between 
Greece and Turkey was the reason the Foreign Office only favoured Turkish 
membership. 
 
Though Strang did not explain why the Foreign Office did not favour having Greece in 
NATO, this study believes it was because these British figures were deeply concerned 
that the two countries, engaged in a rivalry with each other, might have brought harm 
to NATO. This same judgment was used as justification for Greece being less favourable 
for inclusion in the MEC, as outlined by the Under-Secretary for Colonial Affairs, Martin, 
three weeks earlier.554 Although Martin’s outline was for the MEC plan, it was equally 
applicable to NATO because the countries (Greece and Turkey), and the problem 
involved (poor relationship due to the Cyprus question) were still the same. Since it was 
impossible to bring only Turkey into NATO, it seems that the decision not to accept the 
Turkish request was a move taken by the British Foreign Office to prevent the harm that 
these problematic countries might have brought to NATO.555 
 
The second incident that illuminates the fact that the Cyprus problem between Greece 
and Turkey was evident in British thinking was when Bevin asked Koprulu about the 
                                                 
553
 In an American document, it was stated that: ‘any decision Turk participation shld [sic] include 
Greece.’ See FRUS, 1950, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Vol. V, p. 1314, The Acting Secretary of 
State to the Embassy in Turkey, 13 September 1950. See also FRUS, 1950, Western Europe, Vol. III, p. 279, 
Paper prepared in the Department of State, 11 September 1950. 
554
 See record of discussion on Cyprus held at the State Department on 10 July 1950 enclosed in TNA, FO 
371/87722/RG 1081/158, British Embassy Washington to Sir Anthony Rumbold (Southern Department), 
14 July 1950. See this chapter, pp. 182-183. 
555
 The details of the negative effects on NATO would be produced later by the Foreign Office, after it 
could no longer adopt the American reasons for rejection as its own. See this chapter, p. 202, quotation 
about three main reasons against admitting Greece and Turkey into the Atlantic Pact, point (b) (ii). 
199 
 
state of Turkish relations with its neighbours, in particular Greece. Koprulu’s answer was 
as follows: 
 
M. Koprulu said that relations with Greece were very good. It was clear 
that the two countries had a common destiny and that they must stick 
together. He was not very happy about the internal political situation in 
Greece and he thought that General Plastiras had a number of difficulties 
to face, but he believed him to be a sincere friend of Turkey.556 
 
Seemingly, Koprulu did not admit to Bevin that the relationship between Greece and 
Turkey was not in good shape. Nevertheless, the discomfort in Koprulu’s mention of the 
internal political situation in Greece indicated that a rift between Greece and Turkey 
over Cyprus did exist. Although Koprulu did not go into details about the domestic 
situation in Greece, it can be presumed that Koprulu was referring to recent 
developments, like the Ethnarchy delegation and the plebiscite result that favoured 
union with Greece, which were well-received by the Greek government in Athens just 
several weeks before this Strasbourg meeting.557 What is more, at the time the 
Strasbourg meeting between Koprulu and Bevin took place, the Greek government held 
a series of meetings that supported the idea of union with Cyprus, and the Greek 
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Orthodox Church in Athens was actively involved in the enosis campaign.558 As the 
Turkish government was strongly against enosis between Cyprus and Greece, these 
recent developments in Greece surely provoked Turkey, thus affecting the relations 
between these two countries. The Turkish government once asserted that if enosis was 
successfully achieved, and thus harmed Turkish interests in Cyprus, it would be 
impossible for Turkey to remain friendly with Greece.559 
 
It is interesting to note here that there was evidence the relationship between Greece 
and Turkey was already growing bitter immediately after the Ethnarchy delegation 
arrived in Athens, on 24 May 1950. The delegation was warmly welcomed by the Greek 
government and the Greek Orthodox Church. Turkey’s hostile attitude towards Greece 
was noticeable when Greece was omitted from a Mediterranean defence system linked 
to NATO. This pact was re-initiated by the Turkish Democrat government after the first 
Turkish request for membership of NATO was rejected, and the government was 
therefore uninterested in the decision to include Turkey in a regional defence of the 
Middle East made by Bevin and Acheson at the end of the London meetings.560 This 
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matter was reported by Charles, the British Ambassador to Turkey, to the Foreign Office 
two days after the Ethnarchy delegation arrived in Athens as follows: 
 
3. As I [Charles] have suspected, the new [Democrat] Government will re-
open the question of a Pact in the Eastern Mediterranean in which the 
Western Powers would be interested. I told him [Koprulu] that this was a 
different question and had been thoroughly considered by the 
Governments of Great Britain and the United States. M. Koprulu said that 
he was aware of this but the times were such that the President and the 
Cabinet were very anxious to make progress with the defence of this vital 
part of the World in the interests of the World and Turkey. I asked him 
what countries he hoped should be included in this Pact, and he replied 
that he referred in the first instance to the Arab countries, Israel and 
Turkey.561 
 
It should be noted that since the concept of a Mediterranean defence system was 
proposed and initiated by Turkey in early 1947, Greece was considered for inclusion in 
this pact. What is more, it was the Greek government that continued to push for this 
defence system with the British government throughout 1948 and 1949, because 
during this period Turkey paid more attention and interest to NATO.562 Based on this, 
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the new Turkish initiative of a Mediterranean system linked to NATO, in late May 1950, 
was the first time Greece was not considered for inclusion.563 However, there was no 
explanation for why Turkey decided to leave Greece behind. When considering the 
current situation in Greece, this study is convinced it was because Turkey was annoyed 
that Greece warmly supported the union with Cyprus, which Turkey was opposed to. 
This matter therefore proves that at the time Koprulu had a meeting with Bevin, in early 
August 1950 at Strasbourg, the Cyprus question had already affected the Greco-Turkish 
relationship. 
 
On the other hand, since Bevin and the Foreign Office were already aware of the Cyprus 
problem between Greece and Turkey due to the report sent by Charles to the Foreign 
Office, it seems obvious that this knowledge could have motivated Bevin to inquire with 
Koprulu about the state of Turkish relations with Greece, but Koprulu denied the 
existence of a problem. Koprulu’s move is understandable because, generally, 
conflicting countries were considered to be undesirable for membership because they 
would bring about adverse effects on NATO. It is useful to mention here that earlier, in 
March 1950 during the conference in Cairo that discussed the United States policy for 
maintaining stability and security in the Near East, the trouble between Greece and 
Turkey over the Cyprus question had been touched upon. The conference concluded 
that ‘Turkish-Greek relations could be endangered if Greek agitation of this [Cyprus] 
issue were to show signs of achieving results. It is important that we [the United States] 
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encourage the GTI [Greece, Turkey and Iran] states to develop their confidence in and 
cooperation with each other.’564 Based on this recommendation, it was deemed 
necessary for Turkey not to admit that Turkish relations with Greek were not in good 
shape over Cyprus, in order to avoid its second request for membership in NATO being 
rejected. 
 
At the end of the discussion between Bevin and Koprulu in Strasbourg, the latter 
requested British support for Turkey’s application to join NATO.565 Bevin, having been 
advised by Strang and his Foreign Office not to commit himself to an opinion,566 replied 
to Koprulu that ‘he would certainly discuss Turkey’s application with the United States 
Government when he went to New York in a few weeks’ time.’567 This answer further 
demonstrated Bevin’s intention to follow the United States’ stance on this matter. It is 
interesting to note here that, at this point, Bevin might have sensed that there was a 
possibility the United States would accept the Turkish request, saying to Koprulu that: 
‘He *Bevin+ knew the United States Government were re-examining the whole situation 
in the light of events in Korea.’568 Therefore, in response to Koprulu’s request for British 
support of Turkey’s application to join NATO, and keeping in mind an assumption that 
the United States would accept the Turkish appeal for NATO membership, the Foreign 
Office prepared a lucid account of justifications for refusing the Turkish request for 
membership of NATO. Their reasons were detailed as follows: 
                                                 
564
 FRUS, 1950, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Vol. V, p. 5, Report of the Near East Regional 
Conference in Cairo, Summary of Conclusions, 16 March 1950. 
565
 TNA, retrieved from the Brotherton Library, FO 800/507/Tu/50/6, Record of Secretary of State’s 
conversation with the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs at Strasbourg on 5th August 1950. 
566
 TNA, FO 371/87949/RK 1071/22, ‘Conversation between Sir W. Strang and the French Ambassador on 
Turkish desire for inclusion in the Atlantic Pact’, Foreign Office minute by Strang, 3 August 1950. 
567
 TNA, retrieved from the Brotherton Library, FO 800/507/Tu/50/6, Record of Secretary of State’s 
conversation with the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs at Strasbourg on 5th August 1950. 
568
 Ibid. 
204 
 
 
(a) If Turkey is accepted into the Atlantic Pact, Greece would have to be 
accepted too; although the Greek Government are not pressing for 
admission, they would certainly do so if the Turks were admitted and 
it would be difficult to exclude them without causing them 
bewilderment and offence. 
(b) There are three main reasons against admitting Turkey and Greece 
into the Atlantic Pact. These are: 
(i) We would destroy the conception of the Atlantic Pact as a basis 
for building an Atlantic community as a political and economic 
association of nations having common tradition etc., and would 
make it clear that it was only a military alliance against Russia. 
(ii) We would spread the security risks, introduce military problems 
which have no relation to the main European defence theatre and 
would generally disturb the organisation which is just beginning 
to find its feet. 
(iii) Many of the existing members would be strongly opposed to any 
extension of their obligation to go to war.569 
 
The apparent reason the British Foreign Office produced its own account was because it 
could no longer use American justifications for rejection, because it did not agree with 
the US decision to bring Turkey, and thus Greece, into NATO. As earlier discussions in 
this section show, Bevin and the Foreign Office were well aware of the disharmonious 
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relationship between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus; thus, this study believes that 
while preparing this account, the Cyprus issue was one of many that had been 
considered by the British Foreign Office in order to explain why they refused to accept 
the Turkish request for NATO membership. 
 
The first point in this account that indicated the Cyprus issue was dominant in British 
thinking is contained in argument (a): that Greece and Turkey could not be separated in 
terms of security matters. As discussed earlier, due to this notion, Bevin and the Foreign 
Office, who initially only wanted Turkey in NATO, had to give up this idea because it was 
impossible to leave Greece behind. Hence, this explained their decision to reject the 
Turkish request for NATO membership. As shown by this study, the reason the British 
Foreign Office refused to have Greece in NATO was due to the Cyprus problem between 
these two countries. Bevin and the Foreign Office thought it was undesirable to bring 
two countries that clashed over Cyprus into NATO, believing this problematic situation 
might bring harm to NATO.570 Since this account was made based on the consideration 
that Greece and Turkey would become new members of NATO, the harm that these 
countries might have brought to NATO because of the Cyprus problem was reflected in 
argument (b) reason (ii). Those harms were: would spread the security risks; would 
introduce military problems which have no relation to the main European defence 
theatre; and would disturb the organisation which is just beginning to find its feet. 
 
It is interesting to point out here that, argument (b) reason (i) could also substantiate 
the claim that the Cyprus issue was the possible ‘new military problems’ meant by the 
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British Foreign Office. In point (b) (i), the British Foreign Office argued that Greek and 
Turkish membership would make NATO only a military alliance against Russia. This was 
because these two countries were constantly under Soviet military and diplomatic 
threat, the same threats that were facing existing members of NATO. The question then 
was what were the new military problems, which had no relation to the existing 
members, that would be introduced to them? As Greece and Turkey had increasingly 
grown apart from each other because of the Cyprus issue, this unpleasant situation also 
increased the risk of war between them. Therefore, it seems that the Cyprus issue was 
the possible new military problems that would have to be faced by the existing 
members if the Turkish request for membership of NATO was accepted. 
 
It is worth mentioning here that, since Bevin and the Foreign Office were persistent in 
rejecting Turkish requests for NATO membership, in the same account, another 
alternative was suggested for Turkey: ‘if Turkey could not be made a member of the 
Pact some other instrument binding the United States Government to come to the 
military aid of Turkey would be the next best thing.’571 Seemingly, the British thought 
that it would be better for the United States to undertake a direct commitment to 
Turkey than for Turkey to be accepted into NATO. At this point, Bevin and the Foreign 
Office temporarily suggested a new option for Turkey, because they realised Turkey was 
disinterested in the idea of being included in a regional defence of the Middle East.572 
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On the other hand, Bevin was not mistaken about his feeling that the United States 
might accept the second Turkish request for NATO membership. His sense was 
vindicated when, in late August 1950, Franks, the British Ambassador to the United 
States, informed the Foreign Office about the new American position towards Greek 
and Turkish membership.573 Franks also reported that the preparatory talks discussing 
the Turkish application were held on 1 September 1950 and the United States affirmed 
that Greece and Turkey would be included in NATO.574 Since the British Foreign Office 
had already prepared an account of reasons for its rejection, it promptly sent a copy of 
a brief containing the account to the United States, endorsed by the COS, Bevin and 
Prime Minister Attlee.575 Then, the same brief was sent to Bevin for him to use when he 
attended the foreign ministers meeting in New York in the following weeks, in which the 
Turkish request for membership was on the agenda.576 Due to the British government’s 
opposition to the Turkish application, the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCOS) also 
had the same view as the British Foreign Office in argument (b) reason (ii): that NATO 
was still fragile or unstable and thus would be unable to accept any new members as 
yet. The United States JCOS, therefore, suggested that an associate status be granted to 
Greece and Turkey, instead of full membership. The matter was recorded as follows: 
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The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the inclusion of Turkey and Greece 
as full members in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization might 
adversely affect the progress which is now evident in North Atlantic 
Treaty arrangements. On the other hand, the admission of Turkey and 
Greece now would enable the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to 
concert military planning and actions in the Mediterranean and the Near 
and Middle East with those already in progress in Western Europe. The 
Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that it might be possible to obtain the benefits of 
Turk and Greek participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
and at the same time minimize the disadvantages thereof by according 
to these two nations an associate status in the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization. Such a status would permit their representatives to 
participate in coordinated planning against Soviet aggression.577 
 
Bevin and the UK representatives in the North Atlantic Council (NAC) only half-heartedly 
accepted the JCOS proposal for associate membership to be granted to Turkey and 
Greece. They complained that although US proposal represented the least bad choice, 
they doubted it would provide a lasting solution.578 Bevin opposed the associate 
membership decision because he believed it would encourage Turkey to pursue full 
NATO membership. British Ambassador Charles shared his apprehension and 
commented that ‘the Turkish government had not given up their hopes of becoming 
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member of the Pact and suggested in four months time [sic] [the] Turkish Government 
would try again.’579 With the Turks set on full membership, Bevin struggled in May 1950 
when he proposed an alternative defence plan for Turkey. 
 
British Ambassador Charles noted that the Turkish Foreign Minister Koprulu had told 
him that for months the Greeks had declined to accept the co-ordination of staff with 
the Turks.580 Although Koprulu did not overtly mention the reason for the Greeks 
attitude towards the Turks, this study has grounds to propose that it was due to their 
dispute over the future of Cyprus: the Cyprus question formed the only problem that 
troubled the Greco-Turkish inter-governmental relationship at this time. 
 
Other evidence proves that this thorn in the side of Turkish and Greek relations was not 
simply a matter of Bevin’s fevered imagination.  We can see this during a series of 
meetings in Washington between the British COS and the United States JCOS.  The 
agenda centred on the liaison between Turkey and Greece in NATO defence planning in 
the Mediterranean area which arose from their NATO associate membership status. At 
26 October 1950 meeting, it is clear that the Cyprus issue between Turkey and Greece 
was one that could disturb these countries cooperation in Mediterranean. This matter 
was recorded as follows: 
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It was noted that the Turkish G–3 now in the United States would 
talk with the Standing Group on NATO planning on November 
3rd. It was generally concluded that Admiral Carney, General 
Arnold, and the British Air Force representative in Turkey should 
confer in order that the planning in the area be coordinated. It 
was further agreed that when the Greek G–3 makes his 
appearance he should be directed to confer with Admiral Carney. 
It was also concluded that it would be desirable to bring pressure 
upon the Greeks to cease their agitation for the return of Cyprus 
to that country, and that further discussion in this latter subject 
should be held at the political-military talks on 26 October.581  
 
 At the next meeting between the British COS and the United States JCOS in Washington 
on 26 October 1950, the issue about Cyprus was mentioned again as follows: 
 
Ambassador Jessup declared that the U.S. has informed the Greek 
Government, and will continue so to inform them, that the present world 
crisis is not a proper time in which to raise the question of the status of 
Cyprus. Ambassador Franks said that the U.K. would appreciate it if the 
U.S. continues to take this line. Air Marshall Slessor urged that both the 
U.K. and the U.S. point out to the Greeks that Cyprus will be of great 
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importance for operations in the next way, since the Greek are inclined 
for their own purposes to play down its military importance.582 
 
Evidently, the Cyprus issue between Turkey and Greece concerned the British 
government. British fears centred particularly on the damage that could be done to 
collaboration in NATO defence planning in the Mediterranean area. This circumstance 
might have had strengthened Bevin’s resolve not to agree to the full accession of these 
two countries to NATO. He remained fixed in this position until his last day in the office 
and in the face of Turkish resistance to inclusion in the British MEC plan. His prime 
concern stemmed from his fear that the two countries would prove unable to 
collaborate harmoniously with one another on NATO’s Southern Flank. This matter will 
be discussed further in the next chapter. 
 
Overall, the discussion in this section demonstrates that further archival research of 
British records shows that the Cyprus issue was one of the contributory reasons shaping 
the British Foreign Office’s position towards Turkish requests for membership of NATO 
in 1950. This was significant because of the negative effects that Greece and Turkey 
might have brought to NATO due to their ongoing dispute over the future of Cyprus. 
 
Conclusion 
 
After NATO was successfully established in April 1949, Greece and Turkey never gave up 
pursuing their membership of NATO. Nevertheless, Britain remained firm in its decision 
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that these countries should not join. The geographical issue and the MEC are two 
reasons usually argued by scholars in explaining why the British government continued 
to reject Turkish requests for membership in 1950.583 This study, however, views this 
rejection from a different perspective: the ill-feeling between these two countries 
because of their disagreement over the future of Cyprus. This was because, starting 
from late 1949 to 1950, the plebiscite movement in Cyprus that was initiated by the 
Ethnarchy and AKEL became more active and aggressive in achieving their goal of union 
with their mother country Greece. When the Greek government seemed pleased by this 
plebiscite campaign, this matter provoked Turkey because it believed Cyprus belonged 
to Turkey and not Greece. As a result, the Greco-Turkish relationship had visibly 
deteriorated and the British Foreign Office was well aware of this situation. This 
fractious relationship between these two countries, whose security matters were 
related to each other, was deemed likely by Bevin and the Foreign Office to bring NATO 
more troubles than benefits. 
 
The discussion in this chapter shows that this Greco-Turkish conflict over Cyprus was a 
contributory reason that shaped the British Foreign Office’s position towards Greek and 
Turkish membership of NATO. The MEC plan was used by these British officials as a 
means for preventing Turkey and its fraternal security partner, Greece, from joining 
NATO. The MEC regional defence pact, that was initiated by Britain, is a prominent issue 
that has been extensively explored by previous scholars in explaining Britain’s reason for 
rejecting Turkish applications and appeals for membership of NATO, in May and August 
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1950 respectively.584 This study, however, shows that the MEC was used as a means, 
rather than a reason, for keeping Turkey, and thus Greece, outside of NATO. This matter 
was based on the fact that, in the early stages of forming the MEC in 1946, neither 
Greece nor Turkey were considered for inclusion. Only after Turkey requested 
membership of NATO, in early May 1950, did Bevin and the Foreign Office arrive at the 
decision to bring only Turkey into the MEC. 
 
It would be true to say here that Bevin and the Foreign Office’s reasons for rejection, as 
related to the Cyprus issue, were hardly noticed before August 1950. This was evident 
when they chose to echo the US position in this matter repeatedly in late 1949, when 
Turkey inquired about the possibility of NATO being extended. This occurred again in 
May 1950, when Turkey for the first time formally requested NATO membership, and 
again in August 1950, before it learned about the new US decision to agree to NATO 
enlargement. Only after the United States decided to bring Greece and Turkey into 
NATO, due to these countries’ contribution in the Korean War, did the role of the 
Cyprus issue in causing Turkish requests for membership of NATO to be rejected by the 
British Foreign Office become apparent. 
 
It should be noted that, in the British Foreign Office’s reason for rejection as related to 
the Cyprus issue, the descriptions that were used by them were vague. This matter was 
possibly because Turkey had denied the fact that the relationship between itself and 
Greece was deteriorating over the issue of Cyprus so that this matter would not affect 
its request for membership of NATO. Considering that Turkey was still pressing hard for 
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British government support for their wish to join NATO, the British Foreign Office’ tack 
not to point clearly to the Cyprus issue could be considered a prudent move by Bevin 
and the Foreign Office in order to avoid irritating Turkey with a reason that they 
themselves had refused to admit. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The MEC plan, Bevin, the new Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison and the full accession 
of Turkey and Greece to NATO, 1950-1952 
 
Introduction 
 
Historians such as Mehmet Gonlubol, Dionysios Chourchoulis, Ekavi Athannassopoulou 
and Behçet K. Yeşilbursa who touched on the issue of the admission of Greece and 
Turkey into NATO from the perspective of Britain share the view that the difficulties 
inherent in creating the MEC were the main reason Britain accepted Greece and Turkey 
as new members of NATO with full membership status.585 Gonlubol for instance said 
‘once Britain received word that Turkey would play a leading role in the establishment 
of such a pact [MEC] if admitted into NATO, England withdrew her objections.’586 
Chourchoulis likewise argues that ‘Turkey’s definite inclusion in the European Command 
was finally decided only in early 1952 after strong US support, when the MEC project 
was not making any progress and any other solution had been considered 
impossible.’587 Athannassopoulou links this matter to the intransigence of the United 
States and Turkey in accepting the British view - that Turkish military integration in the 
MEC project was more appropriate than in NATO - as follows: 
 
They *the British+ failed to make Turkey’s membership of the Atlantic 
Alliance conditional upon its simultaneous inclusion in MEC, and they 
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had to accept Turkey’s military integration into Eisenhower’s command 
[NATO’s first Supreme Commander, Europe (SACEUR)] instead of the 
Middle East Command. Britain’s failure was due as much to 
Washington’s lukewarm support as to Ankara’s determination not to co-
operate in Middle Eastern defence before Turkey was both politically and 
militarily fully integrated into NATO.588 
 
Similarly, Yeşilbursa points to the reluctance of both Turkey and the United States to 
participate in the MEC and accept British command over it. Yeşilbursa notes that the 
reason the MEC held little attraction for Turkey was because ‘it would afford her 
[Turkey] no effective increase in security.’589 With regard to the USA, Yeşilbursa states 
that ‘the Americans, however, wished Middle East Command to be a NATO command 
so that the United States could join. They also suggested that Turkey should join MEC 
and NATO at the same time.’590 As a result of these problems, Yeşilbursa concludes that 
‘the Cabinet therefore agreed in principle to support the admission of Turkey and 
Greece to NATO and in return to ask the United States to support a Middle East 
Command under British auspices.’591 Besides the United States and Turkey, Yeşilbursa 
argues that Egypt’s unfavourable attitude - it ‘refused to join any Middle East defence 
arrangement until the Canal Zone was completely evacuated by British troops’592 - was 
also one of the reasons why Britain decided to accept Turkish and Greek membership in 
NATO. Yeşilbursa shows that in order to help the MEC plan, the new British Foreign 
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Secretary Herbert Morrison proposed Turkish and Greek membership in NATO as 
follows: 
 
On 14 September [1951], during another tripartite meeting, Morrison 
suggested that at the Ottawa meeting of the NATO Council on 14–20 
September, Greece and Turkey should be asked to join NATO. 
Afterwards, Turkey would be approached regarding MEC. Once Turkish 
approval was secured, Britain would present the MEC proposals to 
Egypt.593 
 
Historians such as Victor Papacosma state that, besides this issue of the MEC, another 
reason Britain agreed to the United States’ proposal to grant Turkey and Greece full 
NATO membership was the deteriorating situation in the Middle East. He explains that 
‘in May 1951 Washington formally proposed that full membership should be granted to 
Greece and Turkey. The worsening Middle East situation, and particularly the Iranian 
crisis, convinced the British in July to add their backing.’594 
 
It is worth pointing out here that these difficulties with Turkey, the United States, Egypt 
and the Iranian crisis that have been focused upon by historians seeking to explain why 
Britain eventually agreed to grant full NATO membership to Greece and Turkey could be 
regarded as external factors. These historians have made less effort to consider the 
change in British position on Greek and Turkish membership in NATO in terms of 
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internal factors. One such internal factor was the ignorance and inexperience of the 
new Foreign Secretary Morrison in handling these interrelated matters that had so far 
deadlocked British efforts to formulate the MEC project. This inexperience might have 
led him to succumb to pressure from the United States and Turkey, both of which 
demanded Britain grant its permission for Greek and Turkish entrance into NATO. 
Yeşilbursa, for instance, only mentions Morrison’s diplomacy, which defers to the 
United States’ preference for Greek and Turkish membership in NATO as a means of 
guaranteeing an American commitment to Middle Eastern affairs and the MEC plan. 
Given the lack of discussion of this internal factor and its neglect by previous historians, 
the object of this chapter is to detail and analyse the ignorance and inexperience of the 
new Foreign Secretary Morrison. 
 
It should be noted here that this study does not deny the importance of those external 
factors that have been studied previously by historians. Rather, it seeks to give a full 
picture of Greek and Turkish admission into NATO from the perspective of Britain, by 
complementing those external factors with the internal factor – the inexperience of the 
new Foreign Secretary Morrison in handling foreign affairs when compared with his 
predecessor Bevin. This chapter will demonstrate that this internal dynamic also 
contributed to Britain’s new position towards Greek and Turkish membership in NATO 
in 1951. To substantiate this thesis, this chapter makes reference to a variety of 
published primary sources, including Kenneth Younger’s diaries and interview 
transcript. Younger was the Minister of State at the Foreign Office and served as deputy 
to both Foreign Secretaries Bevin and Morrison in 1950. In addition, a book written by 
Sir Roderick Barclay, Principal Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary, about his 
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experience during his two-year service to Bevin and six-month service to Morrison is 
utilised. Other sources consulted include a published political diary, memoir and papers 
by Hugh Dalton, Minister of Local Government and Planning in 1951 (former Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, 1945-1947); a memoir by Sir Gladwyn Jebb, former Assistant Under-
Secretary of State at the Foreign Office; published diaries and letters by Sir Harold 
Nicolson, Labour Party politician; a memoir by Dean Acheson, US Secretary of State; and 
the speeches from the House of Commons Parliamentary Debates regarding foreign 
affairs during Morrison’s tenure as Foreign Secretary. 
 
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section discusses the difficulties faced 
by the MEC at the hands of the Egyptian, Turkish and United States governments while 
Bevin was still in office. This section is essential in order to show that Bevin continued to 
refuse full Greek and Turkish membership in NATO, even though Turkey objected to its 
inclusion in the MEC plan having been granted NATO associate member status in 
September 1950 and the fact that it was considered for full membership by the United 
States in early 1951. The discussion of the difficulties with Turkey and the United States 
in this section also further substantiates that the Cyprus issue, namely the deterioration 
in the relationship between Turkey and Greece, was one of the reasons that Bevin 
stood firm in not accepting full Turkish membership in NATO. The second section 
discusses the continuous difficulties with the aforementioned governments that 
hampered arrangements for the MEC under the new Foreign Secretary Morrison. This 
section discusses first the inexperience of Morrison as head of the Foreign Office. It 
then discusses how Morrison’s incompetence as Foreign Secretary contributed to his 
new approach to the issue of Greek and Turkish membership in NATO while he was 
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dealing with the above difficulties. Although the external factors mentioned above have 
been covered widely by previous historians, it is necessary that they are discussed in 
this chapter - it is only by exploring these external circumstances that we can 
understand the internal dynamic that this study attempts to argue was an additional 
factor in Britain’s decision to grant full NATO membership to Greece and Turkey. 
 
Bevin and the difficulties of creating the MEC, May 1950 - March 1951: Turkey and 
Greece remain outside NATO 
 
Since Bevin, the Foreign Office and the COS started the initiatives towards the MEC in 
late 1945, the Egyptian government was the first to make the arrangements for this 
British defence plan difficult. This was followed by the Turkish and US governments 
when the plan was revealed to them in May 1950. It is worth noting here that the 
problems faced with the Egyptian government between 1946 and early 1950,595 and the 
disinterest of the Turkish government in the MEC plan between May and September 
1950 have already been discussed in Chapter Three of this dissertation.596 This section, 
therefore, continues the discussion of the difficulty faced with regard to the Egyptian 
government and the increasing complexity of the MEC arrangements with regard to the 
Turkish and US governments while Bevin was still Foreign Secretary. By showing how 
committed Bevin was to handling these foreign affairs which were slowing the MEC’s 
progress and his simultaneous reluctance to accept the full accession of Greece and 
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Turkey into NATO, this section thus adds weight to the internal dynamic thesis that will 
be analysed later in this chapter. 
 
The relentless uncooperativeness of Egypt towards the MEC plan 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, between 1946 and March 1950 a series of 
negotiations between the British government and the Egyptian government on the 
prospect of Egypt’s inclusion in a regional defence pact of the Middle East had been 
held, but none of these negotiations had succeeded in prompting the opening of 
arrangement for the MEC. This was because both governments had failed to reach an 
agreement over two controversial issues, notably British troops’ evacuation from the 
Suez Canal Zone and the unity of Egypt and the Sudan.597 
 
Bevin, the Foreign Office and the COS continued their efforts to pursue the MEC plan 
with the Egyptian government by sending the Chief of the British Imperial General Staff, 
Field Marshal Sir William Slim, to Cairo in June and July 1950 to resolve the Anglo-
Egyptian dispute over the Suez Canal Zone. A proposal for Anglo-Egyptian co-operation 
in the Suez Canal Zone that was prepared by the COS, in consultation with the Foreign 
Office, was presented before the King of Egypt, King Farouk and other Egyptian 
authorities. In short, the proposal suggested that the role of British troops in the Suez 
Canal Zone would be redefined from the term ‘occupation’ to ‘collaboration’.598 In other 
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words, the British authorities envisaged a completely new approach to defending the 
Suez Canal Zone based on an equal alliance between the Egyptian and British 
governments under the regional pact of the MEC. 
 
Although King Farouk and the other Egyptian authorities were aware that Egypt could 
not defend itself and that a British base was essential to Egypt’s security, Slim got the 
impression that the King intended to let British troops remain in the Suez Canal Zone 
‘for a very long period in his own *King Farouk+ interests.599 The other Egyptian 
authorities however, in particular the Egyptian Foreign Minister Salah ed-Din Bey, 
reverted again to demands for ‘immediate and complete evacuation.’600 The British 
Ambassador in Cairo, Ralph Skrine Stevenson, in his report to Michael Wright (Foreign 
Office Under-Secretary) noted that the Minister of the Interior, Serag ed-Din Pasha, 
asked Slim and himself ‘how can we, the Wafd, accept less than was offered to and 
rejected by Sidky Pasha?’ Serag ed-Din went on to say that the offer to evacuate made 
by Bevin in 1946 was ‘the greatest mistake we had made.’601 However, given that these 
efforts in June and July 1950 were taking place in the midst of the Korean War, the COS 
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felt ‘it would not be practicable to hand these over completely to Egyptian control,’602 
arguing that ‘we *Britain+ must continue to hold very large stocks of equipment and 
stores in the base installations, if we are to have any chance of achieving a rapid build-
up in the early months of the next war.’603 It seems that, since both governments’ 
positions regarding the Suez Canal Zone were resolute, Slim’s initiatives in summer 
1950 did not succeed in making any appreciable progress in an Anglo-Egyptian effort to 
arrange a regional defence of the Middle East. 
 
After Slim’s failure, the next initiative was carried out by the British Ambassador in 
Cairo, Stevenson. It was decided that exploratory conversations between Stevenson and 
the Egyptian Foreign Minister Salah ed-Din Bey should continue and that the latter 
should endeavour to put forward some practical solution to the differences between 
the two countries.604 Again, however, the discussions between Stevenson and Salah ed-
Din Bey still failed to produce any satisfactory settlements because the latter stubbornly 
maintained his position - that the British forces must unconditionally withdraw from the 
Suez Canal Zone.605  
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After unsuccessful attempts by Slim and Stevenson, the next step was for Bevin to see 
the Egyptian Foreign Minister in New York in September 1950. This new effort 
shouldered by Bevin could also be considered futile, since Salah ed-Din Bey persisted in 
his demand ‘that all British forces should be evacuated from the *Suez+ Canal Zone.’606 
Salah ed-Din Bey then told Bevin that ‘there would of course be a Defence Treaty and in 
time of war British troops could return to Egypt’ and added that he had previously told 
Stevenson, off the record, the following: 
 
He [Salah ed-Din Bey] envisaged a transition period of one year in which 
the efficiency of the Egyptian army would have to be increased and in 
which the Egyptian army would have to learn how to maintain the 
equipment and installations which the British would leave behind. They 
could then take over in the [Suez] Canal Zone.607 
 
Salah ed-Din Bey asserted that the main object behind this proposal was to get the 
British to strengthen the Egyptian army, because the British had ‘made little effort to 
build up the Egyptian army since 1937 and as a result the army was now weak [and] this 
was adduced as a reason why the British could not leave Egypt.’608 Although Bevin 
stressed that the British would find it very difficult to defend Egypt if all facilities were 
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denied to them, he promised Salah ed-Din Bey that ‘he would consider them [Egyptian 
proposals+ on his return *to London+.’609 
 
Bevin, together with Stevenson, continued the next effort to discuss the issue of the 
Suez Canal Zone with the Egyptian Foreign Minister Salah ed-Din Bey and the Egyptian 
Ambassador in London, Aly Husny Effendi, in a series of talks in the Foreign Office 
between 4 and 15 December 1950. Unfortunately, both the Egyptian and the British 
representatives in these talks still failed to reach an understanding over the evacuation 
of British troops within a year.610 Bevin argued that ‘evacuation within this time limit 
would mean that Great Britain would be expected to undertake the defence of the 
Middle East in wartime without having been able to make adequate preparations.’611 
However, Salah ed-Din Bey ‘still believed that one year would suffice to enable the 
Egyptian Army to take over the role assigned to the British troops in the [Suez] Canal 
Zone under the 1936 Treaty.’612 Aside from the stalemate over the matter of 
evacuation, these December 1950 negotiations also reached an impasse over the issue 
of Sudan. This was because the Egyptian government was resolute that ‘Egypt and 
Sudan were one country and under one Crown’, leading it reject the British 
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government’s proclamation of self-government and self-determination for the 
Sudanese people.613 
 
Since the Anglo-Egyptian talks of December 1950 had become deadlocked again, Bevin 
made a new effort to end this stalemate in January 1951. Bevin told the Egyptian 
Ambassador Aly Husny Effendi that he had prepared a new proposal for the next stage 
of Anglo-Egyptian discussions - that the question of timing should be revised if British 
troops withdrew from the Suez Canal Zone on Egyptian terms.614 The Ambassador said 
that this question of timing had also been causing his government anxiety and told 
Bevin that his government had been thinking in terms of three or four years, if some 
agreement could be reached.615 It seems that Bevin’s move struck the right note, 
because the Egyptian government apparently also believed that the evacuation of 
British troops within a year was impossible to perform. Bevin’s proposal was agreed by 
the COS and was to be his last initiative as Foreign Secretary. When this proposal was 
discussed and approved in the Cabinet in the first week of April 1951, Bevin attended 
the meeting as Lord Privy Seal, a position to which he was appointed on the day of his 
resignation, 9 March 1951. The new Foreign Secretary at that time was Morrison. 
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It would be fair to say here that Bevin’s initiative in January 1951 can be seen as his last 
effort to ease the difficulty in bringing Egypt into the MEC plan. It seemed that, until the 
last weeks before Bevin’s death in April 1951, he still continued to develop original 
solutions to the Suez problem. Yet Turkey, another prospective member of the MEC, at 
the same time deeply rejected its inclusion in the British plan because it was eager to 
obtain full NATO membership status, having been granted associate membership in 
September 1950. The problems that the Turkish government posed to the British 
government regarding the inclusion of Turkey in the MEC plan during Bevin’s term as 
Foreign Secretary will be discussed in the next subtopic. 
 
The antagonism of Turkey towards the MEC plan 
 
As analysed and discussed in the previous chapter, due to the Cyprus issue between 
Turkey and its security partner, Greece, Bevin and the Foreign Office refused both 
Turkish applications for membership in NATO in 1950.616 Bevin, however, was fully 
aware that without support from the Western powers, Turkey would not be able to 
defend itself from Soviet aggression. He thus offered an alternate defence plan to 
Turkey - the MEC plan - that was simultaneously publicised by him and Acheson on 19 
May 1950. Unfortunately, Turkey proved to be too difficult to convince and it is possible 
to argue that Turkish enthusiasm for joining NATO was the greatest obstacle faced by 
Bevin, the Foreign Office and the COS in their MEC efforts. 
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The first sign that Turkey had little interest in Bevin’s plan was when the Turkish 
Ambassador Açikalin, who found out about the inclusion of Turkey in the MEC from the 
newspaper, complained about this decision being made without first telling or 
consulting the Turkish government.617 This criticism is understandable, given that 
Turkey was expecting the result for its first application for membership in NATO but 
Bevin unexpectedly decided to bring Turkey into the MEC plan instead. Logically, it 
would have been impossible for Turkey to change its long interest in joining NATO and 
agree to join the MEC, a plan that was still only on paper at that time. The disinterest of 
Turkey towards the MEC plan became more overt when it sent its second request for 
membership in NATO in early August 1950, less than three months after the first 
application received no response from the three NATO key allies, namely Britain, the 
United States and France. Although the North Atlantic Council (NAC) rejected Turkey’s 
second application for membership at the September 1950 meetings in New York, it 
was however granted associate membership status.618 
 
This study believes the decision to grant associate membership caused British efforts 
towards the formation of the MEC to progress at a slow pace. The utmost problem that 
emerged from Turkish associated membership was that Turkey became more keen to 
demand full NATO membership. Given the fact that Turkey had struggled to secure its 
place in NATO since its inception years, NATO associate membership status could only 
partly satisfy them. The British Ambassador to Turkey, Sir Noel Charles, told Bevin ‘the 
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Turkish government would more than probably, indeed certainly, accept the 
proposition [associate membership] which they considered as a first step towards the 
attainment of their wish to become full members of the pact.’619 This matter led Turkey 
to set in motion a chain of events that made arrangements for the MEC difficult and 
complicated. 
 
The first problem posed by Turkey after it was granted limited membership of NATO 
happened in early 1951, when Turkey refused to be put under British command in the 
British Middle East Headquarters,620 even though at the same time it showed interest in 
the closest co-ordination and liaison on strategic planning with the British for the 
defence of the Middle East.621 It is worth mentioning here that, in order to attract 
Turkey to the MEC plan, Bevin, the Foreign Office and the COS conducted a policy that 
linked the MEC plan to NATO via the NATO Standing Group (the permanent NATO 
steering body, with the membership of the United States, Great Britain and France).622 
Previous historians such as David R. Devereux and Behçet K. Yeşilbursa argue that 
linking the MEC to NATO was a British strategy to attract the Arab states, and Egypt in 
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particular, to the MEC plan.623 Since this study analyses this matter from the perspective 
of Bevin and the other British authorities who refused to accept Turkish applications for 
membership in NATO, and given that the MEC was used by these British authorities as a 
means to prevent Turkey from joining NATO, thus it could be true to say that this MEC–
NATO démarche was also a British strategy to persuade Turkey to accept the MEC plan, 
since Turkey could regard itself as part of NATO through its membership in the MEC. 
 
The second obstacle to the MEC plan was when Turkey played the “neutrality card” in 
order to pressure the United States into giving its support for Turkey’s full accession to 
NATO. Since September 1950 the Turkish President, Mahmut Celâl Bayar, had hinted 
that Turkey might reinstate its neutral position if its application for membership in 
NATO was rejected. President Bayar said to the United States Ambassador to Turkey, 
George Wadsworth, that:  
 
Does your Government not realize that we Turks will consider further 
deferment of favourable action on our request by the Atlantic Pact 
powers as a refusal and as unwillingness to accept us as equal partners in 
meeting jointly any threat of aggression? We have shown our good faith 
by forthright action towards meeting the Korean crisis. I fear frankly that, 
if Atlantic Pact Council of Foreign Ministers turns down our request, our 
morale will be seriously affected.624 
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In February 1951, President Bayar once again stated in stark terms that a pro-US Turkish 
foreign policy might have to be re-thought if a firm United States guarantee of support 
was not forthcoming.625 In other words, Turkey threatened to adopt a policy of 
neutrality. This neutrality threat was taken very seriously by the US State Department 
and the JCOS because ‘Turkish neutrality “would deny us *the United States+ access to 
the shortest and most expeditious routes to the nerve center of the plague that afflicts 
us”.’626 As a consequence of the Turkish neutrality threat, the United States JCOS saw 
that this matter could be prevented by bringing Turkey into NATO, and after that point, 
the United States JCOS demanded that Turkey be brought into NATO and placed under 
Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) as opposed to in the MEC–NATO plan 
under British command in the British Middle East Headquarters.627 It seems that the 
Turkish neutrality threat had benefitted Turkey in terms of its place in NATO but had 
adversely affected the British MEC plan. 
 
The third obstacle to the British MEC plan brought about by Turkey, in particular by 
Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, Foreign Minister Koprulu and the Turkish Chief of Staff 
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General Nuri Yamut, was when they insisted before General Sir Brian Robertson 
(Commander-in-Chief of the British Middle East Land Forces) that they would desire to 
join NATO first ‘for psychological reasons and because further assistance to Turkey 
might result’ before they would be ready to play their part in the MEC plan.628 It 
seemed that Turkey had attempted to make a bargain with the British government for 
full Turkish accession to NATO by using the MEC plan as its pawn. Seemingly, the 
Turkish attitude further complicated the British MEC efforts, as Bevin and the Foreign 
Office up to this point still refused to accept Turkey as a member of NATO. As noted by 
the Head of the offices of Deputy Under-Secretary of State, Pierson Dixon, before 
General Robertson’s visit to Ankara: ‘if we want to work towards this solution 
[associating Turkey with NATO defence planning] we should try to prevent the idea of 
Turkey joining N.A.T.O. from being further aired between now and the Malta 
conference.’629 
 
Since there were no new reasons for rejection presented by Bevin and the Foreign 
Office at this stage, it is possible to say here that their reasons –the Cyprus issue 
between Turkey and Greece as discussed and analysed in the previous chapter – 
remained the same. However, unfortunately for Bevin, the Foreign Office and the COS, 
the insistence of the United States JCOS that Turkey be granted full NATO membership 
in early 1951 had disturbed their efforts to bring Turkey into the MEC plan. In the midst 
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of increasing difficulties in creating the MEC plan because of the attitudes of the Turkish 
and US governments, Bevin was forced by Prime Minister Attlee to retire in early March 
1951 due to his deteriorating health condition. The issues with the United States 
government that engendered continuing difficulty in creating the MEC plan while Bevin 
was Foreign Secretary will be touched upon in the next subsection. 
 
The unfavourable attitude of the United States towards the MEC plan 
 
When Bevin told Secretary of State Acheson that the MEC plan was an alternative 
option for Turkey instead of joining NATO at the tripartite London Meetings of Foreign 
Ministers in May 1950, he actually revealed the British plan for the defence of the 
Middle East to the United States. The United States government, however, did not 
easily give its political and military support to this British regional defence plan. 
 
The first issue that Bevin and the other British authorities had to deal with was a 
lukewarm response from the US State Department, in particular the Bureau of Near 
Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (NEA) to this regional defence plan. This was 
due to two reasons. Firstly, as mentioned in previous chapters, the United States did 
not see the security of the Middle East as its priority, rather seeing it as primarily a 
British responsibility.630 Secondly, the Bureau of NEA saw this British initiative as 
untimely because the United States had already committed itself to the security of 
Europe through NATO and it was impossible to extend its commitments to the Middle 
East. As remarked by the Ambassador at Large Philip C. Jessup to Acheson: ‘We *the 
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Subcommittee on Near East] again suggested this was a far-reaching question with 
implications extending beyond NE [the near east] and that we felt it should be discussed 
with those responsible for NAT *NATO+ negotiations.’631 The Bureau of NEA also 
asserted that ‘the area *the Middle East+ lacks a power center on the basis of which a 
pact could be built.’632 As a result, the Bureau of the NEA said ‘that we neither 
encourage nor discourage the spontaneous creation of any Eastern Mediterranean 
grouping for defensive purposes.’633 However, due to the outbreak of hostilities in 
Korea in June 1950, the United States decided to take a more active role in the Middle 
East. As noted by the National Security Council (NSC), what was needed was ‘an 
examination of the whole Middle East problem, covering both political and military 
aspects, without prejudice as to what nations should provide the forces required in the 
various eventualities.’634 This new approach to the Middle East was adopted by the 
United States because it believed ‘the USSR has the military capability to occupy any 
country on its periphery, to invade Western Europe and the Near and Middle East, to 
make direct attacks upon the United Kingdom and Alaska.’635 
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The second issue between the British and the United States governments was their 
differences in strategic preoccupation with the Middle East. The US State Department 
was disappointed with the British military strategic preoccupation with the Middle East, 
namely the ‘Inner Ring’ strategy that envisaged defending only Egypt instead of an 
‘Outer Ring’ strategy, primarily that Iran and Turkey could defend the Middle East as a 
whole.636 The reason the British Authorities opted for the ‘Inner Ring’ strategy was 
because the ‘Outer Ring’ strategy was logistically too much for Britain, which was still 
suffering from economic and military weakness.637 Similarly, the United States JCOS, 
which thought that Iran and Turkey would be the first two countries that would come 
under attack if the Soviet Union wanted to expand its sphere of influence in the Middle 
East region, rejected the British position and instead recommended the ‘Outer Ring’ 
strategy as a basis for Anglo-American cooperation in the Middle East.638 Britain, 
accordingly, agreed to review the ‘Outer Ring’ strategy but due to ‘their limited 
capabilities’ asserted that this strategy should adopt concerted measures between 
Britain and the United States to defend the Middle East efficiently.639 
 
                                                 
636
 See FRUS, 1950, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Vol. V, p. 190, Agreed United States–United 
Kingdom Memorandum of Discussions on the Present World Situation, ‘U.S./U.K. Discussions on Present 
World Situation’ – Middle East, Washington, 25 July 1950. See also Toru Onozawa, ‘Formation of 
American Regional Policy for the Middle East, 1950-1952’, Diplomatic History, 29:1 (2005), 117-148 (p. 
123). For further discussion and analysis on the development of the British military strategy see Chapter 6 
in Michael J. Cohen, Fighting World War Three from the Middle East, 1945-1954 (London: Frank Cass, 
1997); Ritchie Ovendale, Britain, the United States, and the Transfer of Power in the Middle East, 1945-
1962 (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1996), pp. 33-35; Devereux, pp. 39-42. 
637
 Ibid. See also Hahn, The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-1956: Strategy and Diplomacy in 
the Early Cold War, p. 103; Zach Levey, ‘Britain’s Middle East Strategy 1950-52: General Brian Robertson 
and the ‘Small’ Arab States’, Middle Eastern Studies, 40:2 (2004), 58-79 (60). 
638
 See Ibid., pp. 190-191.  
639
 See Ibid., pp. 217-221, Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, 
and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Ambassador at Large (Jessup), ‘British Review of Middle East Policy 
and Strategy’, Washington, 19 October 1950. 
236 
 
The third issue that prevented arrangements for the MEC from going smoothly was 
when the British recommendation for Anglo-American cooperation in the Middle East 
proved hard to put into effect. This was because the United States JCOS ‘are opposed to 
any measures which would commit or tend to commit U.S. forces to the Middle East in 
the event of global war.’640 They also ‘consider*ed+ that the Middle East is a British 
responsibility in case of a hot war.’641 As a result, until the end of 1950, the United 
States government was still hesitant about providing military assistance to the MEC 
plan. As expected, the ‘Outer Ring’ strategy proved to be too costly for Britain. 
According to Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African 
Affairs McGhee, ‘the UK, which has primary responsibility for the defense of the area, 
lacks both manpower and resources to successfully defend the area and has no plans 
for defense of the Saudi Arabian oil fields and the Dhahran Air Base.’642 Since McGhee 
had a soft spot for the British and their MEC plan,643 he then tried to find a solution to 
the lack of military support given to the MEC plan by the United States government thus 
far. He proposed to Acheson and the United States JCOS a combined US-UK command 
structure which would stimulate basic cooperation among the states of the area 
because it ‘would include the naming of a British Commanding Officer, the naming of a 
US Deputy Commander and, if possible, the naming of US country advisers or 
commanders for the combined UK-US structures in Greece, Turkey, Iran and Saudi 
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Arabia.’644 Obviously, McGhee was suggesting an immediate action that could be taken 
by the United States to defend the Middle East was to provide full political and military 
support for the British MEC plan.645 McGhee also added that the US State Department 
had ‘serious doubts about the ability of the U.K. to defend them *the Middle East+’ 
because ‘it is very difficult for them *the British+ to get cooperation of the Arab States’ in 
the midst of increasingly strong nationalist sentiments, particularly in Egypt.646 Acheson 
warmly welcomed McGhee’s proposal,647 but the United States JCOS remained 
‘unalterably opposed to putting forces’ in the Middle East because they saw it as ‘a job 
which the U.K. and the Commonwealth have got to do.’648  
 
The associate membership of Turkey, that allowed it to have coordination on strategic 
military planning in the Mediterranean area, brought about the fourth issue between 
the United States and British governments that further complicated the British MEC 
efforts. The issue appeared when the United States JCOS did not agree with the British 
preference for placing Turkey under General Robertson in the British Headquarters 
Middle East Command. This was interpreted by the British COS as evidence that ‘the 
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U.S. Military mission, of which the U.S. Ambassador is the nominal head, nourished the 
ambition of taking over the command.’649 This matter became more apparent when the 
United States 1st Chairman of the JCOS, General Omar Bradley, argued that Turkey itself 
was not willing to accept the British MEC plan or place its forces under British command 
in the British Middle East Headquarters. Admiral Sherman reckoned that NATO 
command under Admiral Carney, the United States Sixth Fleet Commander and 
Commander of NATO’s Southern Flank, would be more suitable for Turkey and its 
security partner, Greece.650 To make matters worse, the US State Department stressed 
that the British would only get the United States’ full cooperation in planning for Middle 
East defence after their differences over the command structure were resolved.651 It is 
fair to say here that, like Turkey, the US government also issued an ultimatum that 
caused the British MEC efforts to become more difficult. If Turkey, which associated 
with NATO strategic military planning in the Mediterranean area, was placed under the 
British Headquarters Middle East Command it would become easier for Bevin and the 
other British authorities to persuade Turkey to join the MEC plan, as this British 
command would become the Headquarters of the MEC after it was established. 
Unfortunately, neither the United States nor Turkey agreed to or accepted Turkey being 
placed under British command. 
 
The fifth issue that made the situation more difficult for the British MEC plan was when, 
in early 1951, the United States JCOS had come to the decision to grant full NATO 
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membership to Turkey following its neutrality threat. The United States JCOS believed 
the best solution to avoid Turkish neutrality, and also the most desirable form of 
reciprocal security arrangement, was to include Turkey in NATO as a full member.652 As 
noted by the United States JCOS, ‘if an offer *of full NATO membership+ is not made 
soon, there is reason to believe that Turkey will veer towards a policy of neutralism.’653 
Apart from the Turkish threat of neutrality, the US State Department asserted that 
‘Congress might more readily accept extension of existing N.A.T.O. umbrella than direct 
United States guarantees to Turkey and Greece which “would set a new pattern”.’654 
Therefore, these US authorities wished to place Turkey, together with Greece, under 
Admiral Carney’s command of NATO’s Southern Flank.  
 
However Bevin, the Foreign Office and the COS, in particular General Robertson, did not 
agree with the United States authorities’ decision to bring Turkey and Greece into NATO 
and place them under Admiral Carney’s command of NATO’s Southern Flank. Historians 
such as Behçet K. Yeşilbursa and David R. Devereux argue that the reason for Bevin and 
Robertson’s hostility to Admiral Sherman’s plan was that they instead wished to include 
Turkey in their MEC plan due to the country’s manpower resources and strategic 
position in the Middle East.655 From the point of view of this study, another reason 
Bevin and the other British authorities stood firm against the inclusion of Turkey and 
Greece in NATO was because they believed these two countries would be unable to 
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cooperate harmoniously in NATO’s Southern Flank due to the Cyprus issue. This matter 
was axiomatic on many occasions. Firstly, as already mentioned in previous chapters, 
Turkey told the British that Greece refused to cooperate with them, meaning Turkey 
was relieved when the NAC had not yet offered the same associate membership to 
Greece.656 Secondly, during the meetings between the British COS and the United 
States JCOS in October 1950 about the cooperation of Turkey and Greece in NATO 
defence planning in the Mediterranean area, the Cyprus issue was mentioned twice. In 
short, both the British and US parties agreed that the Cyprus issue, if being agitated by 
Greece, could disturb the cooperation of these two associate membership countries in 
the Mediterranean.657 Thirdly, at the meeting between the United States JCOS and 
McGhee in early 1951, General Bradley also remarked on the same problem between 
Turkey and Greece as follows: 
 
GENERAL BRADLEY: We have, of course, had discussions with the U.K. 
Chiefs on those problems and have been trying to get together with 
them on our plans for the area. We also called in representatives from 
Greece, Turkey, and Iran in an effort to achieve coordination with these 
countries first. It is very difficult to persuade the Turks to engage in any 
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planning with Greece and Iran. The Turks have a very simple mobilization 
plan–everyone turns out to fight and that is all the plan amounts to.658 
 
Fourthly, in the same meeting, when the issue of the Turkish request for membership of 
NATO was brought up, McGhee stated that ‘it was thought that an extension of NATO 
to this area would place excessive requirements and organisational problems on 
NATO.’659 Given that McGhee was an outspokenly pro-British official, it could be true to 
say that his comment on the ‘organizational problems on NATO’ might have referred to 
the same concern of British officials about the disadvantages that Greece and Turkey 
might have brought to NATO as a result of their strained relationship over the future of 
Cyprus. When combined with the reasons for Britain’s rejection of Turkey’s second 
application for membership; the fact that Turkey would not be disappointed if Greece 
were not invited to join NATO; and the agreement between the British COS and the 
United States JCOS that the Cyprus issue would hamper these countries’ cooperation in 
NATO defence planning in the Mediterranean, - it seems the Cyprus problem was the 
most plausible reason why Bevin, the Foreign Office and the COS insisted on bringing 
Greece and Turkey into the MEC plan instead of NATO. 
 
It is imperative to acknowledge here that, at this stage, Bevin and the other British 
authorities hadn’t seriously considered including Greece in the MEC plan, as only Turkey 
was confirmed to be included.660 It should be noted here that when the NAC decided to 
grant limited membership to Turkey, it was widely agreed that ‘what was done for 
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Turkey must also be done for Greece, even though the latter had made no similar 
request *for membership of NATO+.’661 This matter might have put pressure on the 
British authorities not to exclude Greece if they were determined to bring Turkey into 
the MEC plan. If Bevin, the Foreign Office and the COS believed the Cyprus issue 
between Turkey and Greece would render these countries’ cooperation ineffective and 
therefore justify their decision to keep these countries out of NATO, therefore it is 
interesting to question ‘what is the difference between Turkey and Greece being part of 
NATO’s Southern Flank and Turkey and Greece being part of the MEC plan,’ since the 
same problem would surely occur in the MEC. 
 
One can argue that the expected participation of many other countries in the MEC, such 
as Egypt, Israel, Britain and the United States, was the distinctive factor that would 
differentiate this regional defence pact from NATO’s Southern Flank that consisted only 
of Greece and Turkey, and later Yugoslavia.662 Greece refused to engage in any planning 
with Turkey in a small system that only involved these two countries – like that of 
NATO’s Southern Flank – unless they were part of a larger system which included 
Britain, France, the United States and Italy.663 It could be true to say that, based on 
Greece’s attitude, Bevin and the other British authorities might have perceived that 
Greece and Turkey could still cooperate in the MEC plan in spite of the Cyprus issue 
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because this regional defence plan would not only consist of the two countries, hence 
their decision to let Greece to join the MEC together with Turkey. 
 
To sum up, the Cyprus issue was one of the apparent reasons why Bevin, the Foreign 
Office and the COS remained reluctant to grant full NATO membership for Greece and 
Turkey. It seems that Bevin believed that the hostile Greco-Turkish relationship over 
Cyprus would become ‘a thorn in the flesh’ in their collaboration within the Southern 
Flank of NATO. Such animosity would cause the Southern Flank to become unstable and 
ineffective in safeguarding the Mediterranean area. Yet the Turkish and United States 
governments preferred for Turkey to join NATO, a matter which hindered smooth 
arrangements in creating the British MEC plan. Nevertheless Bevin, the Foreign Office 
and the COS stood firm in their position - that the best place for Greece and Turkey was 
not NATO’s Southern Flank but the British MEC plan. After Bevin left office, the new 
Foreign Secretary Morrison agreed to accept full Greek and Turkish accession to NATO. 
Such a démarche intended to obtain Turkish and American cooperation for formulating 
the British MEC plan. Therefore, in the historiography of the admission of Greece and 
Turkey to NATO, the MEC plan is seen by previous historians as a significant factor.664 
Morrison’s role in this admission is given less attention and this internal dynamic will be 
analysed in the next section. 
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Foreign Secretary Morrison and the continuous troubles in forming the MEC, March 1951 
- October 1951: Towards the full accession of Greece and Turkey to NATO 
 
According to historian John W. Young, it is generally accepted that Morrison was not a 
favourite choice for replacing Bevin due to his lack of experience in foreign affairs.665 
This was because he had spent most of his politic career in domestic affairs, for instance 
as Home Secretary in Churchill’s Inner War Cabinet.666 He was then appointed Leader of 
the House of Commons and Deputy Prime Minister in Attlee’s governments of 1945 to 
March 1951. With Morrison’s substantial experience in domestic affairs, it is fair to say 
that Morrison was not a favourite to be named as Bevin’s successor. It is interesting to 
ask here why Morrison was appointed Foreign Secretary if he was unsuitable for the 
position. It should be noted that Morrison had been involved in some foreign affairs in 
1946 in regards to the issue of Palestine in which he, together with the United States 
ambassador Henry F. Grady, proposed ‘The Morrison Plan’.667 In 1949 he was also 
appointed the leader of the Labour delegation to the Council of Europe in Strasbourg.668 
Nevertheless, these experiences were insufficient for Morrison to be as competent as 
Bevin in dealing with foreign affairs. 
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In Morrison’s autobiography, he noted that Attlee told him about the fact that his 
appointment to the Foreign Office was merely “the inevitable choice” due to his 
seniority within the Labour government when compared to other candidates, such as 
trade-unionist James Griffiths and Hector McNeil, Secretary of State for Scotland, who 
were recommended by Bevin to be his successor but were regarded as too young.669 
Senior Cabinet members also considered that Kenneth Younger, the Minister of State at 
the Foreign Office and the deputy to the Foreign Secretary, might have succeeded Bevin 
as Foreign Secretary, but his name was dismissed because they claimed that his status 
as junior minister meant he lacked maturity and judgement.670 Although Morrison said 
in his autobiography that he did not know what was in Attlee’s mind, he himself felt that 
Attlee might have preferred Griffiths,671 which indirectly implies that the reason Attlee 
was hesitant in appointing him as Foreign Secretary was because he did not have a clear 
grasp of foreign affairs compared to Griffiths, who was a highly competent Secretary of 
State at the Colonial Office where he did well for over a year.672 
 
Before this section continues the discussion of how Morrison dealt with the continuous 
difficulties that obstructed the MEC, it is worth first discussing here how differently 
Morrison and Bevin were in conducting the Foreign Office. This matter sheds light on 
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the internal dynamic thesis argued by this study regarding the issue of full admission of 
Greece and Turkey into NATO. 
 
Criticism of Morrison’s suitability as Foreign Secretary 
 
The criticism that Morrison was not as competent as Bevin in handling foreign affairs 
was voiced not only by the Opposition and the Press, but also by Morrison’s colleagues 
in the Labour Party and his own office. Historians such as David R. Devereux and 
Kenneth O. Morgan argue that Morrison was not at home in the Foreign Office in the 
same way that Bevin had been and he was generally regarded as ‘a poor Foreign 
Secretary.’673 These historians, however, did not see this matter as an important factor 
that had led Morrison to become a catalyst for the change of Britain’s position over full 
Greek and Turkish NATO membership. To elucidate this internal dynamic thesis, this 
subtopic will analyse first Morrison’s lack of characteristics to make a good Foreign 
Secretary. This study by no means suggests that Morrison was a weak minister, but his 
lack of experience in foreign affairs seems to suggest that he was incapable of handling 
foreign affairs efficiently. 
 
The first and the foremost element of this was Morrison’s ignorance about foreign 
affairs. As noted by Sir Roderick E. Barclay, Principal Private Secretary to the Foreign 
Secretary who worked for both Bevin and Morrison, ‘one unexpected complication was 
Morrison’s extraordinary ignorance of most of the Foreign Office problems of the 
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moment.’674 Similarly, Kenneth Younger, the Minister of State at the Foreign Office and 
deputy to both Bevin and Morrison, professed in his diary that ‘he *Morrison] is 
probably more ignorant of foreign affairs than any other member of the Cabinet.’675 
Barclay also criticised Morrison for his lack not only of background knowledge but for 
his inability to comprehend the essentials of the problems regarding foreign affairs, 
even though he had been supplied with all important Foreign Office telegrams and 
despatches before his appointment as Foreign Secretary due to his capacity as a senior 
Cabinet Minister.676 
 
The second characteristic of Morrison that was incomparable to his predecessor Bevin 
was his passion, commitment and devotion as Foreign Secretary. Morrison’s lack of 
enthusiasm in foreign affairs was evident on many occasions. For instance, he 
continually asked his Private Secretary Barclay to reduce the volume of reading material 
that went to him; he constantly suggested offloading some of the work onto the junior 
ministers; he went on holiday at the time the Foreign Office needed him most; and, 
being parochial, he kept occupying himself with the matter of the Festival of Britain 
rather than foreign affairs.677 As mentioned above, Morrison had every opportunity to 
keep himself informed but he still failed to have a full grasp of foreign affairs before he 
became Foreign Secretary. This matter also substantiates the notion that Morrison was 
uninterested in foreign affairs – although he did say in his autobiography that he had a 
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great interest in foreign affairs and the post of Foreign Secretary would bring balance to 
his experience of domestic administration.678 Thus, the rumours that Morrison was 
attracted to the post of Foreign Secretary due to his ambition to become Prime 
Minister, even though the position was not easily suited to his expertise and skills,679 
seems plausible. Bevin, in contrast, had devoted his life to his job as Foreign Secretary. 
He always came into the office on Saturday and ‘normally stayed till 2 or 3 o’clock, 
foregoing lunch.’680 The fact that Bevin was forced to retire and he was upset by this 
dismissal further proved his passion for his job. As commented by one of his staff, ‘he 
*Bevin+ wanted to die in the Foreign Office.’681 
 
The third criticism of Morrison was his lack of skills to run the Foreign Office and his lack 
of aptitude for managing foreign affairs. For example, he was slow in making decisions 
on urgent matters, he cared little about developing a long term policy and strategy and 
he failed to perform strongly in the House of Commons, where he gave ineffective 
concluding speeches and failed to give a clear picture of the policy the British 
government was following.682 In an interview with Barclay that was conducted by 
Morrison’s biographers, Barclay said: ‘With Bevin you just got a simple yes to one 
alternative and no to the others.’683 In addition, Morrison was also exposed to excessive 
criticism from middle-class, university-trained observers from among the Opposition on 
the grounds that he pronounced ‘Tigris’ as rhyming with ‘pig’ and ‘Euphrates’ as ‘You 
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Frates’ in the House of Commons.684 This was because to pronounce these words ‘in 
that way indicates not only lack of education, but also the fact that one has never heard 
the Middle East discussed by men of experience’,685 Labour Party politician Sir Harold 
Nicolson said in his published diary. According to Dalton, someone who worked with 
both Bevin and Morrison said ‘Ernie can’t pronounce the names either. But he does 
know where the places are.’686  
 
With Morrison’s lack of characteristics to make him an effective Foreign Secretary, it 
could be true to say here that complicated foreign affairs such as Korea, Anglo-Soviet 
relations, Egypt, German rearmament and Iran were way too much for him to handle so 
early in his term as Foreign Secretary. This scarcity of qualities shaped Morrison’s 
conduct when he was dealing with the troubles posed by the Egyptian, Turkish and the 
United States governments that slowed the MEC efforts down. Since most historians - 
Behçet K. Yeşilbursa to name just one - argue that there was a linkage between Turkey 
(and Greece)’s participation in the British MEC plan and its admission to NATO, this 
study believes that there was also a linkage between Morrison’s ineptitude in handling 
the challenges posed by those aforementioned governments regarding the MEC plan 
and his eventual decision to grant full NATO membership for Greece and Turkey. This 
matter will be analysed in the next subtopic. 
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The link between Morrison’s ineptitude in handling difficulties in MEC efforts and Turkey 
(and Greece)’s full admission into NATO 
 
When Morrison came to the Foreign Office in March 1951, three prospective members 
of MEC - Egypt, Turkey and the United States – continually caused problems that 
hindered smooth arrangements for this British-led regional defence plan. The first two 
governments, for instance, refused to accept the MEC as long as the British did not 
comply with their demands, namely the Suez Canal Zone and the Sudanese issue for 
Egypt and Turkey’s full membership in NATO. As for the United States government, it 
was still hesitant in providing political and military support to the MEC plan. It is worth 
noting here that Morrison’s new decision to support the full admission of Greece and 
Turkey into NATO was made around two months after he came to the Foreign Office - 
he started to believe that Britain should acquiesce to the Turkish and the United States’ 
pressure regarding this issue on 1 May 1951 in order to help the MEC plan. 
 
To expound the link between Morrison’s new decision on Turkish (and Greek) 
membership in NATO and his lack of experienced in foreign affairs when compared to 
Bevin, this discussion is focused on two main events that occurred simultaneously 
between March 1951 and May 1951: first, Turkey’s determination to obtain full 
membership in NATO and the United States’ strong support for them; and secondly, 
Morrison’s mismanagement of the problems with the Egyptian government. This study 
believes that Morrison’s lack of experience in dealing with the Anglo-Egyptian dispute, 
combined with his mishandling of the issue regarding the Iranian oilfields, caused the 
Egyptian government to become more resolute in rejecting the MEC plan. This caused 
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British efforts to formulate the MEC plan with Egypt to reach an impasse. To help the 
MEC plan, Morrison had little choice but to get help from Turkey and the United States 
in convincing Egypt to accept the MEC plan, hence his decision to agree to full Turkish 
membership in NATO. 
 
Situation I: Turkish and American pressure for full Turkish accession to NATO 
 
To start the discussion, this subtopic touches first upon how Turkey had come to a 
decision to press for full membership of NATO, even though it had already been granted 
NATO associate membership in September 1950. Fundamentally, this was because 
Turkey was concerned with the delay in associating Turkey with Western defence 
planning in the Mediterranean area. This delay was due to the clash of opinion between 
the British COS, General Robertson and the United States JCOS, and Admiral Carney 
over which command would best suit Turkey. It is worth mentioning here that this 
dispute had emerged between these two officials since the Malta meetings that were 
held between 22 and 24 January 1951. This issue also complicated British efforts to 
bring Turkey into the MEC plan as discussed earlier in Bevin’s section.687 
 
When General Robertson and Admiral Carney met again in the Malta meetings between 
12 and 13 March 1951 – three days after Morrison was appointed as Foreign Secretary 
– to discuss the defence possibilities of the Middle East countries, these two 
representatives still failed to reach an understanding over their differences of opinion 
over whether Turkey should be put under General Robertson in the Middle East or 
                                                 
687
 See this chapter, pp. 235-236. 
252 
 
under Admiral Carney in the Mediterranean. Accordingly, no planning for the 
cooperation of Greece and Turkey in the Mediterranean area could be set up as long as 
both the British and the United States governments had not worked out their 
differences regarding this command issue.688 
 
Given that the initiative for associating Turkey in NATO defence planning in the 
Mediterranean was progressing slowly, and the fact that neither the Turkish nor Greek 
representatives were invited to participate in the Malta meeting in March 1951, Turkey 
therefore became anxious and began to doubt the sincerity of the Western powers in 
granting it associate membership in NATO. The Turkish Ambassador to the UK, Açikalin, 
asserted that it was a very long delay in fitting Turkey into the NATO planning 
organisation.689 Turkey’s uneasy feeling regarding this delay became even more evident 
when Açikalin repeatedly pressed the British government regarding what further steps 
were contemplated to associate Turkey with NATO planning for the defence of the 
Mediterranean area.690 To calm Açikalin, Morrison, as advised by the Foreign Office, 
expressed his regret at the delay which had taken place in implementing the decision of 
the NAC in September 1950 to associate Turkey with the NATO planning, and explained 
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how this had been held up pending the outcome of the US/UK talks in Malta on Middle 
East strategy and also owing to the delay in the appointment of a Supreme Allied 
Commander Mediterranean.691 
 
Nevertheless, Turkey lost its patience regarding this delay and decided to press for full 
NATO membership instead in order to secure its participation in Western defence 
planning. Subsequently, the Turkish Foreign Minister Koprulu made a new appeal for 
the admission of Turkey into NATO on 2 April 1951. Koprulu said that Turkey’s efforts to 
secure admission had not been made in the interests of its own security alone, but the 
Turkish government had also in mind the contribution which Turkey could make to the 
security of the rest of the world. Koprulu also expressed his regret towards those 
members of NATO who rejected the Turkish application, arguing these countries ‘failed 
to understand the needs of the hour.’692 This matter was explicit evidence of the 
bitterness of Turkey over the delay in joining NATO defence planning in the 
Mediterranean area. Koprulu’s criticism also indicated that Turkey was actually aware 
that ‘Britain and France, with some support from the Scandinavians, are playing the 
principal part in opposing the admission of Turkey, whereas American official opinion is 
becoming increasingly favourable towards it.’693 It seemed that Turkey wanted to put 
more pressure on the British government, since full political support from the United 
States government was already forthcoming. 
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This new Turkish effort for full admission into NATO indicated that the chances for 
bringing Turkey into the MEC plan became even more remote. Furthermore, this new 
Turkish application for full membership in NATO was made against the backdrop of 
booming American support for full Greek and Turkish membership in NATO. This issue 
was evident in reports by the British Embassy in Washington to the Foreign Office 
between March 1951 and April 1951. The reports explained that Congress and the 
American public had come to hold the same opinion as the United States JCOS and the 
US State Department – that Greece and Turkey should be brought directly into NATO 
instead of being linked to NATO through the British MEC plan.694 Senator Cain, for 
instance, argued that: 
 
You do not have to be a soldier to know the great value which would 
accrue to freedom within the United States by including these countries, 
Spain, Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia.695 
 
Similar unanimity was shown by those officers now on the retired list. For example, 
Governor Dewey stated that: 
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I should like to say also that that answer would apply to Yugoslavia, and I 
should like to see Greece and Turkey brought into the North Atlantic 
Treaty at the earliest possible moment consistent with the diplomatic 
problem involved.696 
 
The Foreign Office however, in particular the Head of the Southern Department Sir 
Nicholas John Alexander Cheetham, firmly asserted that the Foreign Office at present 
did not favour the admission of Greece and Turkey into NATO. The Foreign Office 
believed Greek and Turkish membership in NATO would destroy the Atlantic character 
of that organisation and that Turkey’s inclusion in NATO would upset Iran, which would 
also expect equivalent defence guarantees from the Western powers.697 The United 
States however, in particular US Secretary of the Air Force Thomas K. Finletter, pointed 
out to British diplomat in Washington, George Earl Jellicoe, that a non-Atlantic power – 
Italy - was already a member of NATO. Finletter added that in regard to Iran, the United 
States believed that NATO associate membership would be a preferable solution if 
Turkey was to become a full member of NATO.698 Mr Jellicoe told Mr Finletter that the 
British Foreign Office preferred the extension of a direct American guarantee to Turkey, 
or American association with the existing Anglo-French-Turkish Treaty of 1939.699 
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Although Mr Finletter did not deny that this would meet Turkey’s wishes, he indicated 
that, from the standpoint of the United States government, Turkish (and Greek) full 
membership in NATO would be more preferable because of two reasons that were 
noted by Mr Jellicoe as follows: 
 
(a) Since Congress would be far more likely to accept Turkish association with NATO 
than a direct United States guarantee. Congress might very well object to an old-
fashioned alliance on the 19th Century pattern. 
(b) Since what the United States wanted from Turkey was the right to use Turkish 
bases. They wanted to be able to use these bases as soon as, or before, a war 
broke out. Mr. Finletter clearly feels that the United States are more likely to be 
able to obtain the required base facilities from Turkey if that country is a 
member of NATO.700 
 
Seemingly, the United States government was convinced that Turkish neutrality was a 
real danger, hence its decision to grant full membership in NATO to Turkey and Greece. 
It could be true to say here that Turkey’s threat to revert to neutrality was its most 
successful initiative in that it managed to get the most powerful NATO allies, namely the 
United States, to side with Turkey in its efforts to press Britain to give its consent for 
Turkey to enter NATO before the MEC plan. These two governments’ insistence that 
Turkey should be brought directly into NATO, instead of being linked to NATO through 
the MEC plan, caused the British MEC efforts to become more difficult and the 
discussion with the Egyptian government regarding the MEC to end in stalemate. 
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Turkey’s pressure for full membership of NATO and its support from the United States 
brought great tension to newly appointed Morrison, who at the same time was 
struggling with the continuous troubles posed by the Egyptian government’s refusal to 
accept the MEC plan as long as the British maintained the presence of its troops in the 
Suez Canal Zone. This study believes that efforts to create the MEC with the Egyptian 
government had reached further deadlock because Morrison mishandled the situation 
with Egypt and Iran. This was because the problems with Egypt and Iran were beyond 
his grasp. Anthony Eden, the new Foreign Secretary after Morrison, said in his memoir 
of the Anglo-Egyptian settlement by the Labour government: ‘the position I had to face 
in Egypt was more forbidding than anything which was happening in Persia. I was 
convinced that there the situation had been made worse by some unimaginative 
mishandling, which I believed could be remedied.’701 
 
Situation II: Morrison’s mishandling of the issues with Egypt and Iran 
 
Morrison’s first misconduct in dealing with Anglo-Egyptian relations was shown at his 
first appearance as Foreign Secretary in the House of Commons, on 12 March 1951, 
when he left the Chamber right before the foreign affairs session discussing British 
troop withdrawal from the Suez Canal Zone. Kenneth Younger, who was at that time a 
junior minister, answered the questions on his behalf. This matter was shown as 
follows: 
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Mr. T. Reid asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if, in view of 
the fact that Britain is bound by treaty to come to the aid of Egypt if 
attacked, he will ask the Egyptian Government to desist from its demand 
that British troops at the Suez Canal should leave Egypt, since that is the 
place which they and Egyptian forces might have to defend in a sudden 
emergency. 
The Minister of State (Mr. Younger) Both His Majesty’s Government and 
the Egyptian Government are very conscious of the need to ensure the 
proper defence of this area, and the discussions to which my hon. Friend 
the Under-Secretary referred in his answer to a question by the hon. 
Member for Hitchin (Mr. Fisher) on 29th January are aimed particularly 
at reconciling the need for active defence measures in peace-time with 
the political difficulties raised in Egypt by the presence of foreign military 
forces in their territory. 
Mr. T. Reid Is the Minister aware that if our troops were removed from 
Egypt it would cause consternation in Egypt, especially among 
politicians? 
Mr. Younger I am aware that this is a very important and complicated 
matter, but I cannot go further than what I have said while these 
discussions are in progress. 
Mr. Eden Will the hon. Member represent to the Foreign Secretary, 
whom I am sorry to see leaving the Chamber during Foreign Office 
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Questions, that the question of the hon. Member represents views 
strongly held by hon. Members on both sides of the House? 
Mr. Younger I will certainly take that into account.702 
 
Morrison’s action was widely criticised as being parochial, since before the foreign 
affairs session he had answered questions on domestic issues, in particular the Festival 
of Britain. As noted by Morrison’s biographer, David Howell ‘characterizations of him as 
parochial seemed vindicated when he spent more time on the Festival of Britain on 
London’s south bank than on his departmental affairs.’703 Morrison’s lack of passion for 
foreign affairs contrasted sharply with Bevin, who though ill at that time, still sought the 
best settlement with the Egyptian government until his last day in office and even the 
last day of his life. In Bevin’s last encounter with the Egyptian Ambassador, Amr Pasha, 
in February 1951, he told the latter that ‘I *Bevin+ had wished to assure him *Amr Pasha+ 
that in spite my illness I had been giving much thought to this problem and was most 
anxious to help to bring about a solution.’704 Moreover, Bevin still attended the Cabinet 
meeting on 2 April 1951 as Lord Privy Seal when his January 1951 proposal – a phased 
withdrawal of British forces from the Suez Canal Zone starting in 1951 and to be 
completed in 1956 – and the COS’s proposal – that British forces re-enter Egypt in an 
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emergency – were discussed and approved by the Cabinet.705 Bevin died in the 
following weeks, on 14 April 1951. 
 
Morrison’s lack of aptitude in managing Anglo-Egyptian problems effectively was 
evident when he did not make a quick decision regarding this matter. For instance, 
Minister of Works (and new Lord Privy Seal after Bevin died in April 1951) Richard R. 
Stokes, had sent a telegram to Morrison that urged the latter to figure out the best 
settlement for the issues with Egypt in late March 1951.706 Morrison replied that he 
would only ‘go into the question *of Egypt+ more fully after Easter.’707 As a 
consequence, Stokes put forward his own proposal for an Anglo-Egyptian settlement on 
4 April 1951 and requested his paper be put in the next day’s Cabinet meeting.708 
Barclay commented about this occasion in his book as follows: ‘In Ernie’s day it would 
have been unthinkable for a colleague to trespass on his domain in such a way.’709 
 
The situation with Egypt became more difficult when Morrison mismanaged Anglo-
Egyptian problems by deciding to take “a firmer line” than his predecessor, exactly the 
conduct the Egyptian government had feared would happen since it learnt about 
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Morrison’s appointment to the Foreign Office. As reported by the British Embassy in 
Cairo, both the Egyptian government and the Egyptian press believed that: 
 
the new Foreign Secretary intends to introduce substantial changes in 
British policy in the Middle East, based on firmness and violence if 
necessary; although he believes in the independence of the Middle East 
countries, he wants to restore to Britain the international respect which 
she is about to lose; he has made it a condition of his appointment that 
he should be allowed a free hand in Middle East affairs and the Egyptian 
question in particular.710 
 
The Egyptian government was convinced that Morrison would ‘prefer to “betray” Egypt 
rather than risk the downfall of the *British+ Government.’711 This conviction was 
vindicated when Morrison decided to adopt a number of demands in the new proposal 
for Anglo-Egyptian settlement, presented to the Egyptian government on 11 April 1951, 
which left the Egyptian government with the impression they were being given an 
ultimatum. Those firm demands were: the British government would only perform a 
phased withdrawal after the conclusion of a new treaty; the British government insisted 
on treating the Sudan issue as a separate issue from defence; and the British 
government would stand firm with its aim for the Sudanese to obtain self-governance at 
the earliest practicable opportunity and that no understanding can be reached with 
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Egypt which interferes with this objective.712 The Egyptian Foreign Minister, Salah ed-
Din Bey, felt these new proposals ‘were far worse than anything he had received 
previously.’713 As a result, the Egyptian government rejected the British proposals and 
announced that it would ‘take the form of a reiteration of the Egyptian slogans of 
complete Evacuation and the Unity of the Nile Valley.’714 It could be true to say here 
that, due to Morrison’s firm conduct, Bevin and the COS’s initiative to execute a 
withdrawal of British forces on Egyptian terms, with the hope that in return the 
Egyptian government would be ready to cooperate with Britain in the MEC plan, was 
rendered pointless. 
 
According to historian Wm. Roger Louis, the reason Morrison adopted a firm line with 
Egypt was because he ‘was perplexed with criticism that he should take a more 
aggressive line, especially since at heart he agreed.’715 Since Morrison agreed with the 
opinions of Mr R. T. Paget (Member of Parliament) that were sent to him in April 1951 
regarding the issues with Egypt, he then became more comfortable in carrying out a 
firm policy with Egypt. Mr Paget’s lines that shaped Morrison’s attitude towards the 
Egyptian government were as follows: 
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The M.E. is not an area in which it pays to reward your enemies and to 
neglect your friends. The governments of Egypt, having no social policy, 
are committed to competitive anti-Britishness. For purely internal 
reasons no Egyptian Government can be appeased. Evacuation will be 
followed by a demand to nationalise the [Suez] Canal, for the Sudan and 
then for Uganda and the upper waters of the Nile. *…+ This is not 1946. 
Since then Egypt has wasted her substance and our money on the 
maintenance of a system of social injustice that should have disappeared 
a century ago. *…+ Surely it’s time to get tough. We control the Nile 
water; we supply much of the money on which the Pasha Government 
live; we have an army and a navy!716 
 
However, Morrison’s firm conduct brought about unfortunate results - the Egyptian 
government felt offended by his approach and no settlement for Anglo-Egyptian 
problems could be achieved in the near future. Given that the Egyptian government 
stood firm in its position - that it would only join the British in formulating the MEC plan 
after the evacuation of British forces from the Suez Canal Zone was complete - MEC 
arrangements with the Egyptian government remained deadlock. 
 
Another way in which Morrison mismanaged the Anglo-Egyptian problems was in his 
apparent disagreement with Bevin’s phased withdrawal proposal. This matter was 
evident when he only considered offering to resume negotiations with the Egyptian 
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government on the basis of the COS proposals in his March memorandum and during 
the Cabinet meeting on 2 April 1951.717 Morrison was convinced that bowing to 
Egyptian pressure would further weaken Britain’s position in the Middle East. Morrison 
accordingly suggested to the British Ambassador in Cairo, Stevenson ‘to keep these 
discussions going for some time on the basis of the proposals approved by the Cabinet 
on 5th April.’718 In point of fact, this conduct indicated Morrison’s shallow 
understanding and lack of care for developing a long-term policy with Egypt. This was 
because, since the Suez Canal Zone dispute emerged in 1945, the Egyptian government 
was persistent in its demand for unconditional British troop withdrawal. As argued by 
Lord Privy Seal Stokes: 
 
The Lord Privy Seal said that, from his personal knowledge of conditions 
in Egypt, he was satisfied that no agreement could be reached with the 
Egyptian Government unless we were prepared to give an assurance that 
all combatant British troops would be removed from the [Suez] Canal 
Zone within a reasonable period. *…+ The proposals which His Majesty’s 
Ambassador had put forward in pursuance of the Cabinet’s decision on 
5th April, had been regarded by the Egyptians as an ultimatum rather 
than a basis for negotiation; and he feared that no progress could be 
made unless we could satisfy the Egyptians that we were prepared to 
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make some concession towards their point of view regarding the 
evacuation of combatant troops from the [Suez] Canal Zone.719 
 
Stokes then pointed out that the protracted nature of the talks on the Suez Canal Zone 
would also have an effect on the Sudan, and thus, complicate the situation further. 
Stokes’ argument was as follows: 
 
In these circumstances he [Stokes] saw no advantage in putting forward 
at this stage proposals regarding the future of the Sudan which would 
be equally unacceptable to the Egyptians. This was likely to exacerbate 
feelings still further and thus increase the difficulties of reaching any 
agreement on the Treaty [of 1936].720 
 
It is worth mentioning here that the Egyptian position on the Suez Canal Zone was 
strengthened by Morrison’s simultaneous mishandling of issues with Iran, in particular 
the question of nationalising the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company that had emerged since 
January 1951. Like his policy in Egypt, Morrison also took a tough line with Iran by 
adopting an approach of ‘qualified sabre-rattling.’721 Morrison opted to send troops to 
Iran in order to secure British property and personnel at the Abadan refinery and in the 
southern Iranian oilfields.722 Morrison’s ignorance of diplomatic protocol in handling the 
issue with Iran was strongly criticised by Dalton and Attlee. As Attlee said to Dalton, ‘his 
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*Morrison’s+ ignorance was shocking. He had no background and knew no history.’723 
Similarly, Dean Acheson, US Secretary of State, professed in his memoir about 
Morrison’s ignorance in handling the issue with Iran as follows: 
 
As Mosadeq made his entrance upon the stage, my trusted and 
admired friend, Ernest Bevin, left it. He resigned as Foreign Minister on 
March 9, 1951, and died on April 14, being succeeded by Herbert 
Morrison. Mr. Morrison was a long-time House of Commons man and a 
great expert on the government of London, the London County Council, 
of which he had been an early architect. He knew nothing of foreign 
affairs and had no feel for situations beyond the sound of Bow bells. 
Perhaps to compensate for a sense of insecurity, he accentuated a 
natural abrasiveness of temperament. The change was not a fortunate 
one at this tense period.724 
 
When Morrison eventually realised that his military intervention policy was unwise, he 
then urged a phased withdrawal from Abadan.725 The British evacuation from Abadan 
surely had a great impact on Egypt, which since 1945 had demanded a British 
withdrawal from the Suez Canal Zone. As believed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
Hugh Gaitskell and the Minister of Defence, Emanuel Shinwell at the time, the situation 
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in Iran could lead to the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Zone and therefore the 
collapse of the British position in the Middle East.726 
 
In addition to the fact that British dominance in Iran and Egypt was being undermined 
by nationalist movements in those countries,727 the United States competition for oil 
and influence made matters worse. In Iran, for instance, when negotiations between 
Britain and Iran over the Anglo-Iranian oil agreement in April 1951 went negatively,728 
the US Assistant Under-Secretary McGhee pressured Morrison, who was ready to take 
military action in Iran, for an early British withdrawal from Iran and a total surrender to 
the Prime Minister of Iran, Mohammad Mussadiq.729 Morrison felt irritated by this 
pressure because, according to Morrison’s deputy Younger, if the British were forced 
out of the Iranian oilfields ‘it will be pretty damaging to British prestige, & of course also 
to the government, & to Herbert in particular.’730 Meanwhile in Egypt, the British 
Embassy in Cairo reported to the Foreign Office that during McGhee’s visit to Egypt, 
between 29 March 1951 and 1 April 1951, McGhee denied before the Egyptian press 
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that the United States considered Egypt and the Arab States to be a British zone of 
influence. McGhee’s statement was noted as follows:  
 
If this had been so he would not have made his present tour. America 
had promised in the Tripartite Declaration of May 1950 to reconsider 
applications from the Middle Eastern countries for the supply of arms, 
provided that they were required for legitimate defence. Britain was not 
solely responsible for the defence of this area.731 
 
Indeed, the Egyptian government was pleased that the United States wanted to win 
friendship with Egypt. This was apparently because the Egyptian government believed 
the United States could help Egypt in defence matters far better than the British. This 
was evident when the Egyptian General Secretary, Azzam Pasha, ‘sent a personal 
message to Mr. Truman through Mr. McGhee urging America to “take care of Arab 
interests in order to maintain Arab friendship and preserve world peace”.’732 It could be 
true to say that the British authorities might have felt less offended regarding this 
matter because, as they said later in July 1951, ‘we no longer possess sufficient 
economic and military strength to consider the Middle East as a purely British sphere of 
influence [and] it is therefore only reasonable that our future Middle East policy should, 
as far as possible, be devised in conjunction with the Americans.’733 All these matters 
might have encouraged Morrison to seek the United States’ help in approaching Egypt 
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with the MEC proposal, and subsequently, led to his new attitude towards Turkey’s 
place in NATO. 
 
Morrison yielded to Turkish and American pressure to help the MEC plan 
 
Based on the above discussion of two parallel situations that were faced by Morrison, it 
is clear that Morrison’s hands were full and that the problems with the Turkish, US and 
Egyptian governments left British efforts towards formulating the MEC plan showing no 
satisfactory progress. It is worth remembering here that the Turkish government was 
resolute in obtaining full membership of NATO before it would give its cooperation in 
the British MEC plan, and this Turkish intransigence received full support from the 
United States government. In the midst of difficulties creating the MEC plan with those 
aforementioned governments, a growing problem with Iran with regards to the oilfields 
worsened the situation. The crisis with Iran indicated that Britain had become more 
desperate to form the MEC as soon as possible. 
 
However, there was no sign that the Egyptian government would accept British 
proposals so that defence arrangements between these two countries could be carried 
out. On the contrary, the Egyptian government responded favourably to the US 
Assistant Under-Secretary McGhee’s statement during his visit to Egypt - that the 
United States government was anxious to form a bloc of Middle Eastern countries to 
side with the democracies in the coming war. Apparently, this was because McGhee 
had promised the Egyptian General Secretary, Azzam Pasha, that he would ‘persuade 
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America to render to Egypt and the other Arab states the help they required.’734 This 
was in contrast to the British government, in particular Morrison, who refused to carry 
out the British troop withdrawal from the Suez Canal Zone on Egyptian terms. 
 
It could be true to say here that the Egyptian acceptance of US intervention in the 
defence of the Middle East might have given Morrison the idea that the United States 
could help Britain to persuade Egypt to accept the MEC plan. For this reason, the British 
government’s decision to bow to the US demand for full Turkish membership of NATO 
was seen by Morrison as a necessary action. As argued by historian Behçet K. Yeşilbursa, 
‘the new Foreign Secretary, Herbert Morrison, indicated that the admission of Turkey 
and Greece to NATO might be the only way in which the United States government 
could persuade Congress to accept further United States commitments in the Middle 
East.’735 However, Yeşilbursa did not see this matter as an internal factor that led Britain 
to change its long-standing opposition to full Turkish (and Greek) accession to NATO. 
 
The first explicit evidence that shows Morrison had started to believe that the British 
government should acquiesce to the American proposal for the full admission of Turkey 
and Greece to NATO is found in the Foreign Office file, in a draft memorandum 
Morrison prepared for the Defence Committee dated 1 May 1951. In this paper, 
Morrison drew attention to the pressure being exerted by Turkey and, to a lesser extent 
by Greece, for admission into NATO. Morrison also pointed out that the weight of 
American opinion, both military and political, was on the side of their admission. At the 
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end of the draft, Morrison said that he had reached the following conclusion regarding 
the issue of full membership: 
 
(a) that we should continue, if necessary in high-level talks with the 
Americans, to press our objections to full Turkish and Greek 
membership of N.A.T.O.; 
(b) but that if we fail to carry the Americans with us, and they insist that, 
from their point of view, the only practical solution to the Turkish and 
Greek problems is full membership of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation, we should acquiesce.736 
 
What is more, in the same file there is the Foreign Office minute by Dixon, Head of the 
offices of Deputy Under-Secretary of State, that also mentioned the tendency of 
Morrison to yield to American pressure over the issue of membership in NATO. Dixon 
noted that ‘the Secretary of State *Morrison+ has, therefore submitted to the Defence 
Committee the attached paper which recommends that we should continue to press 
the objections to full Turkish and Greek membership of N.A.T.O., but seeks authority 
[from the COS] to revise this attitude in the event of strong American pressure.’737 At 
the end of this minute, Dixon said that at present, the United States would only give a 
guarantee to Turkey within the NATO framework. He accordingly reckoned that the COS 
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might have to be ready to revise their previous view regarding membership as 
suggested by Morrison.738 
 
After being presented to the Foreign Office, Morrison’s suggestion for yielding to 
American pressure was circulated to the Cabinet of Defence Committee and Prime 
Minister’s Office Papers, both on 4 May 1951. To the former, Morrison mentioned that 
the purpose of his paper was to inform the Defence Committee of recent developments 
with regard to the association of Greece and Turkey with NATO and to seek their 
authority for a change of policy should this become necessary in the near future. The 
same memorandum was forwarded to the Prime Minister’s Office, with the addition of 
a comment that explicitly mentioned Morrison’s preference to acquiesce: 
 
Up to the present time we have resisted the inclusion of Turkey and 
Greece as full members of N.A.T.O. for the reasons enumerated in 
paragraph 9. The Foreign Secretary feels that these reasons still hold 
good and that we should continue to press our objections, but not to the 
point of a deadlock. In fact, the Foreign Secretary suggests that if the 
Americans insist that the only practical solution is to admit Turkey and 
Greece into N.A.T.O., we should acquiesce.739 
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It is worth noting here that in paragraph 9, as mentioned above, there was a list of 
reasons why Britain objected to Greek and Turkish membership in NATO contained in 
Morrison’s memorandum. Those reasons were as follows: 
 
Our main objections to the admission of Turkey and Greece to full 
membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation are: 
(i) it will require the consent of all the N.A.T.O. Powers, many of whom, 
such as Norway and Denmark, would probably be reluctant to 
extend their commitments. We know that the French are opposed to 
it in principle, and would be particularly reluctant to be faced with a 
Parliamentary debate on the North Atlantic Treaty (which would be 
necessary for the admission of new members) just before their 
elections; 
(ii) the extension of the North Atlantic Treaty to the Middle East which 
Turkish membership would involve might well provoke similar 
requests for membership from other Middle East countries; 
(iii) the work of the various N.A.T.O. agencies would be greatly 
complicated by the addition of two more countries, particularly 
when those countries differ so considerably in their social and 
political structure from the existing members of the Treaty; 
(iv) by the admission of Greece and Turkey the alliance would tend to 
lose its “North Atlantic” character as an association of like-minded 
democratic nations with a common historical background, and tend 
to become an encircling alliance of countries bordering on the 
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Soviet Union. Turkey, in particular, is situated in a dangerous area 
and is a direct neighbour to Russia. At present there is no point 
(except Norway) at which the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
directly touches the Soviet frontiers. Events may force us to bring 
the area into direct contact with the Soviet Union, e.g., by the 
admission of the German Federal Republic. But when that event had 
taken place, it will undoubtedly increase the danger of a clash.740 
 
It should be noted here that since Morrison told his office about his preference for 
acquiescing to the American proposal, the latter seemed to agree with this matter. This 
was evident in Strang’s minute regarding his answer to the French Ambassador 
Monsieur Massigli’s inquiry about the British government’s position towards the 
question of Greek and Turkish accession to NATO. Strang told the Ambassador that ‘it 
was possible that while maintaining our objections to Greek and Turkish accession, we 
might be prepared to acquiesce if there were no other way of securing American 
commitment in the Eastern Mediterranean area.’741 The same acquiescence was also 
mentioned in the letter to Dixon (Head of the offices of Deputy Under-Secretary of 
State) from the Western Department of the Foreign Office as follows: 
 
Opposition to the admission of Greece and Turkey to N.A.T.O. is in effect 
our existing policy, and known to be such by the Americans. There is not 
really, therefore, any need for a new expression of that point of view. If 
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there is to be any change in our policy, it is likely to be in the direction of 
acquiescing in the admission of these two countries if the United States 
Government insist that this is the only solution.742 
 
Morrison’s memorandum and his suggestion that the COS revise their opposition 
towards full Turkish membership in NATO was then discussed in the Defence 
Committee meeting (DO (51) 12th Meeting, Minute 4). The Minister of Defence, 
Emmanuel Shinwell, reported that the Defence Committee decided the matter should 
be referred to the Cabinet, who should also have before them a memorandum giving 
the views of the COS on the military implications of the question. It is interesting to 
point out here that Shinwell seemed to agree with Morrison’s proposal to yield when he 
noted that ‘as for the criticism that might be made that we are extending N.A.T.O. far 
wider than was originally intended, I regard this as inevitable.’743 Besides Shinwell, the 
COS’ conclusion at this stage also seemed favourable to Morrison’s suggestion when it 
concluded that the military advantages of including Greece and Turkey in NATO 
outweighed the disadvantages. Those advantages were outlined as follows: 
 
(a) The extension of N.A.T.O. to include Turkey would commit the United 
States to assist in the defence of Turkey and so tend to involve her in 
the defence of the Middle East. 
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(b) Under present circumstances in the event of war Greece and Turkey 
could adopt a position of armed neutrality, but if we included them in 
N.A.T.O. their active co-operation against Russia would be more 
certain. The armed forces of Turkey in particular could make a 
substantial contribution. 
(c) The extension of N.A.T.O. to cover Turkey would give confidence to the 
Middle East countries. 
(d) Military contribution with Turkey and Greece would be made easier. 
Turkey would be less reluctant to plan with the Middle East since she 
would no longer fear the loss of American support. Further, the 
United States Military Mission in Ankara would have no further cause 
to dissuade Turkey from collaborating with the Middle East as it is 
alleged to be the case at present.744 
 
Seemingly, the COS’ argument in point (a) - the military advantage if Turkey was granted 
full membership of NATO - indicates that they agreed with Morrison’s judgement that 
by agreeing to the American preference for Greek and Turkish membership in NATO, 
the British government could obtain an American commitment to Middle Eastern 
defence affairs and thus help the MEC plan. 
 
Later, during the Cabinet meeting on 17 May 1951, Morrison prepared another 
memorandum and asserted that the purpose of this paper was to seek the authority of 
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the Cabinet for the British government’s acceptance of the US proposal for full 
membership of NATO for Turkey and Greece. According to Morrison, two days earlier, 
on 15 May 1951, the United States Ambassador handed an aide-mémoire to the Foreign 
Office informing him that the United States government favoured the admission of 
Greece and Turkey to NATO for reasons that have been discussed earlier in this 
chapter.745 Morrison also stressed that the United States government was only 
prepared to extend a guarantee to Greece and Turkey in the context of NATO, or 
precisely, through full membership of NATO. This was apparently a three-point 
programme for Turkey, namely Turkish association with NATO’s Mediterranean 
Command; Turkish cooperation with the British MEC plan; and a unilateral American 
guarantee supplementing the existing Anglo-French-Turkish Treaty of 1939, would be 
difficult to realise.746 One of Morrison’s reasons for the British government to change its 
attitude and accept the American proposal was his objective to bring the United States 
into Middle Eastern affairs and help the MEC plan. This matter was outlined by 
Morrison as follows: 
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(i) It would extend American military commitments into the Eastern 
Mediterranean area. This has always been our object, and the 
admission of Turkey and Greece to N.A.T.O. must be regarded as the 
price we have to pay for it if the United States will not extend their 
commitments in that area in any other way.747 
 
Morrison’s conclusion at the end of the memorandum was explicit evidence of his 
démarche to follow the American decision on the issue of full membership of Greece 
and Turkey in NATO. Morrison said: ‘I therefore ask my colleagues to agree that we 
should accept the American proposal for the admission of Turkey and Greece to the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and should support it when the question is raised by 
the North Atlantic Council Deputies.’748 
 
Morrison’s suggestion that the British government acquiesce to the American proposal 
regarding Greek and Turkish membership in NATO was discussed in a Cabinet meeting 
on 22 May 1951. Morrison, however, was absent from this meeting and his place was 
taken by the Minister of State Younger. The Cabinet was also supplemented with 
memoranda by Morrison (CP (51) 130) and notes by Shinwell with attached memoranda 
by the COS (CP (51) 132). Upon realising the advantages that could be obtained by 
Britain the Cabinet, which also realised that the MEC plan itself still failed to attract 
Turkey, was ready to accept the place of Greece and Turkey in NATO. The Cabinet 
invited Morrison to handle the question of admission in the manner outlined by Prime 
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Minister Attlee. This was firstly, that the British government at this stage should not go 
further than to indicate to the United States government that it did not disagree in 
principle with the admission of Greece and Turkey, and that it was prepared to give full 
consideration to the issues involved before the matter came up for decision at the next 
meeting of the North Atlantic Council. Secondly, the British government should ask that 
the NATO Standing Group should work out the military implications of the admission of 
these two countries. Thirdly, the British government should seek from the United States 
authorities a clearer statement of their views on Middle East defence and the 
organisation of a Supreme Allied Command, Middle East, and their assistance in 
working out effective defence arrangements with Middle East countries. Fourthly, the 
British government must make it clear that the admission of Greece and Turkey into 
NATO should not be regarded as paving the way for the admission of Spain.749  
 
It should be noted here that Attlee’s third suggestion apparently indicates that the 
Cabinet authorities agreed with Morrison’s argument - that the British permission for 
full Greek and Turkish membership of NATO was a practical démarche to draw the 
United States closer to Middle Eastern affairs and thus help the MEC plan. On another 
note, it is interesting to point out here that by the Cabinet authorities agreeing to 
acquiesce to the American proposal as suggested by Morrison, this meant that the 
British government had changed its long-standing opposition to Greek and Turkish 
membership of NATO. In-depth analysis and discussion throughout Morrison’s section 
demonstrates that the new position of the British government regarding the issue of 
Greek and Turkish admission to NATO was evidently influenced by Morrison. 
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The Greco-Turkish Cyprus issue and military implications for NATO 
 
Morrison’s inability to grasp foreign affairs and his lack of consideration for a long-term 
strategy was seemingly also evident in relation to his conduct in the issue of admission. 
Given that Morrison was new to the issues regarding Turkey, Greece, NATO and the 
Cyprus issue that rendered these countries hostile to one another, Morrison might have 
had little idea about the disadvantages that might be brought to NATO by including two 
countries quarrelling with one another, hence his decision to yield to the American 
proposal. Although the Cabinet authorities had agreed to bring Greece and Turkey into 
NATO, it seemed that they were still anxious about the disadvantages of including them 
in NATO. 
 
The Minister of Defence Shinwell, for instance, raised the issue that the military 
implications of including Greece and Turkey in NATO had not been fully studied during 
the Cabinet meeting on 22 May 1951,750 the meeting in which the Cabinet authorities 
had come to the decision to acquiesce to the American proposal. As a consequence, 
Attlee stressed in his second proposition that the British government should urge the 
NATO Standing Group to carefully study the military implications of admitting these two 
countries into NATO. It is worth mentioning here that, in memoranda by the COS (CP 
(51) 132) for the Cabinet, one of the military disadvantages of admitting Greece and 
Turkey into NATO was related to the problems between these two countries as a result 
of the Cyprus issue. The COS outlined this disadvantage as follows: 
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(d) The inclusion of Greece and Turkey in N.A.T.O. would add two extra 
members to an already large team and would present additional 
security and administrative problems. It would also add two 
additional members to those N.A.T.O. Committees on which all 
Nations are represented.751 
 
Although the COS did not mention explicitly why Greek and Turkish membership of 
NATO would present additional security and administrative problems, this study 
believes it was the same problem discussed earlier - that these two countries would be 
less capable of working together efficiently in NATO’s Southern Flank due to the Cyprus 
issue.752 The COS’ concern about the Greco-Turkish dispute over Cyprus became more 
apparent when, in August 1951, the British diplomat in Athens reminded the United 
States Ambassador about this issue. This matter was noted by Monteagle Stearns, 
American diplomat and Ambassador to Côte d’Ivoire and Greece, as follows: 
 
A month before the Ottawa meeting, the British Embassy in Athens raised 
with United States Ambassador John Peurifoy the desirability of warning 
the Greeks ‘to refrain from stirring up issues (i.e. Cyprus) that might 
cause difficulties with fellow members’. Peurifoy pointed out ‘the 
Department’s reluctance appears to attach conditions on any kind to 
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Greco-Turkish adherence to NATO and presumed this would apply to any 
formal change of Greek policy re*garding+ Cyprus.’753 
 
The above indicates that the British government was still worried that the Cyprus 
problem between Greece and Turkey could bring harm to NATO. However, the United 
States remained resolute in bringing Turkey (and with it Greece) directly into NATO. This 
attitude came as no surprise to the British government. As stated earlier by the Minister 
of Defence Shinwell, ‘it was not unusual for the United States government to press for 
the acceptance of such commitments without full exploration of their military and 
political consequences.’754 
 
Another occasion that could substantiate the concern that the rupture between Greece 
and Turkey over Cyprus could bring military implications to NATO was when British 
representatives in the NATO Standing Group opted for these two countries to be put 
under separate commands. As a result, the NATO Standing Group had reached an 
agreement that Turkey would be placed under the Supreme Allied Commander, Middle 
East (SACME), and this command would be responsible for the NATO Standing Group 
(later this would be transferred to SHAPE). Greece, on the other hand, would be placed 
under the SACEUR southern flank under Admiral Carney’s responsibility.755 This decision 
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to place the two under separate command was accepted by the NAC during the Ottawa 
meeting in September 1951.756 It seems that this separate command for the two 
countries, whose security matters were interlinked, would be a workable solution to 
prevent the Cyprus from affecting NATO’s Southern Flank operation. 
 
Turkey: The issue of command and towards full admission 
 
It should be stressed here that this chapter is not about the establishment of the MEC 
plan by the British government, but rather how the MEC’s entanglements became an 
advantage to Turkey (and Greece) in their acceptance as full members of NATO. This 
chapter, therefore, will not discuss further the continuous difficulties with the Egyptian 
government that left British efforts towards the creation of the MEC deadlocked, since 
to do so is outside the scope of this study. Rather, the chapter will continue to discuss 
the outcome of the British government’s decision to succumb to the American 
proposal. 
 
It could be true to say that Morrison’s démarche to support the full accession of Greece 
and Turkey to NATO achieved full American support for the British MEC plan. A day 
after the Foreign Office told Washington that the Cabinet authorities were ready to give 
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their support for the American proposal,757 the US State Department informed the 
Foreign Office that the United States government was now ready to provide political 
and military support to the British MEC plan and was also ready to help the British in 
persuading Turkey to be integrated into the plan.758 
 
What is more, the United States government also agreed to compromise with the 
British government regarding the command issue for Turkey over which both 
governments’ military staff had previously clashed.759 This was apparently because the 
British government had used their consent for full Greek and Turkish membership of 
NATO as its pawn in forcing the United States to agree that Turkey should not be placed 
under the SACEUR southern flank. As noted by Dixon, the British should ‘use our 
eventual acceptance of Turkish and Greek membership as a bargaining counter in our 
negotiations with the Americans over the N.A.T.O. Commands in the Mediterranean 
and Middle East.’760 Accordingly, when the British government joined the United States 
government in establishing a consensus on how Greece and Turkey were to be brought 
into NATO, between June 1951 and the Ottawa meeting of the NAC in September 1951, 
as discussed above, the United States government agreed to place Turkey under SACME 
as was preferred by the British government, whereas Greece would be under SACEUR. 
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In addition to the British COS’ preference for placing Turkey under SACME, the United 
States JCOS agreed that it would be better to put Turkey in SACME than in SACEUR. 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1st SACEUR, for instance reckoned that: 
 
Despite the important contribution Turkey can make to the defense of 
my southern flank, I consider it militarily impracticable to watch over the 
interests and development of the Turkish armed forces from SHAPE, and 
to control operations from this headquarters. I, therefore, believe that it 
would be in the best interests of NATO and of Turkey itself if Turkey 
should be included in the Middle East Command.761 
  
As for the Bureau of NEA, one of its arguments regarding this matter was as follows: 
 
The problem is to plan for the defense of the Middle East, the real prizes 
of which are the Persian Gulf oilfields and the Cairo-Suez area, and which 
is particularly vulnerable from an invasion through the Caucasus. The 
command should, therefore, face thus squarely and embrace at least 
Eastern Turkey, Iran, the Arab States and Israel. Since the defense of this 
area is not directly related to defense of the NATO area, and none of the 
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countries except, we hope, Turkey, are members of NATO, it should not 
be a NATO command.762 
 
Furthermore, the continuing decline of British prestige in the Middle East, the small 
number of British troops that still remained in the area and the inevitable delay in a 
build-up of Commonwealth forces were also seen by the NEA as additional factors that 
meant Turkey must be placed under SACME.763 
 
Turkey, however, was uninterested in SACME. Turkey worried that under SACME it 
would be identified as a Middle Eastern entity when it wanted to be identified as 
European, after a policy of Westernisation - to have equality in status, civilisation and 
prestige - had been implemented by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.764 Turkey opted for 
SACEUR so that its Westernisation policy could be successfully achieved. On another 
note, Turkey also felt that being under SACME would mean it shouldered dual 
responsibilities and could be called upon in any operation in relation to NATO on one 
hand and the Middle East on the other.765 Turkey accordingly became hesitant to enter 
NATO, even though it had been given the ‘green light’ by the NAC, along with Greece. 
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As a result, the admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO remained pending. The Turkish 
Prime Minister Menderes said that:  
 
in view of the fact that the NATO organization already existed, whereas 
the Middle East Command was only a project, it would be logical for 
Turkey, upon admission into NATO, to take her place within the existing 
Command organization of NATO. Any other solution would cause 
Turkey to feel that she was being treated in a different manner.766  
 
Menderes’ argument was reasonable, since at that time the MEC had yet to be 
established because the British government had still failed to reach satisfactory 
settlements with the Egyptian government regarding the Suez Canal Zone and the 
Sudanese issue. In recent events, the Egyptian government had rejected the British 
invitation, on 13 October 1951, for Egypt to join the MEC as a founding member.767 
With this Egyptian attitude, it seemed that the prospect for the MEC plan to come into 
existence in the near future was still far from reach. Nevertheless, the British 
government was resolute in placing Turkey under SACME. In late October 1951, the 
Joint Planning Staff of the British Ministry of Defence proposed the creation of a new 
Eastern Mediterranean Command, an Aegean command as a substitute to SACME in 
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order to satisfy Turkey over its place in NATO Command under SHAPE and at the same 
time secure Turkey’s integration into the MEC.768 
 
This Aegean command proposal, however, received little support from Prime Minister 
Churchill and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, who had come into office after the 
Conservative Party won the British general election on 25 October 1951. In spite of this, 
Eden continued to pursue the MEC plan and continued the previous government’s 
policy in granting Greece and Turkey full membership in NATO. In regard to an Aegean 
command, both Churchill and Eden agreed that the new command was not perfect and 
was less effective than SACME. Considering that there was a risk that Turkey could be 
directly brought under SHAPE without going through the MEC plan, Churchill and Eden 
were convinced the proposal for this new command should be presented to the NATO 
Standing Group and the United States government so that an agreement could be 
reached and the MEC plan could come into effect.769 Fortunately for Britain, the United 
States JCOS accepted this proposal and strongly recommended this new command be 
organised under SACEUR.770 
 
Following this positive response from the United States JCOS, the British COS asserted 
that they wanted an Aegean command and the MEC to be established simultaneously 
so that the two could be linked together.771 Again, the United States government 
accepted the British COS proposal without protest. With warm support from the United 
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States government for an Aegean command, the NATO Standing Group and the NAC 
also easily agreed to this new command during the Rome meeting of the NAC, at the 
end of November 1951. In the Rome meeting, General Bradley, Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, on behalf of the United States JCOS stressed that several matters were 
important for the United States JCOS: firstly, to establish an Aegean command under 
SHAPE; secondly, to establish the MEC plan and set up its Headquarter in Cyprus, not 
Egypt; and thirdly, to link these two commands under one commander.772 It should be 
noted that it was initially recommended by the United States JCOS that the Aegean 
command be placed under SACEUR. However, it had to be moved directly to SHAPE in 
order to ensure an Aegean command could be closely linked to the MEC, which was 
itself under SHAPE. Following the establishment of this new command, the NAC 
asserted that Turkey could choose to either participate in an Aegean command under 
SHAPE, or an Eastern Mediterranean command under SACEUR. Foreign Secretary Eden 
preferred for Turkey to choose the former, but General Bradley insisted that the 
decision should be made by Turkey. 
 
In terms of the positive outcome of the Rome meeting, on paper, the planning for the 
creation of the MEC seemed likely to come to a conclusion for the first time since its 
inception in late 1945. However, the reality was far more complicated. At the end of 
January 1952, the British government ‘concluded that there was no immediate prospect 
of getting Egypt to join the MEC as a founder member.’773 As the British government 
insisted that there should be no further delay in creating the MEC, it therefore told the 
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United States government that it had decided to proceed with the MEC without Egypt 
by proposing a nucleus Middle East Command Organisation in Cyprus.774 The British 
government urged the other six sponsoring countries of the MEC plan - the United 
States, France, Turkey, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa – to open discussions of 
a new version of the MEC plan.775 However, Sir Knox Helm, the new British Ambassador 
to Turkey, who replaced Sir Noel Charles in late 1951, informed the Foreign Office that 
Turkey would refuse to take part in any discussions before it officially entered NATO.776 
Accordingly, the British government was willing to let Turkey be placed under SACEUR–
NATO’s Southern Flank, as opposed to an Aegean–SHAPE agreement, as a strategy to 
nudge Turkey to join the discussions for the new version of the MEC. Yeşilbursa notes 
the following: 
 
The British view was that the Council should agree that Turkey and 
Greece should form part of Admiral Carney’s Southern Command, and 
should pass a resolution to this effect, to come into force automatically 
on their entry into NATO. From the British point of view, this would allay 
Turkey’s fear that she would be side-tracked into the MEC before her 
position in NATO was firm. It should also win Turkey’s agreement to start 
discussions on the MEC immediately after Lisbon.777 
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Apparently, faced with great difficulties in establishing the MEC plan, the British 
government eventually yielded to the Turkish demand for its place under SACEUR–
NATO’s Southern Flank rather than an Aegean–SHAPE. What is more, as the MEC plan 
or an Aegean command had not yet been established, the British government had to 
accept Turkey into NATO first, in order to push Turkey to be involved in the MEC plan. In 
light of this, SACEUR–NATO’s Southern Flank was the apparent command that suited 
Turkey after its accession into NATO. It is worth mentioning here that the British deputy 
of SACEUR, Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery, argued that ‘it would be impossible for 
Carney to control concurrently a battle on the Italian front and another on the Turkish 
one.’778 Historian Chourchoulis also notes that ‘Montgomery believed that “when the 
MEC is finally set up, this fourth command of SHAPE could be transferred en bloc to the 
MEC, where it really belongs”.’779 
 
On the other hand, Churchill himself seemed likely to agree to Turkey being placed 
under SACEUR–NATO’s Southern Flank when he suggested that the commander of 
SACEUR also command a British Headquarter of the MEC plan.780 Under this condition 
that the commander of SACEUR also be commander of the MEC plan as Churchill 
proposed, if Turkey agreed to participate in the MEC plan, whether or not it had been 
accepted into NATO, Turkey would be placed under and commanded by SACEUR. On 
top of this, the British initiatives towards establishing a nucleus of the MEC plan in 
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Cyprus, and its suggestion for Turkey and Greece to be included under Admiral Carney 
of NATO’s Southern Flank, were supported by the United States. Turkey eventually 
joined NATO on 18 February 1952, together with Greece. It is worth mentioning here 
that, even after Turkey officially entered NATO and was involved in arrangements to 
create a nucleus of the MEC plan, this regional pact still failed to be established 
successfully. According to Athanassopoulou, ‘differences of approach with the 
Americans and the lack of interest by the Arab countries led finally to the collapse of the 
idea *the MEC plan+ in 1953.’781  
 
Conclusion 
 
It cannot be denied that, from the point of view of Britain, the MEC plan was a 
significant reason that led to the successful accession of Turkey and Greece to NATO. 
This study however has demonstrated that the MEC plan was not the only prominent 
feature in the story of this admission. The internal dynamic, namely the inexperience of 
new Foreign Secretary Morrison, was also a contributory factor that should not be 
neglected or regarded as a side issue. The fact is, he played an appreciable role in the 
accession of Greece and Turkey into NATO. His predecessor Bevin had maintained the 
position that Greece and Turkey must remain out of NATO, even though the MEC plan 
was becoming increasingly difficult to form throughout 1950 and until his resignation in 
early March 1951. 
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Morrison, however, within merely two months of becoming Foreign Secretary, yielded 
to external pressure by agreeing to grant Greece and Turkey full membership of NATO. 
Morrison hoped that this diplomacy would help Britain settle the differences with both 
the United States and Turkish governments and result in these two powers supporting 
the MEC plan. As a result, the Cabinet authorities agreed to approve Morrison’s 
suggestion to acquiesce to the American proposal. The British government 
subsequently abandoned its long-standing opposition to full Greek and Turkish 
accession to NATO and started a new policy in support of this aim. 
 
This shift in British policy regarding the admission of Greece and Turkey into NATO took 
place when Morrison was Foreign Secretary. Changes in British strategic thinking could 
be seen as another significant factor that contributed to Britain’s eventual acceptance 
of Greece and Turkey to NATO. It is generally accepted that this new direction in British 
policy towards the issue of admission was initiated by Morrison because he wanted to 
ease the difficulties of forming the MEC. Nevertheless, it still failed to be founded. It is 
interesting to point out here that Bevin had endured the difficulties in forming the MEC 
far longer than Morrison, but he did not succumb to either the United States or Turkish 
governments’ pressure or change his decision over the place of Greece and Turkey in 
NATO. 
 
Bevin’s determination to sustain his opposition to Greek and Turkish admission was 
influenced by his long entanglement with this issue since NATO’s inception years. This 
experience enriched Bevin with deep knowledge of affairs involving Turkey, Greece and 
NATO. Hence, Bevin had done his best in keeping Greece and Turkey out of NATO as 
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long as he could and sought rather to obtain a unilateral United States guarantee to 
their defence. Bevin maintained this strategy until he left office in March 1951. Even 
after Bevin’s retirement, the other British authorities, for instance the Foreign Office 
officials and the COS, continued to pursue this strategy. It seemed that although efforts 
towards the establishment of the MEC had almost reached an impasse, Bevin and the 
other British authorities remained optimistic that this problem could be worked out by 
demanding the United States’ direct commitment to Greece and Turkey. Morrison, 
however, less than three months after he came into office, easily gave in to pressure 
from the Turkish and United States governments. 
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CONCLUSION: 
The British Foreign Office – Rejection and Acceptance of Greek and Turkish membership 
of NATO 
 
This thesis has analysed the admission of Greece and Turkey into NATO, which involved 
two significant themes – rejection and acceptance – from the perspective of Britain, in 
particular the Foreign Office and its two Foreign Secretaries, Bevin and Morrison. As 
shown in Chapter One, Greece and Turkey were of great importance to British strategic 
interests in the Mediterranean and Middle East and were among the two earliest 
‘victims’ of Soviet encroachment. Considering these facts, the British decision not to 
invite Greece and Turkey to join NATO was highly questionable. This led this study to 
look for other motivations for Britain’s policy, in particular from the point of view of 
Foreign Secretary Bevin and the Foreign Office. 
 
It is worth noting here that it was Bevin who initiated the idea of NATO and the one 
who put immense effort into its establishment. According to historian Martin H. Folly, it 
was Bevin was who initiated negotiations for creating NATO in the face of considerable 
American reluctance and the one who kept the idea alive from March to July 1948, 
when there was also a lack of enthusiasm for the plan from elsewhere.782 Similarly, Lord 
Ismay stated in his memoir that Bevin ‘was one of the principle architects of the North 
Atlantic Alliance.’783 Therefore, an approach which focused on the internal perspective 
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 Folly, ‘Breaking the Vicious Circle: Britain, the United States and the Genesis of the North Atlantic 
Treaty’, p. 60. 
783
 Lord Ismay, The Memoirs of Lord Ismay (London: Heinemann, 1960), p. 354. The same expression 
about Bevin and the Atlantic Treaty was said by the Prime Minister Attlee in his broadcast tribute to Bevin 
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of Britain, in particular Bevin and his Office, was appropriate in seeking to offer a 
comprehensive account of the issue of Greek and Turkish admission, which thus far has 
been missing from the literature and historiography of this topic. 
 
In regard to Foreign Secretary Bevin and the matter of rejection, this study discovered 
two distinguishable periods in which Bevin refused to accept Greece and Turkey as 
members of NATO, with different reasons given in each period. Previously, historians 
such as Ekavi Athannassopoulou and Abdulkadir Baharçiçek have merged these two 
periods and put forward the same argument for both - that Greece and Turkey were 
excluded from NATO due to geographical considerations, the prospect of a 
Mediterranean pact and the British MEC plan.784 It is clear that these historians have 
approached the matter of rejection thematically and, in doing so, neglected its 
chronology. This thematic approach led these historians to neglect other factors that 
were far more significant than geographical considerations and the prospect of a 
Mediterranean pact during NATO’s negotiation years. It also led them to regard the 
MEC as a reason for keeping Greece and Turkey outside NATO, rather than a means by 
which to do so, during the early years after NATO was successfully established.  
 
With regard to the first phase of rejection, during NATO’s negotiation years between 
1948 and early 1949, this study has rejected geographical considerations as a factor. As 
expounded in Chapter Two, this reason cannot be seen as Bevin’s primary motivation 
for rejecting Greece and Turkey when Italy, another Mediterranean country that was 
                                                                                                                                               
after Bevin’s death. See Attlee’s speech enclosed in his memoir, Clement R. Attlee, As it Happened 
(London: Odhams Press, 1954), p. 237. 
784
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supposed to be included in a Mediterranean pact, was invited to join NATO as an 
original member. Further scrutiny of Foreign Office files (FO 371) and Bevin’s private 
papers (FO 800), found two key factors that shaped the British decision not to invite 
Greece and Turkey to join NATO during its formative years: Bevin’s preference for 
forming NATO swiftly which was impaired by delays during negotiations and the Cyprus 
dispute between Greece and Turkey. It is important to point out here that these aspects 
were not studied by previous historians in justifying Britain’s attitude towards inviting 
Greece and Turkey to join NATO. 
 
In FO 371 file 71458, it is noted that the reason Bevin was eager to form NATO promptly 
was the increasing Communist threat in Czechoslovakia, Finland and Norway.785 
Furthermore, in FO 371 file 78328, Bevin asserted that NATO could help Britain recover 
from its economic and military weakness,786 adding to his determination to avoid any 
further delays. However the many delays that occurred during the negotiation years - 
including American hesitation to form NATO quickly and trouble over Italian and 
Algerian membership - diminished Bevin’s ability to form NATO as soon as possible. 
Bevin therefore had no intention of inviting Greece and Turkey to join NATO, even 
though they were of great importance to British strategic interests in the 
Mediterranean and Middle East. Bevin’s conduct was based on two circumstances: first, 
Greece and Turkey were in dispute over Cyprus at the time; and second, during the 
negotiations the United States and Canadian representatives strongly rejected the 
                                                 
785
 See TNA, FO 371/71458/N 3001/3001/63/G, ‘Establishment of an Atlantic Security System’, From 
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 TNA, FO 371/78328/R 1843/1072/67/G, ‘Turkish interest in proposed North Atlantic Pact (Record of 
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prospect of any countries suffering from domestic difficulties becoming members of 
NATO.787 Bevin, who was keen that the arrangements for NATO were not delayed any 
further, was convinced that inviting Greece and Turkey to join would bring about 
another possible delay to its formation due to these two abovementioned 
circumstances. 
 
Bevin’s concern about the possibility of a new delay if Greece and Turkey were invited 
to join NATO is clearly shown in his answer to Turkish Foreign Minister Sadak during 
their conversation in February 1949.788 However, it should be noted here that Bevin did 
not explicitly mention that his concern was the result of the Greco-Turkish Cyprus 
dispute, neither to Sadak nor to Stikker (Foreign Minister of the Netherlands), who had 
also asked Bevin why Greece and Turkey were not considered eligible to join NATO. 
Bevin used vague terms such as ‘Turkey and Greece might present some *political+ 
difficulties’ to explain his decision to Stikker.789 Given that Cyprus was the only issue 
present at that time which made Greece and Turkey hostile to one another, this study 
therefore believes it was this rupture over Cyprus that Bevin was alluding to in his 
conversation with Stikker. 
 
By adding these reasons to the current literature – namely Bevin’s personal aim to form 
NATO swiftly and the Cyprus dispute between Greece and Turkey – this study has 
                                                 
787
 See TNA, CAB 129/23, CP (48) 6, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, ‘The First 
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provided a new angle to the reasons for Britain’s rejection of their membership. This 
study has also elucidated Bevin’s pivotal role in the process of forming NATO and his 
significant efforts in ensuring its prompt and successful formation, and in doing so has 
called into question the assertion of historians such as Lawrence A. Kaplan and Peter 
Foot - that the United States played a more crucial part than Britain during NATO’s 
negotiation years.790 
 
For the second phase, after NATO was established, this study has focused on Bevin’s 
continual rejection of Greek and Turkish membership of NATO between late 1949 and 
early 1951. This study has a different opinion to previous historians who have discussed 
this period, such as Ekavi Athannassopoulou, Behçet K. Yeşilbursa, S. Victor Papacosma, 
Dionysios Chourchoulis and Mehmet Gonlubol, who posit that the MEC plan was the 
main reason Bevin and the Foreign Office rejected Turkish applications for membership 
of NATO in 1950.791 As explicated in Chapter Three, this study has propounded the idea 
that the MEC plan was used as a means of preventing Turkey and its security partner, 
Greece, from joining NATO rather than a reason that they couldn’t join. This is derived 
from a thorough analysis of the Foreign Office files of FO 371 (file 87948, 87949 and 
87975), Bevin’s Private Papers of FO 800 (file 457 and 477) and the Cabinet Office 
Papers (CAB 131/9). After paying painstaking attention to these primary materials, 
several salient aspects of the MEC plan were identified that uphold this hypothesis and 
demonstrate that it from the outset of the MEC plan the British government did not 
consider either Greece or Turkey as potential members. Only after the Turkish 
government had formally requested its membership of NATO, in the first week of May 
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1950, did Bevin abruptly come to the decision to bring Turkey into the MEC, a decision 
which was announced to the public in mid-May 1950 without first informing Turkey. 
 
This study saw Bevin’s démarche - to bring Turkey into the MEC plan - as a subtle way of 
ensuring Turkey remained out of NATO. The reason behind this decision is believed to 
be the Cyprus dispute between Greece and Turkey. Extensive scrutiny of the Foreign 
Office files of FO 371 (file 78329, 78427, 87722, 87723, 87948, 87949 and 87951), 
Bevin’s Private Papers of FO 800 (file 507), Colonial Office Papers of CO (file CO 67) and 
Defence Ministry Papers of DEFE (file DEFE 5) found that the Greco-Turkish Cyprus 
dispute is seemingly the most plausible reason for Bevin’s continued rejection of Greek 
and Turkish membership of NATO. Bevin, who had dealt with the increasing difficulties 
in Cyprus since 1947 and the question of NATO membership since its inception in 1948, 
expected that Greece and Turkey would be unable to work harmoniously in NATO due 
to their bitter disagreement over Cyprus. In spite of the United States government’s 
determination to bring Greece and Turkey into NATO and place them together under 
the forthcoming Southern Flank, Bevin believed these two countries would bring more 
problems to NATO than they would benefits. This resulted in the decision to reject the 
second Turkish request for membership, in August 1950, and accordingly a set of 
reasons for the rejection were produced by the Foreign Office. Phrases like ‘*it+ would 
destroy the conception of the Atlantic Pact’, ‘*it+ would spread the security risks’, it 
could ‘introduce military problems which had no relation to the main European defence 
theatre’, and ‘the existing members would be strongly opposed to any extensions of 
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their obligation to go to war’792 that were used by the Foreign Office to reject the 
Turkish application are believed by this study to have been hinting at the Cyprus issue 
between Greece and Turkey. Again, Bevin and the Foreign Office did not say explicitly 
that their worries about Greece and Turkey being accepted as new members of NATO 
were due to the Cyprus issue. This omission was presumably undertaken because Bevin 
and the Foreign Office wanted to avoid irritating the Turkish government with their 
reasons for rejection. 
 
Bevin’s expectation that Greece and Turkey would refuse to cooperate in the military 
field due to their clash over Cyprus was vindicated in September 1950, when the 
Turkish Foreign Minister Koprulu told the British Ambassador Charles about Greece’s 
disinclination to accept staff co-ordination with Turkey.793 This problem seemed difficult 
to settle, as indicated by the fact that it was repeatedly discussed during military talks 
between the British COS and the United States JCOS in October 1950 and in January 
1951. Both agreed that the Cyprus issue could disturb Greek and Turkish cooperation as 
two associate member countries in the Mediterranean area.794 Due to the difficulty of 
getting Greece and Turkey to work jointly towards NATO defence planning in the 
Mediterranean, it could be true to say that the same problem could occur in NATO’s 
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Southern Flank. Thus, the collaboration between Greece and Turkey in the Southern 
Flank of NATO seemed doomed to fail. This might have encouraged Bevin to do his best 
to prevent them from joining NATO and explain his refusal to accept the Turkish appeals 
for membership of NATO. Bevin remained resolute in this decision until he left office in 
early March 1951 due to his poor health. 
 
By demonstrating that the Cyprus issue further encouraged Bevin and the Foreign 
Office to continue their policy of rejecting Greek and Turkish membership of NATO, this 
thesis has produced a novel understanding of the issue. What is more, it has also 
conveyed a message to historians such as Dionysios Chourchoulis, Bruce R. Kuniholm 
and George R. Harris, who only paid attention to the Cyprus problem after Greece and 
Turkey had been admitted to NATO, in particular the 1955 Cyprus Emergency,795 that 
this Greco-Turkish problem also had an effect long before their admission into NATO. 
 
The second subject in this issue is the matter of acceptance. The significant change in 
policy of the British government - from complete rejection to supporting full Greek and 
Turkish membership of NATO - happened in May 1951, during Morrison’s foreign 
secretary-ship. In existing literature on Greek and Turkish accession to NATO from the 
point of view of Britain, the MEC plan has been the main focus of historians. Mehmet 
Gonlubol, Dionysios Chourchoulis, Ekavi Athannassopoulou, Geoffrey Lewis and Behçet 
K. Yeşilbursa, for instance, contend that the obstacles to forming the MEC had pushed 
the British government to accept Greece and Turkey as new members of NATO.796 
Those obstacles were: that the Turkish government urged the British government to 
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accept Turkey in NATO first, before Turkey accepted its obligations as part of the British 
MEC plan; that the Egyptian government was resolute in its position that the Anglo-
Egyptian dispute over the Suez Canal Zone and the unity of Egypt and the Sudan must 
be settled prior to any arrangements for Egypt’s participation in the MEC plan being 
made; and that the United States government remained non-committal, notably in 
terms of military support, towards the British MEC plan. This study perceives the 
difficulties with these three governments as external factors. 
 
With regard to Foreign Secretary Morrison and his eventual acceptance of Greece and 
Turkey into NATO to assist the formation of the MEC, this study has not rejected such 
external factors. As elucidated in Chapter Four, this study has instead focused on 
Morrison’s role in the issue of admission, which is perceived as an internal factor. In 
conjunction with careful appraisal of private papers, diaries and memoirs by Morrison’s 
colleagues in the Labour government detailing their criticism of Morrison’s conduct as 
Foreign Secretary, as well as the Foreign Office files of FO 371 (file 90130, 90131, 
90133, 95002, 95285, 95286, 96539, 96541 and 96542), Foreign Office files of FO 141 
(file 1442), Defence Ministry Papers of DEFE (file DEFE 4 and DEFE 5), Cabinet Office 
Papers of CAB (CAB 128/19, 128/20, 129/45 and 131/11), Prime Minister’s Office Papers 
of PREM 8 (file 1379) and HANSARD, this study has found that Morrison’s ineptitude in 
handling difficulties faced during efforts to form the MEC, in particular the problems 
with the Egyptian government, led him to accept full Greek and Turkish admission to 
NATO. Such a démarche was undertaken in order to obtain the United States’ help in 
convincing the Egyptian government to accept the British MEC plan. 
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Morrison came to the Foreign Office with different characteristics and a different 
diplomatic stance from his predecessor Bevin. His lack of experience in handling foreign 
affairs, his ignorance of issues that involved the MEC, Egypt, Turkey, Greece, Cyprus and 
NATO and his lack of care for developing a long-term strategy meant he easily yielded to 
outside pressures from the United States and Turkish governments that were pushing 
for full admission of Greece and Turkey into NATO. Morrison’s decision to follow 
America’s lead on this issue was made less than three months after his appointment as 
Foreign Secretary. Therefore, it cannot be denied that the British government changed 
its long-standing opposition to the accession of Greece and Turkey to NATO after 
Morrison came into office as the new Foreign Secretary. In other words, Morrison’s 
incompetence as Foreign Secretary as a result of his lack of experience in foreign affairs 
is another important factor in the admission of Greece and Turkey into NATO. This 
internal dynamic is seen by this study as an additional factor justifying Britain’s 
eventually agreement to grant full membership of NATO to Greece and Turkey and 
represents a new contribution to the literature on this issue. 
 
Overall, by demonstrating that Bevin had contributed significantly to Britain’s rejection 
of Greece and Turkey from NATO, both before and after it was established, while 
Morrison subsequently played an appreciable role in the full accession of Greece and 
Turkey to NATO, this thesis has produced an original set of arguments to be added to 
the literature discussing the issue of their admission. The originality of this thesis is in its 
emphasis on the role of the two Foreign Secretaries, Bevin and Morrison, the delays 
faced in forming NATO and the rift between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus. This study 
has shown that Bevin was resolute in his opposition to Greek and Turkish entry into 
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NATO because he believed the Cyprus conflict would have brought about a further 
delay to its creation. He also believed this would have affected Greece and Turkey’s 
commitment to military operations in NATO’s Southern Flank and affected NATO’s 
stability as a whole. It was ultimately his successor, Morrison, who came to the decision 
to acquiesce to the American proposal, without considering thoroughly the military 
implications of this admission. Morrison’s intention was merely to keep the MEC project 
alive in the face of unfavourable responses from the United States, Turkey and Egypt. 
Unfortunately, the MEC still failed to be founded successfully and remained on paper by 
the time Greece and Turkey eventually joined NATO, on 18 February 1952, and was 
terminated for good in the following year. 
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Appendix A 
 
 
 
Map 1: The Northern Tier (1946) 
 
[From Bruce R. Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power 
Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey and Greece (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1980), p. xiv] 
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Appendix B 
 
 
 
Map 2: Dardanellas and Bosphorus 
 
[Adapted from www.globalresearch.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/turkish-straits-
2.gif.jpeg] 
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Appendix C 
 
 
 
Map 3: The Mediterranean Area 
 
[Adapted from www.thewallmaps.com/continents/mediterranean_political/] 
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Appendix D 
 
 
 
Map 4: Soviet claims on Eastern Turkey and demands on the Straits (1945-1946) 
 
[From Bruce R. Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power 
Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey and Greece (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1980), p. 289] 
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Appendix E 
 
The Third Force memos 
 
TOP SECRET 
___________ 
 
C.P. (48) 6 
4th January, 1948 
 
CABINET 
--------- 
 
THE FIRST AIM OF BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 
 
Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
It must be recognised that the Soviet Government has formed a solid political and economic 
block behind a line running from the Baltic along the Oder, through Trieste to the Black Sea. 
There is no prospect in the immediate future that we shall be able to re-establish and maintain 
normal relations with European countries behind that line. As I have explained in a separate 
paper these countries are dominated by the Communists, although they are only a minority in 
each country. Indeed we shall be hard put to it to stem the further encroachment of the Soviet 
tide. It is not enough to reinforce the physical barriers which still guard our Western civilisation. 
We must also organise and consolidate the ethical and spiritual forces inherent in this Western 
civilisation of which we are the chief protagonists. This in my view can only be done by creating 
some form of union in Western Europe, whether of a formal or informal character, backed by 
the Americas and the Dominions. 
 
The Situation 
In another paper I have attempted to give my colleagues a sober and factual account of Russian 
policy. It is clear that from secure entrenchments behind their line the Russians are exerting a 
constantly increasing pressure which threatens the whole fabric of the West. In some Western 
countries the danger is still latent but in German, France, Trieste, Italy and Greece the 
conflicting forces are already at grips with one another. In each country the issue is still in doubt 
and we must act resolutely if we are to prevail. The Soviet Government has based its policy on 
the expectation that Western Europe will sink into economic chaos and they may be relied upon 
to place every possible obstacle in the path of American aid and of Western European recovery. 
Our course is equally clear. I have done and will continue to do all I can to bring the Marshall 
Plan to fruition. But essential though it is, progress in the economic field will not in itself suffice 
to call a halt to the Russian threat. Political and, indeed, spiritual forces must be mobilised in 
our defence. 
 
The Western Union 
I believe therefore that we should seek to form with the backing of the Americas and the 
Dominions a Western democratic system comprising, if possible, Scandinavia, the Low 
Countries, France, Portugal, Italy and Greece. As soon as circumstances permit we should of 
course wish also to include Spain and Germany, without whom no Western system can be 
complete. This may seem a somewhat fanciful conception, but events are moving fast and the 
sense of a common danger drives countries to welcome tomorrow solutions which appear 
unpractical and unacceptable today. Almost all the countries I have listed have been nurtured 
on civil liberties and on the fundamental human rights. The recent proceedings of the Human 
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Rights Commission at Geneva have shown that of the eighteen States represented, all except 
Russia and three satellites were in substantial agreement with the British draft of an 
International Convention for the protection of these civil liberties and human rights. Moreover, 
most Western European countries have such recent experience of Nazi rule that they can 
apprehend directly what is involved in their loss. All in a greater or lesser degree sense the 
imminence of the Communist peril and are seeking some assurance of salvation. I believe 
therefore that the moment is ripe for a consolidation of Western Europe. This need not take the 
shape of a formal alliance, though we have an alliance with France and may conclude one with 
other countries. It does, however, mean close consultation with each of the Western European 
countries, beginning with economic questions. We in Britain can no longer stand outside Europe 
and insist that our problems and position are quite separate from those of our European 
neighbours. Our treaty relations with the various countries might differ, but between all there 
would be an understanding backed by power, money and resolution and bound together by the 
common ideals for which the Western Powers have twice in one generation shed their blood. 
I am aware that the Soviet Government would react against this policy as savagely as 
they have done against the Marshall Plan. It would be described as an offensive alliance 
directed against the Soviet Union. On this point I can only say that in the situation in which we 
have been placed by Russian policy half measures are useless. If we are to preserve peace and 
our own safety at the same time, we can only do so by the mobilisation of such a moral and 
material force as will create confidence and energy on the one side and inspire respect and 
caution on the other. The alternative is to acquiesce in continued Russian infiltration and 
helplessly to witness the piecemeal collapse of one Western bastion after another. 
The policy I have outlined will require strong British leadership in order to secure its 
acceptance in Europe on one hand and in Dominions and the Americas on the other. Material 
aid will have to come principally from the United States, but the countries of Western Europe 
which despise the spiritual values of America will look to us for political and moral guidance and 
for assistance in building up a counter attraction to the baleful tenets of communism within 
their borders and in recreating a healthy society wherever it has been shaken or shattered by 
the war. I believe that we have the resources with which to perform this task.  
Provided we can organise a Western European system such as I have outlined above, 
backed by the power and resources of the Commonwealth and of the Americas, it should be 
possible to develop our own power and influence to equal that of the United States of America 
and the U.S.S.R. We have the material resources in the Colonial Empire, if we develop them, and 
by giving a spiritual lead now we should be able to carry out our task in a way which will show 
clearly that we are not subservient to the United States of America or to the Soviet Union. 
I have already broached the conception of what I called a spiritual union of the West 
tentatively to Mr. Marshall and M. Bidault, both of whom seemed to react favourably without of 
course committing themselves. I now propose, if my colleagues agree, to ventilate the idea in 
public in my speech in the forthcoming Foreign Affairs Debate and thereafter to pursue it, as 
occasion demands, with the Governments concerned. 
 
E. B. 
 
 
Foreign Office, S.W.1,  
      4th January, 1948. 
 
____________________________ 
 
[Adapted from TNA, CAB 129/23, CP (48) 6, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, 4 January 1948] 
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Appendix F 
 
 
 
Map 5 – Map for an atomic attack 
 
British target map for an atomic attack on the Soviet Union from bases in Cyprus, 1948, 
TNA, DEFE 2/1654, JP (48) 39 [From Richard J. Aldrich and John Zametica, ‘The Rise and 
Decline of a Strategic Concept: the Middle East, 1945-51’, in British Intelligence, 
Strategy and the Cold War, 1945-51 ed. by Richard J. Aldrich (London: Routledge, 1992), 
pp. 236-274 (p. 257)] 
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